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PREFACE
Few ideals characterize the spirit of the West as 
does the ideal of progress. Indeed, so closely allied to 
the rise of the West has been the ideal of progress that 
doubts about it cast a shadow on the destiny of the West
itself.
These doubts have arisen. No longer does belief in
progress command the prestige it once enjoyed. The assurance
that "civilization has moved, is moving, and will continue to
move in a desirable direction" is essentially bankrupt. In
the eyes of the British historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, it is a
"fallaciously comfortable doctrine," a facile belief "that
Western Society could see ahead of it an unbroken vista of
progress toward an Earthly Paradise."^
the sober observation of the American sociologist Edward A.
Ross who wrote at the end of World War II that,
the rosy doctrine in great favor a generation ago 
that man’s social progress is inevitable because 
brought about by impersonal forces working in his 
interest, will go into discard.2
Belief in progress persists as popular myth, and sober 
thinkers retain the vague hope that in some sense progress 
may yet prove to be a reality. But Pandora has opened her 
box. In an age when optimism should abound, pessimism instead
One need only note
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is the order of the day. 
man lost confidence in his power to do good with the power 
he had wrested from nature.
How did this come about? Western
He lost confidence in his future.
The contemporary crisis is a crisis in the interpre- 
tation of history. A few months before Oswald Spengler!s 
Per Untergang des Abendlandes appeared on the bookshelves of
a defeated Germany, an American sociologist could still 
declare that,
philosophy of history is quite out of fashion . . , 
and it is as much as one1s scientific reputation is 
worth to treat it with seriousness and dignified 
respect.K
Within a few years, however, Spengler and the philosophy of 
history became serious subjects among intellectuals, and 
philosophers of history joined the ranks of the foremost 
minds of the twentieth century.^
Almost uniformly these latter-day "prophets” rejected 
the unilinear view of history. They examined critically the 
nature and meaning of progress and discovered decline as 
well as progress in the affairs of men. The law of progress 
which earlier students of society believed to exist and 
thought they had discovered lost its attraction. Instead 
cyclical views of history which had been abandoned were 
revived, and Western civilization was evaluated in the light 
of the larger perspective of world culture.^
The crisis in the human situation today is not only 
a crisis in the interpretation of history but a crisis in
vii
axiology. No longer is it possible to establish any generally
acceptable basis for values which will support a convincing 
theory of progress. At one time, Western man could appeal 
to the working of a beneficent Providence or to the working
of an inner teleology in the affairs of man. Building on the
vestigial remains of an implicit value system, the naturalists 
Comte and Spencer could--in their century—develop a doctrine 
of automatic progress-automatic because linked to the laws
of nature, and progress because values still enjoyed a measure 
of objectivity. Today this is virtually impossible. Little 
of these earlier foundations remains. The ideal of progress
which has been both the ground and guiding force of the 
Western way of life has lost its theoretical support, and no 
adequate alternative has been established in its place. This
is the dilemma of modern man.
Formerly Western social scientists sought the general 
laws of progress in the belief that these laws were natural 
and discoverable. Today the social scientist avoids general­
izations and seeks instead particular solutions to particular 
problems. So long as the facts are made to fit simple rubrics,
so long as they are quantified, the social scientist believes
Indeed the generalthat he has properly performed his task, 
belief holds that as data become quantifiable, the discipline
Yet it is becoming clear thatbecomes more nearly a science, 
social science involves more than the statistical analysis of
The dynamics of human behavior involveverifiable facts.
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depths and complexities that defy quantitative analysis. Bold 
new approaches are needed. Intelligent speculation must lead 
the way. The scientific method must acquire new dimensions in 
order to cope adequately with the human situation. Values can 
no longer be ignored as they have been in the past.
After World War I, Western man engaged in a great
masquerade. 
sense of despair.
lusioned intellectuals turned to a pessimism that permeated 
every aspect of Western life—a pessimism not likely to pass
For some, life became an 
encounter with nothingness from which there could be no return. 
Others made a pilgrimage to the world of Freud, 
revived traditional religion.
The British historian Arnold J. Toynbee symbolizes
He assumed a mask of optimism to hide an inner 
There arose an "age of anxiety." Disil-
so long as the crisis persists.
Still others
Toynbee’s quest is modern man’s search for
Outstanding in the world of disen-
this jquest.
reality and significance, 
chanted intellectuals, Toynbee meets the challenge of chaos 
His response is the response of religion. He en-head-on.
From the Wilsonianvisions anew a God of creation in history.
liberalism of his earlier days, he returns to his ancestral 
religion and moves on to discover the destiny of man in the 
future of higher religions*
This return to religion has alienated Toynbee from
It has placed him inthe main stream of Western thought, 
opposition to naturalistic views of history at almost every
ix
turn. Were Toynbee a lesser mind than he is, he would be 
swept aside by the forces of secularism or by the forces of
pessimism. But Toynbee is too formidable a figure to be 
pushed into oblivion. His Study of History is one of the 
truly monumental achievements of the twentieth century, and 
his challenge of naturalism calls into question the whole 
issue of the nature, the meaning, and the purpose of history.
Before one can come to grips with any aspect of
!
I
A Study of History. Toynbeefs concept of the method and
Toynbee 1s "etherial-meaning of history must be mastered, 
ization” can be understood only in the light of these larger
issues. Etherialization is an idea that Toynbee works into 
all levels of life and history. It is, in short, his 
principle of progress.
Toynbee rejects the eighteenth century view of 
progress and the unilinear view of history that it implies. 
Yet in his search for a principle of growth, he develops an 
idea which suggests itself as the basis for a general theory 
of progress. Toynbee!s idea of etherialization takes into 
account certain realities in the human situation and in 
history which earlier theories neglected. By so doing it 
suggests the means whereby the ideal of progress may be 
reconstructed.
To evaluate the full significance of the idea of 
etherialization, one must trace the development of Toynbee's 
own thought, his view of human nature, and his theory of
x
society. His debt to others is considerable, 
hesitate to acknowledge this, 
late influence of the contemporary Swiss psychologist,
He does not
In particular there is the
Carl G. Jung.
The psychology of Jung is basic to the comprehension 
and the appreciation of the idea of etherialization—more so 
than Toynbee himself appears to realize. Toynbee utilizes the 
ideas of Jung in connection with his theory of higher religions 
but does not reformulate his idea of etherialization in these
same terms. Before an adequate analysis and interpretation of 
etherialization can be attempted, a careful study of relevant 
Jungian theory is necessary.
When Toynbee!s views of man, society, and social change 
have been accounted for--as well as key Jungian insights--it 
will then be possible to examine carefully the idea of 
etherialization itself and its counterpart, breakdown. Since 
etherialization is the phenomenon which characterizes man in 
process of civilization, it is evident that any light which 
reveals the fundamental nature of this phenomenon may help to
clarify contemporary problems..
In his attempt to get at the heart of the growth and 
decline of societies, Toynbee brings to light the dramatic 
role of human personality and the tragic nature of the human
Break-He believes that man must create or die,, 
down is the failure of creativity, and this failure is itself 
the greatest of the challenges that confront man.
situation.
xi
Toynbee does not reiterate Spengler*s pronouncement 
of doom, nor does he proclaim automatic progress. Instead he 
describes history and the human situation as a struggle for 
self-transcendence and ultimate transfiguration.
But Toynbee is not altogether free of errors and 
inconsistencies. He entertains an almost compulsive penchant 
for personification, systems, and categories. His analogies 
are hazardous, and he is himself uncertain whether the 
spiritual progress of which he speaks is really progress or 
merely a restoration. These and certain other objections are 
dealt with in a concluding critique.
The implications of Jungian psychology for the idea 
of etherialization must be carefully examined, for Toynbee 
has unequivocably affirmed the importance of depth psychology 
in the interpretation of history. Finally, the conditions 
for a satisfactory reconstruction of the ideal of progress 
must be enumerated, for it is the loss of confidence in this 
ideal that underlies contemporary disenchantment.
Failure to share all of Toynbee*s views or conclusions 
must not be permitted to prevent a profiting from particular 
insights. His errors are the inescapable pitfalls of a vast 
effort. They do not necessarily impugn his entire work. It 
is some of his great ideas which the writer seeks and which 
the writer hopes will contribute to the interpretation of 
history. These ideas center in his idea of etherialization. 
They are articulated in terms of the various disciplines that
xii
they touch. No attempt is made to trace their validity in 
terms of specific historical phenomena alone. Instead they 
are assessed in terms of their meaning and their
implications.
xiii
PREFACE
Footnotes
Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1934“5>ijJ, IX, 1&7, hereinafter 
cited A Study.
^Edward A. Ross, "The Post-War Intellectual Climate," 
American Sociological Review. X (October, 1945), 650.
“^Even positivist Charles Frankel admits that "the 
crisis of our time is a crisis in our interpretation of 
history."
Bros
students of the philosophy of history as, for example,
Albert Schweitzer, The Philosophy of Civilization, trans.
C. T. Campion (New York: The Macmillan Co 
Tillich, The Interpretation of History, trans. N. A. Rasetzki 
and Elsa L. Talmey (New York: Charles Scribner*s Sons, 1936); 
Nicholas Berdyaev, The Meaning of History, trans. George Reavey 
(New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1936); Pitirim A. Sorokin, 
Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (Boston: The Beacon 
Press, 1950); Jacques Maritain, Freedom in the Modern World 
(New York: Charles Scribner!s Sons, 1936); F. C. Keller,
"The Meaning of Progress," Social Studies, XLII (February, 
1951), 51-7; and Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History: A Com­
parison of Christian and Modern Views of History (New York: 
Charles Scribner1s Sons, 1949), in which Niebuhr asserts, for 
example, that the "refutation by contemporary history of 
modern man!s conception of history embodies the spiritual 
crisis of our age." (Ibid
^Arthur James Todd, Theories of Social Progress 
(New York: The Macmillan Co
(The Case for Modern Man [New York: Harper and 
195517 P. 5). This view is shared by many serious• f
1951); Paul• 9
p. 8.)• 9
1921).), p. 454.• 9
^In addition to Toynbee, there are Sorokin, Berdyaev, 
Maritain, Schweitzer, Kroeber, Northrop, et. al.
^Sorokin, _______
Cultural Dynamics TNew York: The American Book Co 
IV, Chaps. 2, 12, 13, and 14*
pp. 275-79, Cf. Social andop. cit • 9
1937-41),• 9
CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESS
The Idea of Progress
For many of us, wrote Gilbert Murray, the idea of
progress !Tis a truth that lies somewhere near the roots of
our religion.11^" Indeed so persuasive was the idea for many
that at one time it was accepted as a final truth. Whatever
once may have been this persuasiveness, however, the idea of
2progress no longer commands the prestige it once enjoyed.
Breakdown of faith in progress may be attributed to 
two factors: an inadequate theory of man and an inadequate 
theory of values-. These same factors also precipitated a 
crisis in the interpretation of history, a crisis which 
provoked Toynbee to write his monumental Study of History. 
Before the significance of Toynbeefs efforts can be evaluated, 
however, it is necessary to survey briefly the main streams 
of thought about history that preceded Toynbee and in par­
ticular to examine the idea and the belief in progress.
When belief in progress became the fundamental faith 
of modern Western Europe, it established itself on the con­
viction that the central variable in human advance is human 
3knowledge S Western philosophers like Ren6 Descartes and
1
2
Francis Bacon argued that the new knowledge of the inner 
workings of nature which science would bring would enable 
man to create a new world. Later, thinkers of the Enlighten­
ment like Perrault and Fontenelle added that the accumulation
of this new knowledge was inevitable. Had not Locke shown 
that the mind was a repository of experience which could be 
passed on, as Pascal had argued, from generation to generation? 
The impressive fact was that this new knowledge was indeed 
"cumulative.” There was now little reason to doubt that man
could continue to climb pn the shoulders of his ancestors--as
the "Moderns" argued--and see a little further with each new 
It was not at all surprising, therefore, that ingeneration.
171+0 the Abb6 Castel de Saint-Pierre (1658-1753) could con­
vincingly propose a new dogma of the inevitability of progress, 
and the Marquis de Condorcet could with irrepressible optimism 
pronounce that "the perfectibility of man is absolutely
,.14-certain.
But this new idea of progress became many different 
things to many different people. To the central variable of
knowledge was added the idea of the advance of economic 
liberalism, of industrialism, of constitutional democracy, or
By the beginning of the nineteenthof human happiness, 
century, the notion had grown that history was itself a self- 
redemptive process that assured a rosy future for mankind.
Thus at the very threshold of "the age of anxiety," an 
optimistic Spencer could write that "progress is a necessity," 
and that "it is certain that man must become perfect.
3
To be sure, there were those like Jacob Burckhardt
and Alexis de Tocqueville in Western Europe or the gloomy
Adams brothers, Henry and Brooks, in the United States, who
refused to be impressed by the onrush of technology and
bourgeois culture. In France, Sorel wrote of The Illusions
of Progress (1908), and in Germany, Nietzsche grimly warned
that "everything bows before the coming barbarism."^
Yet in Western Europe, and particularly in the United
States, an increasingly popular belief in progress gave wings
to the idea of progress. It assumed the form of various
ideals--such as manifest destiny, increase in the standard of
living, or the dissemination of democratic government through- 
7out the world.1
Whatever its particular expression, progress was 
interpreted in terms of Western touchstones of value. These 
were essentially materialistic because observed progress was 
essentially material and because the arts and religion had 
lost their central significance in Western life.
Belief in spiritual progress captured less critical 
minds who thought that somehow it followed in the wake of 
material progress,. In general, however, observed progress 
was material while belief became spiritual. The idea grew 
that civilization itself was a unilinear process moving with 
time in a desirable direction. In short, the ideal of
progress—Idea or belief—displayed a curious mixture of 
hopes and wishful thinking sustained by an expanding material
Progress was here toeconomy and an increasing world power.
k
stay. It was a natural law. Were not the steady advances 
in human science and institutions convincing evidence? Had 
not Darwin demonstrated convincingly that men had ’’progressed11 
from a lower form of life and would continue to ’’progress?”
So grossly misinterpreted was Darwin that he himself was 
obliged to remind his admirers that regress as well as 
progress was the product of evolution. Biological evolution 
could not be viewed as a necessary law of progress.
Various theories arose not only with respect to the 
nature of progress but with respect to how it came about. 
Spencer spoke of the survival of the fittest in a brutal 
world of laissez-faire competition that would end in a 
remarkably peaceful world of industrial societies. Kropotkin, 
on the other hand, spoke of progress through mutual aid— 
through cooperation rather than competition. Spencer 
believed that progress was best achieved by leaving nature to • 
her own devices whereas his opponents of varying degrees of 
violent intention and good will argued that progress had to 
be brought about by intelligent intervention.
Few theories of progress were as ambiguous and incon­
sistent as that of Rousseau*s. Rousseau called for a repudi-
8
ation of the progress of civilization and a return to
On the one hand he spoke of the ’’perfectibilityprimitivism.
of man” while on the other he condemned ’’civilization” as an
9intolerable perversion of the noble savage. Rousseau1s
romantic disciples perpetuated his longing for a return to a 
primitive barbarism that would purge civilization of its
i
5
decadent elements.
For some the goal of progress became the organized 
depersonalization of man in some beehive utopia, 
surprising, therefore, that shortly after World War I, at the 
dawn of the nage of anxiety,11 the disenchanted and thoroughly 
pungent Dean Inge could write that,
It is not
the whole structure of our social order encouraged the 
measurement of everything by quantitative standards. 
Everyone could understand that a generation which 
travels sixty miles per hour must be five times as 
civilized as one which only travelled twelve. Thus 
the beneficent "law of progress" was exemplified in 
that nation which had best deserved to be its exponent. 
The myth in question is that there is a natural law of 
improvement. , . . Belief in this alleged law has 
vitiated our natural science, our political science, 
our history, our philosophy, and even our religion. . . . 
Nature knows nothing of this precious law [of progress]. 
Her figure is not the vertical line, nor even the 
spiral, but the circle—the vicious circle.. . . . 
eat birds, birds eat worms, worms eat men again. . . ." 
It is not certain that there has been much change in 
our intellectual and moral endowment since pithecan­
thropus dropped the first half of his name. . . 
larism, like other religions, needs an eschatology, and 
has produced one. A more energetic generation than 
ours looked forward to a gradual extension of busy
industrialism over the whole planet............ The twen-
. is not likely to be a pleasant time
"Men
Secu-
tieth century . .
to live in.
So confused became contemporary ideology of progress that,
it is truer of the votaries of progress than of the 
adherents of any of the great religions that they 
believe without knowing either quite what they believe 
or quite why they believe it.,11
The Meaning of Progress
To survive this bankruptcy into which it has fallen, 
the idea of progress needs reformulation, 
is the development of a satisfactory theory of man and
The major problem
6
values Even so, a theory of progress does not necessarily 
command belief in progress. The conditions for progress 
required by a satisfactory theory may preclude belief in it.
Although related, idea and belief are not identical. Survival 
of belief in progress depends upon a clear idea of what 
progress means and on a conviction that the conditions which 
it requires do in fact exist, are forthcoming, or are at 
least possible. Any belief or idea which can be embarrassed 
by the facts of history or psychological incongruities is
bound to be discredited.
When Toynbee speaks of civilizations in growth, of 
Man-in-Process-of-Civilization, of the Chariot of Time moving 
with the rise and fall of civilizations, he has in mind a 
qualitative change in the processes of life itself. His is 
not the spatial metaphor of direction in the sense that the 
secularizers of Augustine interpreted progress in the 
eighteenth century; direction to him means only "becoming 
less unlike God.11 Hence, for Toynbee, progressive change is 
a distinctly qualitative phenomenon which only incidentally 
displays quantitative characteristics. Progress, in this 
sense, is therefore related to values which are in turn a 
function of the development of personality.
Although progress is a function of value, it cannot 
be interpreted to mean the mere quantitative increase of
Progress is not essentially more or less of this or 
that. Unlike probability, for example, value cannot be 
assigned a number, for number is a kind of value itself.
values.
7
Instead, progress must refer to an advance that relates to
It is not possible to demonstrate, for 
example, that the people of any particular age are more or 
less happy than those of some other age in any calculated
It is not possible to speak, for example, 
of progress in the fine arts in the sense that Beethoven is
objective reality.
Benthamite sense.
better in some quantitative sense than Bach, or that a Renoir 
has "more" beauty than a Leonardo da Vinci. Indeed progress
is not a matter of going anywhere or increasing anything.^
The quantitative or spatial criterion of progress is a crude 
adaptation to life as a whole by popular thought of certain 
"progressive11 features in Western economy and science. It 
is patently inadequate as a general criterion because it 
fails to come to grips with the problem of personality and 
value. The concept of progress must be established on 
grounds that clearly possess meaning and significance for 
the life of man. It must be supported by an adequate theory 
of value and an adequate theory of human personality for 
which and to which value attaches significance. It can 
hardly be supported by any theory which does not propose to 
show how values are created, how they are significant, and 
how they persist in the enrichment of life. A theory of 
progress is no better than the value system that is invoked 
to support it.
1
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The Ancient View of History
The ancients rejected the idea of progress on the 
grounds that natural events were repetitive and that change — 
including that which man himself effected--tended toward 
degeneration rather than improvement. Change was discouraged 
and instead stability was sought as the basis of the good 
life. The Greeks had no word for progress. They could not 
imagine that man was advancing in general or in particular. 
Plato, for example, spoke of the philosopher as the 
"spectator of time and existence," as though he could observe 
an endless procession of the past, present, and future.
Despite their tendency to deify man and his institutions, 
the Greeks were restrained by an ever present Fate--moira— 
which limited their own as well as the creative possibilities 
of their anthropomorphic gods. The events of life were 
recurrent. They were bound to the order of nature. At best 
the cycles of change were identical or—on occasion— 
dissimilar to dispel boredom. Never were they progressive. 
Indeed, if any general tendency was detected, it was downward. 
It was not difficult to agree with Hesiod that men lived in 
the miserable age of iron. Plato and Aristotle both sought 
to forestall doom by preserving the stability of society at 
all costs
But he wasLucretius suggested the idea of progress, 
obliged to resign himself to the inevitable dissolution of 
the natural elements in man or to the inevitable corruption
9
15and decay of human society. So long as nature was the final 
arbiter of man's fate, her way prevailed; and her way was the
way of growth and decline, of the endless turning of the Wheel 
of Existence. Progress is not sustained, and no theory of 
progress can enjoy ontological status.. The Greeks and Romans 
recognized that the natural order is indifferent to man, that 
it bears no necessary relation to his aspirations.
Modern theories of progress have added little to the
^ The endless change of con­
temporary naturalistic theory cannot properly be termed 
progress. A general progress implies an advance with respect 
to some external and independent frame of reference. There 
is no such thing as a purely immanent advance--"upward or 
downward. Without objective reference, subjective value 
judgments are no more than what they purport to be, i.e 
matters of preference. The ancients were wise in rejecting
profound wisdom of Lucretius.
• 9
progress because the change they discovered led to observable 
degeneration in terms of their values as well as to observable 
improvement in terms of these same values. Moreover, for 
them, observable improvement in technology was so negligible 
as to offer little inspiration for a belief in progress. The 
ancients erred, however, in speaking of natural degeneration 
for the same reasons that moderns err in speaking of natural 
But their error was inconsequential because theyprogress.
actually preferred a doctrine of recurrent cycles congruent 
with their mythology as well as with their observations of
nature.
10
The doctrine of recurrent cycles appeared in ancient 
Babylonia and in ancient Egypt.
both Indian and Chinese thought prior to 1000 B.C. 
the Chaldean priest, Berossus (ca. 250 B.C.), spoke of a 
Great Year during which all heavenly bodies return to their 
former position., 
in the philosophies of Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus 
of the sixth century B.C„
things return to themselves and the Stoics envisioned a
It may have been present in
Plato and
The idea of the Great Year is also found
Later, Aristotle argued that all
17universal conflagration whose end would herald a new era. 1
If . . . nature were in essence merely the endless 
and orderly repetition of cycles of change, as 
Aristotle suggested, then human affairs as a part 
of nature could manifest no permanent tendency toward 
either amelioration or degeneration.18
Naturalism and Progress
What the ancient world lacked that would encourage
a belief in progress was a swiftly advancing technology or
Either of these might havean eschatological mythology.
suggested the notion of a change for the better—an improve­
ment that was not followed by a return to the lowly state
Lacking these, the ancient world frankly
Contemporary naturalistic
that cursed man. 
rejected progress as untenable, 
thought, on the other hand, attempts to support the idea of 
progress on naturalistic grounds, but fails because of
inadequate axiology.
If the notion of progress is to relate to any form 
of change, it must invoke a system of values. This value
'
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system must be supported by an ontology that provides for 
the advance of value, that is, the creation and sustenance 
of value.
■
Hence values must possess objective reference. 
Were values purely subjective, that is, relative, or matters 
of mere preference, they would share the fate of their par­
ticular context or circumstances. Values must in some sense
possess a life of their own. They must enjoy objective
ontological status. A purely naturalistic metaphysics is
not able to provide this status. Contemporary positivism,
for example, teaches that values are purely subjective, that
19is, emotive judgments. y 
anchorage. They cannot support a doctrine of progress. To 
support a doctrine of progress, values must in some sense 
relate to an objective creative source in which they may 
"live and move and have their being.”
Through its doctrine of meliorism, contemporary 
pragmatism recognizes this need to establish value on a 
firmer basis than positivism will allow. But pragmatism can 
only establish a nominal basis of value by ascribing to it 
qualified factual reality. The values of pragmatism still 
lack the ontological anchorage necessary for a theory of 
progress. Contemporary naturalistic theories of progress 
retain, therefore, the appearance of authenticity only by 
incorporating surreptitiously the vestigial remains of an 
implicit religious axiology.
If religion be broadly defined as man’s relation to 
ultimate rather than finite or ephemeral concerns,
As such, they have no ontological
then
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value/--which relates to man’s ultimate interests--must be
grounded In some world-view congenial to religious concerns. 
To be sure, not every religious world-view will support the 
idea of progress. Yet that view which does support it must 
of necessity be a religious view with an adequate axiology 
and an adequate theory of man.
The Greeks interpreted man in terms of nature. 
Supreme value was found in resignation. The good life was
the cultivation of those values related to the life of
resignation. Epicurus taught, for example, that there were
individual values grounded in man as an individual fulfilling
natural destiny. As an over-arching, on-going ideal, 
progress was as impossible as it was meaningless. Indeed, 
if this world were essentially evil or destined to degener­
ation and destruction, escape through withdrawal was the 
ideal course of action. Progress in terms of a betterment 
of existence could be interpreted only in terms of a renunci­
ation of the world and of life. Even the profound humanism 
of Plato and Aristotle was unable to thwart the desire to
escape the darkness of the cave of the everyday world and
20bask in the light of a contemplation of changeless eternity.
A theory of progress must point to an ideal end. 
Marxists, for example, attempt to meet this requirement by 
speaking of the ideal of the classless society, but the 
classless society is not a transcendent ideal.
21station on the road of the materialistic dialectic.
Instead they transcend the
It is but a
way
Ideals are not concrete goals.
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value judgments of the moment. Nothing is quite so stulti­
fying, so disenchanting as believing that one has arrived-- 
than an 11 ideal11 has been achieved. Always there is the 
vision, the dim apprehension of that which transcends one!s
power of full comprehension or communication, 
vision is essentially a religious faith.
In short, while it is true that progress in any 
practical sense is limited to certain immediate, specific, 
and finite goals, it is also true that these particular 
goals, insofar as they relate to a general theory of progress, 
must be informed by some value apart from themselves, 
over, the increase of value—of the good--which is the 
general meaning of progress must be possible, 
which does not provide for the possibility of the creation 
and sustenance of values or one which renders this highly 
improbable is hardly capable of encouraging a theory of
And this
More-
A world-view
The particular and subjective values of the
Objective reference becomes the 
Values--explicit or
progress.
relativist cannot qualify. 
sine qua non of a theory of progress. 
implicit--cannot die with the individual, 
to sustain themselves in some respect from generation to
They must be able
In short, they must bear spiritual significance.generation.
The Judeo-Christian Contribution
Historically, the possibility of progress was first
suggested in the philosophies of history of the major Heb
11 Only twice in the
rew
prophets of the eighth century B.C.
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history of thought,” says Baillie,
has the idea arisen that history might be tracing 
another pattern than the circular one, and in both 
these cases it Was ... a non-recurrent movement 
towards the ultimate triumph of good. . . 
only among the Hebrews that we find any conception of 
history as a significant process. Nowhere, if we 
except the Zend Avesta, is the sequence of historical 
events conceived as leading anywhere or as accom­
plishing anything.22
The Hebrew possessed the unique insight of placing the source 
and sustainer of value within the processes of man's life and 
at the same time placing it beyond these processes. His 
eschatological concerns suggested an ideal which could infuse 
purpose into process--into change. He saw life not only as 
process and recurrence but as uniqueness as well. Unique 
events were the real substance of history--the deviations 
from an order of nature whose endless recurrences were called 
the "vain repetitions of the heathen." These unique occur­
rences were the means whereby value entered histbry. Karl 
Lowith observes that,
the two great conceptions of antiquity and [Judeo-] 
Christianity, cyclic motion and eschatological 
direction, have exhausted the basic approaches to the 
understanding of history. Even the most recent attempts 
at an interpretation of history are nothing else but 
variations of these two principles or a mixture of both 
of them,23
It was this directional and eschatological character of 
Christian philosophy of history—its separation of human 
history from nature--that subsequently provided the basis for 
the emergence of the Western belief in progress.
Christian philosophy of history, Western historiography was 
able to abandon the cyclical pessimism of the ancients.
It is
Through the
1
:
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The Abortive Modern Synthesis
-
With the emergence of the modern world, the Judeo-
Christian view of history that was given its classic
expression in Augustine underwent--as did all areas of
Western thought--a gradual secularization. H. Stuart Hughes,
for example, believes that,
one way of characterizing the course of European 
historical writing from St. Augustine to the eighteenth 
century would be to describe it as a progressive secu­
larization of the concept of history as eschatology.
By the time of Voltaire and Gibbon . . . the consciously 
Christian structure remained . . . the outlook was still 
eschatological; the eighteenth-century historians sought 
out the purpose of man--and found it in his advance 
toward reason. . . . And it could be called apocalyptic-- 
in the sense that the apocalypse had been moved up to 
the present, the age of intellectual light and harmonious
reason. 21+
-
In altering the Augustinian view of history, later 
Western thinkers tried to embrace both naturalistic and
religious historiography. The former, they believed, 
reestablished the contact with nature which the Greeks
The latter providedpreferred and the modern world demanded.
the axiological basis for a theory of progress which the 
Greeks could not provide and the modern religio-naturalistic
Thus in Kant, for example,synthesis was destined to lose, 
history is believed to proceed as if there were in nature a
An inner teleology, Kant argued, servedmind with a plan, 
to convert irrationality into rationality in and through the
Nature thereby acquired a purposefulactions of individuals.
25orientation.
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During the Enlightenment, the Idea of progress 
became largely an expression of confidence that responsible 
and intelligent individuals would work to bring it about.
By the late nineteenth century, however, after Hegel and 
the Romantics had transformed it, progress involved nature 
as well as man in a gigantic and inevitable unfolding 
(Entwicklung) of the World Spirit.^ 
infallibility, Hegel gathered moral support from Darwin who 
was unable to prevent the misinterpretation and misappli­
cation of his theory. In short, the predestination of 
Augustine became the inexorable laws of development, evo­
lution, race, or manifest destiny.
Obvious and impressive advances of knowledge and 
human!tarianism during the nineteenth century tended to 
establish progress as a dogmatic belief. Paradoxically, 
however, developments in the same century tended to destroy 
the basis for a theory of progress. By depersonalizing all 
processes of life, the philosophers of the nineteenth century 
undermined the supporting axiology of progress and trans­
ferred the entire problem of progress from its locus in human 
personality to some impersonal process. They failed to 
account for the fact that, apart from personality, value
As if assured of
lacks relevance.
Progress became not only naturalistic but determin- 
The optimism of eighteenth century libertarianismistic.
changed into the pessimism of Spenglarian determinism. 
Christian drama of salvation and the vision of a New Eart]
The
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was transformed by secularization first into a naturalistic 
process of historical self-redemption and then into a 
historical doom no less determined than were the cycles of
eternal recurrence that animated the world of history for 
27the ancients. ' The Judeo-Christian intuition of an immanent
as well as transcendent !!giver of life" was abandoned for a 
natural process sanctioned by the laws .of nature instead of
Augustine*s pre­
destination was taken from a God of justice and concern and 
transferred to a natural order of chance and indifference-.
guided by the inscrutable will of God.
The final secularization of the Judeo-Christian view by Hegel, 
Marx, Comte, and Spencer clinched the bankruptcy of the idea 
of progress.
Earlier Augustinian predestination had precluded the 
development of a theory of progress. Its secular counter­
part failed as well by substituting historical determinism. 
Determinism reduces individuals to the status of puppets
subject to natural forces and removes from them participation 
in and resolution of the processes of history. Hegel 
pictured his great men as pawns in the unfolding of the 
Absolute, and Comte taught that progress was inevitable 
because men possessed the natural instincts of gregariousness 
and self-betterment. The possibility and contingency of 
progress taught by Turgot and Condorcet in the eighteenth 
century were set aside for the impersonal and inexorable-- 
because natural-processes of history.
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By making progress inevitable, historical determinism
Man no longer !!learned by
In short, the basis 
The problem of good and evil was
coalesced value and disvalue.
suffering11 but "progressed by suffering." 
of value was obscured.
resolved by erasing the distinction between them, by subsuming
one under the other, or by incorporating it within the other.
On this basis, all events acquired value because they all
served the unfolding historical process. They were necessary
a priori. History could not have been other than it was.
History became its own judge and its own redeemer. "Die
„28Weltgeschichte 1st das Weltgericht. It is not surprising 
therefore that Schopenhauer renounced the idealism of his
colleagues and sought a negation of the will-to-live at the 
roots of existence itself.
Value cannot be limited to natural process and retain 
its significance. While all events may in some sense be 
bearers of valued value must also in some sense possess an 
independence that assures its survival, and it must also in 
some sense retain relevance to human concerns. Without these
relations, there can be no progress--only process.
The Axiology of Progress
Bankruptcy of the contemporary view of progress was 
ensured by removing the drama of human events from the arena 
of human personality and decision.
the outcome of challenges and responses but of external
In other words, impersonal forces such as the
No longer was progress
processes.
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historical dialectic or natural selection were advanced as 
the modus operandi of progressive change, 
contingency, progress was depersonalized.
\
By removing its 
Human personality 
was not the central factor simply because it was itself a
part of natural processProgress was removed from the 
drama of free response--which no longer existed--and those 
factors related to the articulation of these responses in 
the creation of value. The human freedom offered as the
ideal of historical determinism could hardly be identified 
as the freedom of human personalities resolving their 
existential situation as creative agents under the judgment
of God.
By depersonalizing progress, the basis of value was 
undermined. Value must center in the meaning of life for 
the human personality in its existential situation and in
its relation to historical processes in time. Apart from a 
consideration of human personality, value is an empty 
abstraction.
Weakening of theories of progress in the contemporary
world also resulted from the relativization of values. But
relativization cannot be absolute. The idea of progress 
requires an open rather than a closed future. What is needed 
is a transcendent ground which informs immanent process. 
Values relevant to particular processes thereby support 
progress by their relation to some transcendent and therefore 
By its very definition, this norm must be 
religious because it embodies ultimate concerns.
ideal norm.
The
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of axiology and progress theory must therefore be religious..
A theory of progress must delineate the qualitative 
aspects of process, This axiological requirement is the 
Achilles heel of most modern theories of progress, 
theory of progress must embrace within its compass all
While a !
aspects of life including the material, it is the qualitative 
rather than particular aspects of change which are significant.
Values whose increase comprises progress relate to 
human "good.” As such they relate to the functioning of 
human personality as well as to ideal and objective ends. 
Values accrue as the ideal contents of human thought and 
aspiration. They challenge human personality even as human 
personality creates them. The highly personal nature of 
human creativity suggests that creativity is the outcome of 
optimum human functioning. This in turn suggests the crucial 
role of personality dynamics in an adequate theory of 
progress. Creative functioning of human personality vis A vis 
the objective elements of value permits the infusion and 
advance of value in cumulative human experience. This in­
crease of value in and through the growth of human personality 
can be properly termed progress if the metaphysical theory 
invoked supports it.
The human psyche works out the significance and 
meaning of life in the face of ultimate and therefore
In terms of these concerns, values arereligious concerns, 
established as subjective relevants having objective refer-
Although the subjective content of value may beence.
I
fc
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strictly non-religious, the objective reference which pro­
vides its meaning for progress as well as its claim to value 
is religious.
iAn axiology which supports a theory of progress must 
infuse all processes of life with value. Heretofore theories 
of progress have been limited largely to quantitative defi­
nitions and to the elaboration of evidence for or against 
progress in terms of the particular criterion invoked. Little 
attention has been devoted to the role of human personality-- 
the actual processes by which this advance is achieved.
Other than in the enumeration of the "great man" theory of
history or variations thereof, the function of human person­
ality and its dynamics has been neglected. Psychological 
theories of the origin and development of culture or civili­
zation have not, in general, related a theory of personality
directly to the phenomenon of the growth and decline of
29societies or to the general problem of human progress.
An Adequate Theory of Progress
Decline of faith in the possibility of progress must 
also be attributed to the fact that in the face of impressive 
evidence of continuing human misery, purely naturalistic 
accounts ring a distinctly hollow note.
led to believe that "progress” is a kind of escape from the 
"backwardness” of present life to the happiness of some
This anticipation, however, offers
Western man has been
anticipated utopia, 
little relief from the immediate realities of the human
1
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situation. Unless meaning and value can find their way into 
the tragedies of the present, the idea of progress has no
genuine point of departure. Progress must build from the 
present. If value is not created and sustained in the
present, if the present loses meaning, no theory of progress
\_;
will elicit conviction.
While particular advances have been made for some 
people in terms of materialistic standards, general progress 
is not certain—perhaps not possible--in terms of these 
standards. It cannot be argued that there is less starvation, 
less inhumanity to man, for example, than there was fifty or 
even two-hundred fifty years ago in any general sense of the 
term. The idea of progress as popularly conceived is there­
fore called into question and rightly so, for as it stands 
and has stood, it offers little more than an invitation to 
disenchantment. Indeed, for many it has become a thoroughly 
bankrupt--if not obsolete--idea.
Yet evidence for "progress11 in some sense of the word 
cannot be entirely discounted. Man has risen above his 
tragic circumstances in genuine instances of self-transcendence. 
He has convincingly demonstrated that he is in some sense 
more than the world in which he lives and can in some sense 
profit by his failures as well as consolidate his gains. An 
adequate theory of progress must take this into account. It 
must discover within the mystery of human life that which can 
encourage a belief in progress. It must recognize that 
progress issues from the response of human personality to the
L
i
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challenges of life. Belief in progress must recognize that 
the ideal world is forever in the making. "To live in an
ideal world," Goethe once wrote, "is to treat the impossible 
as if it were possible," to construct alternatives when 
there are none and to seek possibility in the face of 
necessity. In short, a theory of progress that is to 
buttress belief in progress must be a theory of transfigur­
ation, a theory of the struggle for significance, and a 
theory of the emergence and growth of value from a natural
order which ignores value to a transcendent order that is 
the source and sustainer of value itself.
Humanity is part of a vast spiritual continuum—a 
vast environment of ideas and personality determinants as 
well as an environment of physical nature. The human psyche 
strains, as it were, between the possibilities of barbarism 
and sainthood. Yet in the flux of events that move the
wheels of time, man appears to be progressing as personality 
toward a transfiguration.
So it appears to Arnold J. Toynbee. He believes that 
there is evidence of this in all aspects of life and in all 
aspects of history. Evidence of it is the etherialization of 
life. Etherialization, Toynbee believes, is the qualitative
aspect of change that constitutes growth or progress, 
absence, on the other hand, suggests disintegration.
When growth falters in one
For
Its
But
there are many aspects of life.
aspect, it continues as etherialization elsewhere. 
Toynbee, therefore, etherialization is the principle of
progress—not the progress of a Condorcet or a Comte but the 
progress leading to ultimate transfiguration of human 
personality;
To qualify as a satisfactory theory of progress, 
however, Toynbee!s doctrine of etherialization must come to 
terms with the problem of values. Toynbee must demonstrate 
that etherialization permeates all processes of life. He 
must show how etherialization may be said to be progressive, 
how it persists rather than perishes with the vicissitudes 
of particular situations; Some eschatological myth must 
hold out the hope of an ideal end, and the probability as 
well as the possibility of the creation and preservation of 
value must be demonstrated.
Toynbeers theory of progress must build on an 
affirmative world and life view that supports itself from 
within and from without--from human psychic resources within 
and from transcendent ideals without. Observable nature is
indifferent to the fate of man, and contradictory with
Man, therefore, must derive hisrespect to his values.
values from extra-natural sources.
These sources are the creative processes of human 
personality and ultimate reality. The creative human person­
ality establishes its ideals and its values in opposition to 
as well as in harmony with the nature from which it sprang— 
a nature whose regularity and necessity it transcends. It 
becomes a creative agent in defiance of primordial structures. 
It reaches for transfiguration.
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To isolate the most general and most essentially 
qualitative elements of the creative process that is progress 
is a manifestly difficult task. To serve as a satisfactory 
general criterion of progress, Toynbee*s etherialization 
must be able to delineate some aspect of life peculiar to 
growth and to growth only. Since etherialization purports 
to identify a qualitative phenomenon, it cannot propose to 
measure progress quantitatively. Hence Toynbee*s etheriali­
zation can hardly be said to be a criterion in the strict 
sense of the word. Instead, it must be shown to serve as a 
heuristic device which contrasts what is believed to be
progress when it occurs with what is believed to be the 
absence of progress.
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of the vain hopes and illusory short cuts suggested by magic 
and religion-. . % deterred man from the harder road to the 
control of Nature by [scientific] understanding." 
demonstrated with considerable erudition, however, that modern 
naturalistic theories of history are unable to establish a 
meaningful destiny for man. Naturalistic theories are 
essentially "non-historical." They cannot provide ontological 
anchorage for meaning or value. (Tillich, op. cit., pp. 19,
32, 43, 47, 76, 119, 135, 163, 175, 209, 2l67~2BS7 293, 299ff.,
and 306.)
p. 101).
"The pursuit• 9
Tillich has
* ^Baillie, op. cit
in Pitirim Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: 
American Book Co., 1937-4^-) 9 , Chap. X.
"^Hildebrand, op. cit., p. 7.
pp. 4i+ff. Cf. extensive studies• 9
^Cf. C. K.. Ogden and I.. A. Richards, The Meaning of 
Meaning (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 192317 pT 123: 
■"TEe"ir£hical use of 'good' is ... a purely emotive use.
When so used the word stands for‘nothing whatever."
Aver. Language. Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications,
1946), p. 107; C. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Lanp;uap
Yale University Press, 1944), P- H; and Moritz Schlick,
Problems of Ethics, trans, David Rynin (New York: Prentice-Hall, 
37939 )"~p28. For an analysis of problems posed by positivist
Cf. A. J.
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theories of values as applied to social theory, see William L. 
Kalb, "Values, Positivism, and the Functional Theory of 
Religion: The Growth of a Moral Dilemma," Social Forces, XXXI 
(May, 1953), 305-11. Kalb argues that by denying ontic status 
to values, positivism introduces this dilemma in social theory: 
The functional theory of religion views religion as a sort of 
social cement whose values become social values. If values 
are illusory, the cement is non-existent.’ To urge acceptance 
of what is therefore in reality illusory is to deprive people 
of the very knowledge which is the sine qua non of human 
dignity for the positivist. Other s tudies of the consequences 
of the relativization of values may be found in the various 
works of Jacques Maritain. For the destructive implications 
of the absolute relativization of values in the realm of 
political and legal theory see John H. Hallowell, Main Currents 
in Modern Political Thought (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1930),
Chap. IX.
20Cf. Baillie, op. cit., p. 52: "The secret of 
salvation lay in what the Stoics called . . . 1 flight from 
Baillie1s analysis ofi ftthe world of sense to pure being, 
the Greek and Roman world-view may be found in Chap. II, op. cit. 
Cf. also Henri Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, 
trans. by R. Ashley Andra and Cloudesley Brereton with the 
assistance of W. H. Carter (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935), 
p. 210: "Action is a weakening of contemplation," according 
to Plotinus, Enneads III, viii, Ij., quoted in Bergson who 
thereupon comments that Plotinus "remains faithful to Greek 
intellectualism, he even sums it up in a striking formula."
(Ibid.)
21Karl Marx observed that "the ideal is nothing else 
than the material world reflected by the human mind." Capital, 
A Critique of Political Economy, trans. and rev. Ernst 
Untermann (l+th ed. rev.; C. H. Kerr Co., 1906), preface.
22Cf. Baillie,’ op. cit.. pp. 56ff.; Collingwood, 
op. cit., p. 52; H. Stuart Hughes, Oswald Spengler (New York: 
Charles Scribner1s Sons, 1952), p„ 2Bf.; Albert Schweitzer, 
Christianity and the Religions of the World, trans. Johanna
1922), Po 28; AlbertPowers (New York: The Macmillan Co 
Schweitzer, "The Conception of the Kingdom of God in the 
Transformation of Eschatology," epilogue in E. N. Mozley, 
The Theology of Albert Schweitzer for Christian Inquirers 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951).
• 9
2^Karl Lowith, Meaning In History (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 19lj.9), p. 221.
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^From Augustine, Pascal took the idea that mankind 
was "the whole sequence of human beings, throughout the whole 
course of the ages, as the same man living and learning some­
thing all the time." Pensfees, quoted in Baillie, op. cit., 
p. 3. "During the whole course of modern culturewrites 
Tillich, "philosophy maintained the belief in providence. It 
did not call it !providence,1 it called it * pre-established 
harmony* or *law of progress and perfectability.
(The Protestant Era, op. cit.. p. 10.) Cf. Hughes, op. 
pp. 2Bf.; Hildebrand, op. cit.. p. l8lj. (re Fontenelle),
(re Turgot), and pp. 321-28 [re CondorcetJ; Bury, 
p. 110 (re Fontenelle); and Fay, loc. cit.
5
-
i «
cit., 
P. 15 
op. cit.,
25''Immanuel Kant, Principles of Politics, trans. and 
ed. W._ Hastie (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Pub., 1891), 
and 66‘f. Cf. Kant, The Idea of a Universal History on a 
Cosmo-Political Plan, trans. T. DeQuincy (Hanover, 1927), 
passim. For a discussion see Baillie, op. cit., pp. 118-21.
pp. 1-29,
26In a profound analysis of the rise of historical 
determinism in general and the philosophy of history of Hegel 
in particular, Schweitzer observes: "In Hegel*s philosophy 
the connection between ethics and belief in progress, on which 
the spiritual energy of modern times has always rested, is 
broken, and with the separation both are ruined." The Philoso­
phy of Civilization. Part II, Civilization and Ethics, op. cit 
p. 219. ’Schweitzer believes that Hegel is largely responsible 
for the bankruptcy of the modern idea of progress. Cf. his 
"Religion and Modern Civilization,” The Christian Century. LI 
(1931;), lij83f. and 1519-21. Cf. also Morris R. Cohen, Reason 
and Nature (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931), P. 378: 
"There is something inexpressibly brutal in the dogma of 
necessary universal progress, which is simply the old dogma 
that this is the best of all possible worlds in a temporal 
form. # . . This glorification of the historical actual . . . 
prevents us from seeing all the finer possibilities, hopes and 
aspiration/ at the expense of which the triumph of the actual 
is frequently purchased." Cf. also a similar view of Berdyaev's 
discussed in 0. F. Clarke, Introduction to Berdyaev (London: 
Geoffrey Bles, 1950); and in Baillie, op. cit
• 9
pp. 127-30.• 9
The significance of the idea of the Kingdom of God 
in the development of the Idea of Progress is carefully 
examined by Schweitzer in "The Conception," Mozley, loc. cit. 
For Augustine, man covered a fixed course in time. There is 
a distinct event as beginning and a distinct event as end. 
Christ is the central event of history. Augustine's analogy 
of mankind progressing as a single person to an end in 
Judgment could be transformed to a doctrine of simple progress
4
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in time. Hildebrand says that f,in the seventeenth century 
this analogy became fundamental to the formulation of the 
modern idea of progress.11 (Op. cit.a p. 10.)
28Schiller is said to have discovered this idea in 
medieval thought. For an incisive critique of the idea of 
the self-redemptive nature of history, see Niebuhr, Nature 
and Destiny of Man, loc. cit.; and Faith and History, loc. cit.
29For a comprehensive and generally erudite study of 
"psychological" approaches to history and social theory see 
Pitirim A. Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories (New 
York: Harper Bros 
believes that psychological theories constitute a variation 
of animism and in general fail to bridge the gap between 
"psychic" and material or physiological forces through which 
human activity must take place. He concludes, therefore, 
that they inhibit causal analysis of phenomena in the usual 
scientific sense. However, causality in a prescriptive sense 
is itself an anthropomorphic or animistic notion, 
descriptive sense, however, the idea of causality does not 
rule out psychic factors, for these becoms related phenomena 
as are all phenomena. Law becomes merely a description of 
recurrences, regularities, or patterns, and cause a symbol 
of significant relationship. On this basis, psychological 
studies are not as invalid as Sorokin appears to believe 
them to be.
Sorokin1928), Chaps. XI, XII, and XIII.• 9
In the
CHAPTER
THE PILGRIMAGE OF ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE
Toynbee*s life and thought are symbolic of the crisis 
in Western thought; His pilgrimage from Wilsonian idealism 
to the mystic extravaganza of the tenth volume of his Study
is symptomatic of the change in the Zeitgeist os the West.
His story is the story of modern man's quest for salvation.
It is the story of the profound preoccupation of many of the 
best minds of our age. His struggle is the struggle of 
Western man awakened to a tragic sense of history, a ’’struggle 
by his subconscious Magian self to overcome the Hellenic 
education imposed on his conscious English self.”1
In 1912, Toynbee was a thoroughgoing liberal, stead­
fast in a humanist faith inculcated by what he himself later 
described as a npost-Renaissance classical and humanist 
education." He was a specialist in Hellenic history. He 
accepted the liberal belief in progress, a progress achieved 
through the instrumentality of democratic nationalism. He 
shared most of the nobler sentiments of this nationalism.
He spoke of the nation state as "the most magnificent . . . 
social achievement in existence." He was proud of the 
beneficent civilization of the West. He believed that it
33
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should be carried to the uttermost ends of the earth. He
defended the idea of the basic unity of human culture.
Civilization was an evolutionary heritage of* the entire human 
p In almost every respect he shared the attitudes of arace.
This was to beconfident and unskeptical Victorian era. 
expected, for Toynbee was an Englishman born in 1889, 
Englishman who had received an education in the Greek and
an
Latin classics at Winchester and at Balliol College and had 
absorbed the glory of British prestige at its zenith.
In 1912, however, Toynbee became fascinated with
3contemporary problems and their parallels in the past. While 
viewing the ruins of Sparta from the citadel of Mistra in 
Laconia, he experienced a "horrifying sense of sin manifest 
in the conduct of human affairs" and wondered prophetically 
whether "man's most damning vice was his brutality or his 
irrationality," This traumatic experience profoundly altered 
the nature and course of his thought. Toynbee was ushered 
into the "age of anxiety."
This was in 1912. In 1915, he was assigned to Turkish 
Affairs in the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign 
Office. As public servant he was assigned for three or four
For a sensitive soul likehyears to a study of atrocities.
Toynbee's, this research was sufficient to erase any complacent 
illusions he harbored concerning the advance of human morality.
He became interested in contemporary problems on a vast scale. 
Not only history and international affairs commanded his 
attention, but religion, depth psychology, and a host of
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subjects came under his scrutiny. From his study of con­
temporary events and depth psychology in particular he con­
cluded that,
atrocities seem to be outbreaks of bestiality 
normally "suppressed11 in human beings but almost ^ 
automatically stimulated under certain conditions.
These findings shook his confidence in nationalism and
liberalism. He became convinced that a high correlation
exists between the Westernization of peoples, with its
corollary phenomenon of nationalism, and the incidence of
atrocities.
During World War I, Toynbee began to sense significant 
parallels between the nationalistic "war to end all wars" and
the disastrous Peloponnesian and Hannibalic Wars of an earlier 
7
civilization. By 1918, he abandoned the popular doctrine of 
the unity of civilization for historical pluralism. He could
no longer accept the popular belief in a succession of ages:
Paleolithic, Neolithic, Chalcolithic, Copper, Bronze, Iron, 
and Machine. For him, this theory represented the patronizing 
and provincial outlook of a contemporary scholarship which 
entertained an exaggerated view of the importance of material 
culture. He argued that,
it is a mere accident of no scientific significance 
that the material tools which Man has made for himself 
should have a greater capacity to survive . . . than
Man’s psychic artifects [sic ]. “
Man’s mental apparatus is more significant than the material 
apparatus which happens to be at his command, Toynbee con­
cluded. The invention of language, for example, is vastly
36
more significant than the invention of radio.
The homo faber criterion fails to impress Toynbee.
He suspects that it reflects a prejudice arising from the 
influence of the spectacular material achievements of post- 
Renaissance Western man. It reaches its reductio ad absurdum. 
he believes, in application to the highly developed civili­
zations of the Americas. The Mayan civilization, for example, 
never left the "Stone Age" In material technique, yet it
achieved marked excellence in astronomy and in the invention
9of the calendar. Toynbee finds evidence for the theory of
the unity of civilization inconclusive:
In the history of Man's attempt at Civilization, 
there has never been any society whose progress in 
Civilization has gone so far that, in times of 
revolution or war, its members could be relied upon 
not to commit atrocities.10
In 1921, nine years after his traumatic experience 
at the site of Sparta, Toynbee outlined the main themes of 
his philosophy of history. During the brief period he was 
war correspondent for the Manchester Guardian, thirteen 
parts of the projected Study were formulated.
Toynbee had already identified most of his civilizations.
In a lecture entitled "The Tragedy of Greece," delivered at 
Oxford in 1920, he spoke of the "morphology of civilizations,"
By this time, *
and he began to interpret history in terms of social entities
-11 Helike "universal religion" and "internal proletariat*
"affiliatedspoke of the latter as the chrysalis of an
He also spoke of the possibility of the newcivilization."
world religion—Bahai--emerging from the encounter betwe
37
Islam and the West as the chrysalis for a new civilization. ^ 
His experience in the Greco-Turkish War convinced him that 
11 the real entities of human geography . . . are cultural and 
. . . [should be] called civilizations.
During the summer of 1920, he read Spengler and 
wondered whether his “whole [embryonic] inquiry had been 
disposed of by Spengler before even the questions, not to
speak of the answers, had fully taken shape, 
reached radically different conclusions.
Spengler!s tragic sense of history, he returned to the Hebraic- 
Christian vision of God as the foundation of the Universe. 
Spengler, on the other hand, expressed the poetic defiance 
of a skeptic for whom history was a profound and impenetrable 
mystery--a mere symbol of an essentially inscrutable Reality.
By 1922, Toynbee had formulated the main outlines of 
his monumental Study, and in 1927, after two years as 
Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, he began to gather his data.
volumes were prepared between June, 1927 and June, 1929.
By 1939, when six volumes of the Study had been 
published, Toynbee had moved from the liberal-humanist out­
look of his earlier period to a frank acceptance of the 
Christian view of life and history.1^
But he
While he shared
Notes for all ten
15
World War II interrupted and profoundly influenced 
During the period of 1939 to 19ij.6, heToynbee's thought. 
served as Director of the Research Department of the Foreign
At the end of the war, he received the aid of theOffice.
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Royal Institute, of the Council on Foreign Relations, of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, and of the Institute for Advanced 
Study at Princeton toward the completion of the remaining 
volumes of his Study.
Significant changes were effected, however, when, in 
1946, Toynbee returned to his labors on the Study. Parts VII,
IX, XI, and XII were radically altered in keeping with new
findings. These particular parts dealt with his study of 
Universal Churches, of Contacts Between Civilizations in 
Space (Encounters Between Contemporaries), of Law and Freedom 
in History, and of The Prospects of Western Civilization.
These changes were related in part to the fact that 
by 1945, Toynbee had moved from orthodox Christianity--much 
to the embarrassment and chagrin of both admirers and 
tormentors--to a "trans-Christian" philosophy of history 
reflecting the insights of Vendanta Hinduism as well as those 
of Augustinian Christianity. Indeed, Toynbee began to refer 
to himself as "a Symmachan-minded disciple of C. G. Jung" and
did not hesitate to be frankly critical of Orthodox Christian 
ideas He said, for example, that he stood with "Symmachus
as against St. Ambrose, with Mangu as against William of
„18 HisRubrtfck, and with Radhakrishnan as against Karl Adam, 
pilgrimage was reaching its destination, 
begun in 1912 and had had for its goal the mystic vision of 
life and history sub specie aeternitatis was about to be 
consummated.
The quest that had
When completed, the ten volumes comprised over 3,1
39
words. Toynbee1s claim to fame, however, is rooted in his 
message rather than in the sheer weight of his erudition.
An eleventh volume prepared in collaboration with Professor 
Edward D. Myers is to appear shortly as is also a Retractationes 
prepared with the assistance of Mrs. Toynbee, the former 
Veronica M. Boulter. The eleventh volume will comprise a 
geographical gazetteer and consolidated index.
Throughout the ten volumes of the Study, Toynbee 
develops his early conviction that Mthe most tremendous of
all the lessons of History [is] the [discovery of the] divine
„19irony in human affairs. 
charged--a "prophet of doom overcome by the imagination of 
disaster," nor does he share Spengler!s conviction that "the 
history of humanity has no meaning whatsoever," or the 
agnosticism of Schweitzer who can discover no grounds for
Instead, Toynbee believes
Yet Toynbee is not--as is often
20meaning in the facts of history, 
that,
life on our . . . planet, [is] moving evolutionarily 
in a five-dimensional frame of Life-Time-Space; and 
. . . human souls, raised to a sixth dimension by the 
gift of the Spirit [are] moving, through a fateful 
exercise of their spiritual freedom, either towards 
their Creator or away from Him.21
History, he believes, is a vision of God's creation on the
from its source in God toward God its goal.
not a venture into nothingness, a story "full of sound and
fury signifying nothing."
meaning which reveals itself to those sincere souls who seek
History, says Toynbee,
History ismove
Behind its apparent chaos lies a
for it.
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is a vision, dim and partial, yet true to reality 
as far as it [goes]—of God revealing himself in 
action in souls that are sincerely seeking Him.22
With the Swiss psychologist Carl G. Jung, Toynbee believes
that there is na purposiveness out-reaching human ends [which]
is the life-giving secret for man.n^
origin and man’s destiny, is the outcome of blind chance is--
in the face of what Toynbee discovers--untenable. Chance,
Toynbee asserts, explains nothing:
Chance is ... a negative and therefore necessarily 
a relative [concept], and ... to see in Chance an 
ultimate explanation of any phenomenon would be as 
naive an error as to mistake a sign-post for the goal 
to which it pointed.2q.
To speak of chance is to affirm absence of known pattern.
To speak of cause by chance says nothing about cause; it
merely indicates what was not a cause. To see cause in
chance is to see the absence of cause. But absence cannpt
be seen. If we fail to detect a pattern we may deny the
pattern; but we cannot see the absence of that pattern, for
25that is negative. We can only see the positive.
The obscurity of the meaning of history, Toynbee 
believes, should not be allowed to discourage us from seeking 
partial insight. For Toynbee, therefore, the problem of 
history involves religious dimensions, and because of this, 
it must employ as legitimate tools of understanding the means 
of sympathetic insight and poetic imagination.
Goethe once complained that there were few men who 
possessed the "imagination for the truth of reality.11 "ho
That the universe, man’s
s t
4i
prefer,” he lamented,
strange countries and circumstances of which they 
know nothing, and by which their imagination may be 
cultivated. . # . Then there are those who cling 
altogether to reality, and, as they . . . [lack] the 
poetic spirit are too severe in their requisitions.2o
MThe great historians,11 suggests Ernst Cassirer,
avoid both [these] extremes. They are empiricists 
. . . but they do not lack the “poetic spirit.1* It 
is their keen sense for the empirical reality of 
[particular] things combined with their free gift of 
[poetic] imagination upon which the true historical 
synthesis . . . depends.27
In the attempt to penetrate the formidable array of facts at 
his command, Toynbee seeks the aid of Goethe's Urphanomen.
His data possess a qualified empirical reality. His histori­
ography is cautiously objectivistic, but he warns that,
The sorting out of facts is essentially one faculty 
of the Soul. When we think about something, we are 
apt also to have feelings about it, and our impulse 
to express our feelings is still stronger than our 
impulse to express our thoughts. Feelings about History 
. . . have . . . been expressed in imaginative words in 
divers genres of literature ... a lyrical genre, an 
epic genr.e, a narrational genre and a dramatic genre; 
and the feeling for the poetry in the facts of History 
has availed itself of all of these.28
Thus Toynbee restates the sentiments of the Swiss cultural
historian, Jacob Burckhardt, who wrote that “history is . .
it 29in a large measure poetry.
It is important, therefore, to recognize that 
Toynbee!s monumental Study is not narrative history as such 
but a work of art, “a provocative series of judgments master-
..30 It is, he hopes, a profound vision offully compounded.
God at work in Man and in History, a feeling for the poetry
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in the facts of history which becomes,
a lamp unto his feet and a light unto his path; , . 
a path [which] ascends from a feeling for the poetry 
in [the facts of] History to a [mystical] partici­
pation in Man’s fellowship with Man ... to the 
threshold of the saint’s [mystical] communion with 
God [Himself].31
Toynbee’s answer to his own and modern man’s quest for
significance is his discovery of,
the passage of History gently flowing through him in 
a mighty current, and of his own life welling like a 
wave in the flow of this vast tide#32
His vision, therefore, reflects, in part, the conviction of
the French philosopher, Henri Bergson, who believed that,
the ultimate end of mysticism is the establishment 
of a contact . . . with the creative effort which
life itself manifests, 
it is not God Himself.33
This effort is of God, if
To portray this feeling and this vision, Toynbee is 
obliged to use the language of metaphor and myth. How else
he asks, is one to ’’convey the soul’s obscure intuition of
This language, however, deeply«3l+the mysteries of Life?
disturbs Toynbee's less poetic colleagues, 
dampen his amazing popularity, 
gathered at the University of Minnesota in 1955 to hear
But it does not
Eleven thousand Americans
Toynbee speak on the relatively ’’unsuspenseful theme of
35 Many ’’want to have 
at least a glimpse of the future, some wisdom, some prophecy,” 
some guide.^
1 HThe New Opportunity for Historians.
The Western view of history has been seriously dis­
credited, Toynbee believes.
Western dominance since the failure of the Ottoman assault
It is a view which reflects
1*3
on Vienna in I683.
way of life is immortal.
37 By exposing its bankruptcy, Toynbee brings to 
light the crisis that confronts Western thought.
It is a comforting view that the Western
It began to ebb in 1914 and is today
in retreat.
He "puts an
end to . . . the Hegelian naivet6, that is to say, the idea 
of a [rational] development of linear history. n38 Like Karl
Jaspers, he envisions the emergence of an era of genuine world 
history.^ "In this [particular] regard," says the French
historian, Jacques Madaule, Toynbee "has achieved a veritable
n40Copernican revolution in the field of history.
Toynbee grounds his Study of History in a profound
He believes thatview of the human psyche and its dynamics, 
the depths of the human psyche are linked in common community
There is for Toynbee, aswith Life as a whole and with God-.
there was for the American mystic, Rufus Jones, a vast realm 
of the subconscious which borders upon the infinite Life, 
rises out of it, and may receive incursions from it.^*
This recognition by Toynbee of the crucial role of
the dynamics of human personality—however speculative, poetic, 
or religious--is possibly Toynbee's major contribution.
Through it, Toynbee is able to affirm the reality of freedom 
and to replace the drama of man's destiny in the workings of 
He is also able to reaffirm confidence in the
Concerning this,
his psyche, 
genuinely creative possibilities of man.
he says:
kb
We shall no longer make the scientific postulate of 
the Uniformity of Nature, which we rightly made so long 
as we were thinking of our problem in scientific terms, 
as a function of the play of inanimate forces. We shall 
be prepared now to recognize, a priori, that, even if 
we were exactly acquainted with all racial, environ­
mental or other data that are capable of being formulated 
scientifically, we should not be able to predict the 
outcome of the interaction between the forces which these 
data represent. ; . . [The] unknown quantity is the 
reaction of the actors to the ordeal when it actually 
comes, . . . Psychological momenta, which are inherently 
impossible to weigh and measure and therefore to estimate 
scientifically in advance, are the very forces which 
actually decide the issue when the ecnounter takes place.
. . . [This leads us to the conviction] that the out- 
‘come of an encounter cannot be predicted and has no 
appearance of being predetermined, but arises, in the \ p 
likeness of a new creation, out of the encounter itself.
The real continuity of history does not consist in the 
external forms of a civilization nor in the surface flow 
of events, but rather in the forces that are psychologi­
cally active in the depths of the people.4-3
For Toynbee, these forces find vent in a dialectic 
of rhythms. Rhythms are basic to Toynbee!s philosophy of 
history. They are expressed in Toynbee!s hosts of word-pairs. 
From a poem of Robert Browning, for example, Toynbee appropri­
ates the word-pair nchallenge-and-response. 
known of Toynbeefs word-pairs is paralleled in the word-pair 
rhythms of "withdrawal-and-return,n "rout-and-rally,TT "schism- 
and-palingenesia11 and so on. For Toynbee, these rhythms are 
archetypal. They are recurrent themes, 
believes, there would be no life, for rhythm is the basic form
This best
Without them, Toynbee
of life.
It is Toynbee's revival of religious historiography,
The most important fact about man, 
But these are not the
however, that is unique. 
he says, are his religious concerns.
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particular concerns of orthodoxy. Toynbee's search transcends 
orthodoxy.. His universal history attempts to restore that 
sense of religious ultimacy which Western rationalism destroyed.. 
His encounter with history is an existential encounter with
Reality. It is a supremely religious experience. The failure 
of rationalism to grapple with the existential realities that
confront the Human Psyche moved Toynbee—as it did Burckhardt— 
to shape historiography
on the idea that the dynamic of man's inner life, 
his beliefs and his passions, comprise the materials 
for the life and death of societies .1+5
Yet Toynbee's preoccupation with religion is more than
the mere reassertion of the reality of psychological momenta, 
existential realities, or the tragic sense of life, 
creative potentiality of man, he says, is rooted in the nature
God's law is the Law of Love and Perfect
The
of God Himself.
"God' sLiberty, and both share jurisdiction over human affairs, 
love is the source of Man's [potential] freedom,11 he says.
Man's freedom is in varying degrees encumbered by the Laws of
This subconscious may
spawn a monster as well as "Poetry and Prophecy.
the drama which unfolds within the human psyche possesses
profound historical significance, for,
"The Law of God" [which is Love and Perfect Liberty] 
reveals the regularity of a single constant aim 
pursued unwaveringly in the face of all obstacles and 
in response to all challenges by the intelligence and 
will of a personality. "Laws of Nature" [and the 
Subconscious, on the other hand.] display the regu­
larity of a recurrent movement.47
These recurrent movements of Nature are vain repetitions unless
But
the Subconscious which animate him.
„l+6 Moreover,
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"they are pictured as being the laws of Nature, the wheels
that God has fitted to His own chariot."^®
The riddle of the relation between God's law and a 
human soul's freedom is the . . . most difficult, 
and the most crucial of all questions.49
The answer is found, Toynbee believes, in the religious
doctrine of the transfiguration in which man wills God's
will with a will of his own. Transfiguration is the final
destiny of man. It is as if God had reached or was in the
process of reaching some pinnacle and was urging the creatures
of his own making to realize their own potential natures even
as God Himself was working out His own destiny. Thus the
drama of Man's fate is "having daily and hourly to purchase
and repurchase his right to Life and Freedom by perpetually
responding to repeated challenges.
Nur der verdient sich Freiheit. wie das Leben,
Der Taglich sie erobern muss.50
Man must create or die! His destiny is to become 
like the Creator Himself. His fate is to share the fate of 
his Creator. The drama of Life to which man is a party and 
with which his destiny is linked works itself out through the 
experience of learning by suffering. The successful denoue­
ment of the encounter of human personality with reality is 
realized through what Toynbee calls etherialization. 
Etherialization is the index of creative existence.
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When Toynbee speaks of religion he means higher 
religion, that is, in the formal sense, Christianity, Mahayana
These are the religions whichBuddhism, Hinduism, and Islam.
kl
emerge from the traumatic experiences of an internal prole­
tariat in some particular civilization of the secondary order. 
They arise as the response of the "Human Psyche" to the 
challenge of social breakdown and the challenge of funda­
mental psychological needs. Toynbee says:
Each of the higher religions . . „ [is] apt to lay 
stress on some particular aspect of God's relation 
to Man, of the individual soul!s relation to the 
religious community, or of the religious community's 
relation to the political.52
Toynbee believes that the history of Religion, particularly
as it relates to that of the four higher religions and their
divers sects, can be explained within a Jungian understanding
of the basic nature of the Human Psyche:
In the Human Psyche there are divers faculties and 
attitudes that are, all alike, important in seeking 
vent. 'These are all to be found in every individual 
human being, but this in different combinations and 
different relative strengths [culturally determined] 
which display themselves in a variety of psychological 
types. There is not and cannot be, any psychological 
type in which all the psychological elements can have 
full play at the conscious level: in every type there 
are . „ . some elements that are repressed in the 
Subconscious, and in every type the repressed elements 
seize . . . every opportunity of flooding back, 
unbidden, into Consciousness. . 
living higher religions, and each of their principal 
sects, had been attuned to some particular psychological 
type or subtype, and each religion was ever seeking 
. # . to achieve the impossible feat of ministering to 
the whole gamut of the Psyche's elemental needs for 
expression.
Therefore, Toynbee cautions:
Any existing higher religion. . . . [aspiring] to 
become the Universal Religion [is] doomed to dis­
appointment............ The heavenly music . . . [can]
be heard only in a symphony . . . [and] in harmony, 
in order . . . [that] every human being of every 
psychological type . . . [can] enter into communion 
with God.53
Each of the
1+8
The four higher religions . . . [are] four variations 
on a single theme. ... If all the four components 
of this heavenly music of the spheres could be audible 
on Earth simultaneously, and with equal clarity, to 
one pair of human ears, the happy hearer would find ^ 
himself listening not to a discord, but to a harmony. ^
For Toynbee, therefore, there is no exclusive revel­
ation of Spiritual Truth:
Any such claim is an error which is ... a sin.
In claiming to possess a monopoly of the Divine 
Light, a church . . . [is] guilty of hubris. In 
denying that other religions may be God’s chosen 
and sufficient channels for revealing Himself to 
some human souls it seems to me to be guilty of 
blasphemy.55
nThe diversity of the higher religions,” he continues, "is a 
necessary corollary of the diversity of the Human Psyche."
A Symmachan-minded disciple of €. G. Jung . . . 
would hold that if the revelation of the One True 
God is to be accessible to all men, it has to be
diffracted.56
And if the Law of God is Love, God must favor no individual
He must provide the requisite pathsor group over another, 
by which the Human Psyche in its diverse character may find
its way to God.
Does this mean that Toynbee’s pilgrimage ends in the 
belief that there must be a unification of the higher
religions or that Christianity is not superior in some sense 
to other higher religions? Toynbee does not say this, nor
The inherent nature of man and of societydoes he imply it. 
rules out the possibility of one Higher Religion, for this
could be realized only in a community of Saints--individ
Hence unity must be confined 
Toynbee invokes the orthodox
who have become Transfigured.
to a Kingdom of Heaven.
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formula: Man cannot become what God wills him to be unless
he, that is, Man, wills God's will with a will of his own. 
But to will God’s will as the will of his own would imply 
man's inability to commit sin; it would destroy his freedom
as well as his humanity—unless there occurred a universal
Transfiguration so that all men would freely will God's will 
with a will of their own.^ This, Toynbee believes, does not 
appear to be possible. Certainly history does not suggest
its likelihood. Because of the nature of the Human Psyche, 
man must struggle up his own particular Jacob's ladder to 
his own particular salvation. No single path suffices for
all men.
Toynbee sees superior elements in Christianity.
He attempts to establish them by an appeal to psychology. 
Christianity, he says, stresses the Feeling function
("Faculty” in Toynbee) of the- four polar functions of the
The Feeling function doeshuman psyche described by Jung, 
not have for Jung the unfortunate connotation of the English 
word; it is more accurately termed the evaluative function. 
Over against the Thinking, the Sensation, and the Intuition 
functions, Feeling is, for Toynbee, the superior avenue to
It plays the music of Love, 
the function stressed by the Mahayana with its Bodhisattvas,
It is alsocommunion with God.
and Shiah Islam.
[The] affinity [is] conspicuously close * . 
Christianity and the Mahayana which shares the 
vision of God as a self-sacrificing saviour. V*
. between 
same
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Hinduism1s emphasis upon the Thinking function handicaps it 
in the introverted sphere of religion. But Hinduism has a 
compensating contribution which outweighs its negative 
aspects by its emphasis upon spontaneous charity toward all 
revelations--past, present, and future. This, Toynbee 
believes, must become ,fthe first spiritual requirement in an 
age in which the whole of Mankind . . . [may be] united . . 
by Western technology, 
the requisite for survival, according to Toynbee, and it is 
this vision which is Hinduism/s major contribution.
Toynbee is convinced that each of the higher religions 
needs reorientation at the hands of the other three. He
»i 60 The spiritual union of mankind is
shares Radakrishnan1s conviction that,
the West is passing through a new Renaissance due to 
the sudden entry into its consciousness of a whole 
new world of ideas [of] . . . Asia with which India 
is linked up. For the first time in the history of 
mankind, the consciousness of the unity of the world 
has dawned on us. Whether we like it or not, East 
and West have come together and can no more part.61
Toynbee1s reviewers and critics confront the reader 
with a veritable pot pourri of critiques ranging from the
The superficiality of some general-profound to the jejune, 
izations about Toynbee suggests a tendency to prejudge him
A particularlyor to leap to unwarranted conclusions, 
worthwhile critique from the pen of Lewis Mumford reminds us
that,
the glory of Toynbee’s work—a glory that no criticism, 
however radical, can diminish—is that his is perhaps 
the first mind that has done something like justice to 
[the] complexity [of human history] and [its] mystery.
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As master of universal history, Toynbee "breaks with many of 
the idola of supposedly scientific and objective thought.11 
!,No book that deals with human affairs," Mumford continues,
has been more free from the blatant parochialisms 
of our age and our civilization: 
nationalism, the exaltation of Hellenic and later 
European civilization at the expense of nineteen 
other significant societies, our excessive pride in 
material conquests and mechanical productivity, our 
naive submission to the one-eyed methodology of the 
physical sciences and "objective11 [positivistic] 
scholarship; the bias of narrow specialism and ego- 
centricity, the notion that our age is the climax 
of human existence and that its ephemeral values are 
eternal ones.63
the obsessions of
"If our world civilization survives," concludes Mumford, 
"A Study of History will stand out as a landmark, perhaps
||64 Notwithstanding his otherwise 
serious objections to Toynbee, Mumford continues his praise-- 
which is more than polite--by characterizing Toynbee as 
honest, sincere, saintly--"witness his judgment on the con­
sistently brutal ways of the English-speaking peoples in 
dealing with native populations," his affirmation of the 
essential dignity of human life, the importance of history, 
and his recognition that "a life that does not go into 
action is a failure." Mumford also praises Toynbee for
even a turning point.
exposing the rationalist illusion that religion is a primi­
tive, pre-scientific superstition—hardly worthy of serious
He believes that Toynbee has restoredscholarly attention, 
the status of mythology, and has challenged the imaginative
65powers of contemporary scholarship.
Toynbeefs pilgrimage has led him beyond the vision
52
of orthodox Christianity and the purview of contemporary 
scholarship. His genius does not lie in the accuracy of his 
particular pronouncements but in the timeliness, the clarity, 
and the profundity of his vision.
St. Augustine articulated the spirit of the medieval 
world--the world that gave birth to Western civilization. 
Machiavelli gave expression to the spirit that made this 
civilization supreme in the world. Toynbee gives voice to 
the new spirit of the emerging world community.# He does not 
say that the transition to world community will be painless, 
for it is a great revolution in the life of man. But he 
points to world community as the alternative to annihilation-- 
an annihilation which he does not believe modern man will
66choose.
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CHAPTER III
TOYNBEE'S HISTORIOGRAPHY
In a presidential address to the American Historical 
Association in 1923, Edward Cheyney expressed the hope that 
historiography would discover the scientific "laws of history" 
and thereby bring history into line with the great advances 
of the natural scientists. Cheyney's hope characterized the 
general attitude of historians since l8£0. During these 
years, many historians tried to apprentice history to the 
natural sciences. Their "fact-finding" objectivism did not 
pass unchallenged, however. By the mid-twentieth century, a 
romantic subjectivism had assumed the proportions of a full- 
scale revolt.'*"
In the wake of this revolt is Arnold J. Toynbee.
Toynbee calls for interpretive history in the meaning of
2Herodotus f s historia. Following Jacob Burckhardt, Toynbee 
insists that history is more than the prosaic recitation of 
facts.^ He believes that historiography should embrace 
interpretation as well as narration, and that history should
provide instructive clues to the meaning of life, 
respect, Toynbee exemplifies the contemporary search for
"Seldom in history have men been as
In this
significance in life, 
disturbed about history as we are today," writes Paul Tillich.
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f!We urgently want to have at least a glimpse of the future, 
some wisdom, some prophecy. !lThe destiny of mankind is 
involved in [this] issue about the nature of history,” con-
nWe ought . . .to give far more time and 
far more serious and strenuous thought . . . [to this problem
^ Yet historiography
tinues Toynbee.
of] one's general ideas [about history].”
has become the equivalent of research alone, and the gathering
Even John Dewey observed that,
piety to the past is not for its own sake nor for 
the sake of the past, but for the sake of a present 
so # .
future.o
of facts an end in itself.
enriched that it will create a better
Confronting this demand for meaning is the obvious
complexity of history. A discomforting suspicion persists
that the facts of history may be so complex as to suggest and
to support virtually any theory of history that may be 
7 Yet Toynbee does not allow this possibility to 
deter him from seeking a ”dim and partial vision” of the 
forces at work in history because he believes that some 
insight is better than none at all and that practical guides 
to wisdom are desperately needed. But he is convinced that 
only a genuinely artistic creation can provide this vision, 
that unimaginative approaches to the problem will fail as 
they have in the past.
Unfortunately Toynbee's historiography is best known 
through abusive evaluations by his critics. Toynbee himself 
is partly to blame because he has not defined his terms or 
his method with the precision demanded of his profession.
advanced.
8
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Like Plato, he refuses to give T!a short and simple exposition 
of [his] philosophy in writing.^ 
explain what he is trying to do, but his historiography pre-
He does not hesitate to
eludes the logic which his tormentors would impose upon hirr;.1^
It is therefore no wonder that he has aroused the indignation 
of his colleagues. Like the mystic, Toynbee assumes that 
those who understand need no explanation whereas those who 
do not will fail to profit from any amount of explanation.
Hence Toynbee gives the appearance of unjustified license. 
Actually his methods and conclusions are much less presumptuous 
than they appear to be.
History may be approached in two general ways. First, 
there is the formal logic and epistemology of history, the 
systematic study of history as a narrative account--formal 
Geschichtsphilosophie as Bauer described it. The second is
more nearly the French meaning of philosophie de l?histoire
which in the narrower sense is the attempt to understand and 
to interpret the course of human events, 
with "methodology” or "historiography"—with what Charles 
Oman described as "the art of dealing on paper with past
The latter is what has been customarily thought of
The former deals
events."
philosophy of history or universal history because of its
Actually both comprise the philosophy
as
more speculative nature. 
of history as such.^
The Western terras "History," "Histoire," "Storla."
and Geschlchte," are essentially ambiguous, argues Toynbee. 
They may refer to relatively subjective studies of history
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or they may refer to relatively objective narration of human
Toynbeefs monumental Study is history
It is not narrative but interpretive
history. And because it is interpretive, argues Pieter Geyl,
loit is not history. ^ 
tive or philosophy of history is crucial. It must be examined 
thoroughly.
events on a time scale.
IPin the former sense.
The issue of the legitimacy of interpre-
Philosophy of history has only recently commanded the 
grudging respect of the historian or social scientist. One 
reason is the sincere desire to escape the stigma of subjec­
tivity. To accomplish this, generalizations have been 
scrupulously avoided. Opposition to generalization in any 
form is reflected in the entire field of historical sociology. 
Indeed this may account for the general decline of interest 
in this particular field since the turn of the century.
The critical methods of contemporary social science discourage
14
overt generalization In any form, and there is a reluctance 
on the part of the social scientist to accept moral responsi-
The desire to avoid generalizations--bility for his findings, 
particularly those that involve value judgment—stems partly 
from a confidence that the scientific method and all that it
implies is essentially self-correcting, and that it therefore 
transcends the inexactitudes of moral decision, 
cultural relativism has encouraged a neglect of generali-
But social thinkers have never
Moreover,
zations and value judgments.
really escaped generalizations nor have they escaped value 
Even social scientists of the caliber of Franzjudgments.
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Boas, Robert Marett, Clark Wissler, Robert Lowle, Alexander 
G-oldenweiser, Alfred Kroeber, Edward Sapir, Ruth Benedict, 
Margaret Mead—to name but a few—have all made deliberate 
however cautious generalizations and have thereby engaged 
surreptitiously in the "philosophy11 of history.^ 
to be sure, is one of the more ambitious and imaginative 
thinkers to enter the field of historical sociology. By 
yielding to the "mystical appeal of religion and legend,” he 
has scandalized sociology from the standpoint of its purists. 
Yet it was an American sociologist Arthur Todd, who observed 
that,
Toynbee,
the stream of history is no more vague than the 
stream of individual consciousness. Consciousness 
can be tested, measured, and compared. The history 
of human society should likewise yield to measure­
ments of depth and composition, ebb and flow.16
The question, of course, is one of method. . How does Toynbee
propose to deal with the depth and composition--the ebb and
flow--of history?
Initially he must come to terms with three basic 
problems: (1) the objectivity of historical knowledge;
(2) the relation of historical knowledge to science and myth; 
and (3) the practical significance of historical knowledge. 
Toynbee explicitly rejects both extreme objectivism and 
extreme subjectivism in his historical epistemology. Histori­
cal facts, he says, have a life of their own; they are 
discovered, but their discovery and elaboration is the effort 
of an involved or existentially concerned human mind whose 
practical search for significance takes for its point of
17
65
departure certain mythological elements. The relation of 
history to myth is therefore one of complementariness.
Indeed, Toynbee's own thesis is a magnificent example of 
the employment of empirical data in the service of mythology. 
Toynbee has self-consciously sought to abstract the signifi-
18
cant mythological meanings from the data which he has amassed.
He believes that,
"History11 grew out of Mythology, a primary intuitive 
form of apprehension and expression in which the Drama 
and the Novel likewise took their origin. In 
Mythology, the distinction between facts and fictions 
is left undrawn; and while "History" has differentiated 
itself from Mythology by making an effort to extract 
the facts, it has never succeeded in dispensing with 
fictitious elements altogether.19
In A Study of History. Toynbee proves nothing in the usual
sense of the word. But he brings into focus intuitions of
ultimate concern to man. Thus through his magnificent
imagery, he is able to render intelligible an account of man.
In addition, Toynbee deliberately relates the 
insights of mythology to modern scientific attempts to 
explain the history of man. He shows, for example, that the 
scientific writer transforms the cosmic rhythms of mythology 
into the full dress of scientific symbols. Toynbee abstracts 
ideas from the verbal casings in which they are articulated 
and from which they must derive their measure of acceptance.
He argues, like Mommsen, that history is better history if 
it is also a work of art, and he agrees with Croce that the 
writing of history is essentially an art.. His imaginative 
insight makes it possible for him to see in Darwin's vari­
ation, for example, the Creative Spirit of God, and in Darwin's
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natural selection, the Adversary0 For Toynbee, the mythical 
beings who struggle for the mastery of human destiny are the 
clashing forces of the "Human Psyche.” ”We can [not] under­
stand the genius of human creativity without the aid of 
[these] mythically conceived images,” he says. In the 
appeal to mythology for clues to the deepest mysteries of man, 
Toynbee reveals an unmistakable Romanticism. Yet "despite 
[his] verbal and conceptual excesses,” writes H. Stuart Hughes,
the Romantic historian [such as Toynbee, is] on the 
track of most of the major innovations that we have 
learned to associate with our own time: the study of
art forms as a key to the spirit of past ages, the 
theory of non-logical motivation, and the notion of21relativism in judging moral and political behavior.*
Finally, for Toynbee, the practical significance of the study 
of history is its capacity to suggest guides for the future.
Toynbee entertains a profound dislike for mechanistic
22 His most severe criticismapproaches to the study of man.
is directed at what he calls the apathetic fallacy--that is,
the attempt to render impersonal the uniqueness of human
personality. Not only does Toynbee detest mechanization of
human phenomena, but he detests equally the imposition of
provincial Western standards on history. The two master
institutions of the West, he says, are Democracy and 
21 The attempt to interpret history explicitly 
or implicitly in terms of these Western touchstones of value 
displays a lack of historical perspective. Western values
Industrialism.
possess no necessary ontological status or blessing of 
However significant they may be as humanimmortality.
I
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achievements, they are nevertheless ephemeral. As a psychic
epic of infinite dimensions, history knows nothing of the
reassuring but fictional periodications of "Ancient,"
"Medieval," or "Modern." "This survival of the misconception
of 1 the Unity of History,1" he argues,
is to be explained by the persistence of three 
underlying misconceptions: the ego-centric illusion, 
the catchword of 1 the Unchanging East,* and the mis- p), 
conception of growth as a movement in a straight line. ^
The rejection by Toynbee of the conventional Western
view of history tempts his critics to associate him--too
hastily—with Spengler. For Spengler the historical
Weltaspeckt of Civilization, that is Kulturen, or civili-
25zation in growth, is absolutely incommunicable, 
on the other hand, speaks only of partial insularity. His 
civilizations maintain contact in time through renaissances 
as well as contact in space through physical contiguity and 
contemporaneity. There is not in Toynbee the absolute
Toynbee,
cultural relativism which places serious strictures on the
Spengler*s errors springplausibility of Spengler*s theory.
from an assumption that civilizations are tightly insulated 
For Toynbee, on the other hand, a psychic con-organisms .
tinuum links all mankind at the primordial level even as all
27men enjoy a monogenetic origin.
tain a universally valid religion, science, or mathematics.
Spengler could not enter-
His relativism and historicism is total and complete. History 
is the story of the individual destinies of isolated
civilizations.
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The controversy which rages about Toynbee*s histori­
ography far transcends attempts to identify him with Spengler. 
The charge is made, for example, that Toynbee* s Study is a 
magnificent piece of imaginative literature, but that it is 
not history; nor is it sociology because of the "unscientific11 
method Toynbee employs. Professor Barnes argues, for example, 
that because of his "search for laws and trends in social 
development,11 Toynbee *s efforts should be historical sociology 
rather than history, but since Toynbee ignores the methods 
and literature of sociology, he is obviously no sociologist. 
The answer to this persistent objection to Toynbee is that,
piecemeal criticism by specialists . . . has thus far 
blinded us to the real character of A Study of History.
In the first place, it is not a work of history [in 
the conventional sense]. . .
it is, a fortiori, not a work of archaeology, sociology, 
philosophy, theology, or even all these combined.29
It is, instead, a unique intellectual achievement in its own
right.
. In the second place,
Evaluations of Toynbee are highly contradictory.
They suggest serious misunderstandings and misinterpretations. 
Idealist Collingwood, for example, describes Toynbee as a
30positivist whereas positivist Barnes views him as a mystic.
In view of Toynbee*s method and the confusion it evokes, 
Gustaf Renter concludes that Toynbee»s work must be
"intellectually dangerous and totally false as a picture of
„31 Yet the error is notthe function of historical studies.
His categories, for example, are interpreted 
They should be viewed as ideal or heuristic
all Toynbee*s.
too literally.
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devices designed to penetrate human phenomena that would 
otherwise remain opaque. But they nevertheless disturb 
Toynbee's less imaginative critics; and ill-advised attempts 
to summarize Toynbee exaggerate their arbitrary nature. The 
simple fact is that few have fully understood Toynbee. Even 
Renier--who characterized the Study as intellectually
dangerous--later confessed that he was nnot competent to
««32criticize Toynbee's philosophy of history.
Another common error is the tendency to permit the 
vastness of Toynbee's visionary hopes to discount his analysis 
of specific social and historical problems. Because Toynbee 
attempts a god-like view of history, it does not follow that 
all his specific analyses are necessarily invalid. Nor does 
Toynbee's religious interests necessarily add error to all 
that he says. Secular bias in many of his critics obscures 
many valuable insights and imposes on Toynbee a host of 
imagined difficulties.-^
The objection that Toynbee's work is not history 
stems not only from aversion to interpretive history but 
from confidence that facts alone comprise history and that
the objectivity of these facts can be established as one
Toynbee cautions, however,might establish a natural law.
that,
"history” , . . does not really present the facts, 
all the facts, and nothing but the facts in the 
lives of societies of this species [civilizations]. 
Besides presenting facts, it has recourse to fictions 
and it appeals to laws; and on the other hand there 
certain facts which it leaves alone because they 
not grist to its mill.34-
are
are
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What are the facts ignored by contemporary historians, asks 
Toynbee. They are the facts concerning primitive [pre-historic] 
societies studied by anthropology. They are the facts related 
to the private lives of human beings—subconscious realities 
and emotional states.
The ideal of absolute historical objectivity is a 
useful fiction which the idealist-subjectivistic historians—
nThe realityrather than Toynbee--have called to question, 
of history,11 wrote Ernst Cassirer "is not a uniform sequence
,,35of events but the inner life of man. And Collingwood adds 
that history is the mental reliving of the past by the 
historian. In rejecting positivist historiography, Collingwood
said:
there is no such thing as empirical history, and there 
is no such thing as . . . scientific history. . . .
An historical fact, once genuinely ascertained, grasped 
by the historian*s re-enactment of the agent*s thought 
in his own mind, is already explained.36
Cycles or patterns, therefore, become functions of thought
about history. They are not necessarily in history itself.
The cyclical interpretation of history, for example, Is but
one of several possible patterns. It is a function of the
37limitation of historical knowledge itself. Hence the
interpretation of history--cyclical or linear--is a function 
of a particular common fund of knowledge or ignorance.
Is therefore presentist, relative, and subjective, 
realist-objectivist imagines that he discovers the facts or 
patterns of history, says the subjectivist.
It
The
But his knowledge
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of history and the assurances thereof possess no more 
certainty than ToynbeeTs. Possibly Toynbee may have relived 
history more fully, more empathetically.
j
To the idealist-subjectivist, on the other hand,
Toynbee is a positivist because he believes that his facts 
and patterns possess a degree of objectivity. Toynbee 
believes that he is discovering an objectively real "God at 
work in Life and History." He believes that there are 
objective clues to objective facts in history.
Yet Toynbee recognizes that to gain access to reality, 
useful fictions or ideal categories must be imposed on data 
which mix fact and fiction, reality and myth. This is neces­
sary in order to gain insight into what is taking place. Thus 
universal history is not merely another name for historiography, 
as Collingwood would have us believe, nor is objectivity in 
the study of history impossible. Toynbee does not agree with 
the idealist-subjectivists that the future can in no way be 
extrapolated from the present or the past. Although there is 
always the unique in human phenomena there is also the 
recurrent or persistent, he argues. Irrationality, for 
example--elements of the subconscious--persist. They are not 
eliminated by a growth of rationality. Subconscious elements 
In man account for regularities that reveal themselves on time 
spans exceeding the life span of a single individual. More­
over there are objective clues to these objective realities. 
Because the facts of history possess a degree of objective 
reality, they can be observed externally as well as articulated
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internally and suggestive clues discovered. Re-enactment of 
events in the mind of the historian does not imply isolation 
from the realities without. We note, for example, that the 
present carries with it elements of the past. These are
embedded in the structure of present events, the subconscious, 
even in the universe at large. Hence the assertion by Renier, 
for example, that !! hi story cannot repeat itself. . . The
historian cannot prophesy1’ are strictures that Toynbee cannot
accept in an absolute sense although—one must hasten to add--
Renier admits that,
the whole present ... is a trace of the past. . . .
What is the present? Is it not merely the meeting 
point between the past and future as, according to 
Montaigne, the Stoics proclaimed? Is it a line 
without thickness, a pure abstraction? Not entirely.
The present is that portion of experienced time about 
which we have a feeling that it has not yet been 
absorbed into the past.39
Skepticism in historiography is deceptive. Positivist- 
Realists are not skeptical about historical knowledge as such 
but about philosophy of history, about the meaning of history. 
Idealists and subjectivists, on the other hand, are generally 
skeptical about the objective facticity of historical
he does not view himself as a prophet.
knowledge, including interpretations thereof, but not about 
the philosophy of history as Croce, for example, developed it, 
about the pragmatic value of history for the contemporary
Toynbee assumes a
nor
situation as Dewey, for example, argued, 
somewhat critical objectivism--an intermediate position
between idealism and realism, subjectivism and objectivism. 
For him, there is objectivity with respect to certain aspects
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of the facts and their interpretation, 
meaningless, nor is it the subjective invention of mind, 
myth and fiction are necessary if history is to be made 
intelligible or meaningful, 
may be illustrated as follows:
History is not
Yet
Toynbee!s historical epistemology
MYTHOLOGY
NON-CONCEPTUAL 
NON-SYSTEMATIC EXPERIENCE
ABSOLUTE FACT ABSOLUTE FICTION
CONCEPTUAL
SYSTEMATIC EXPERIENCEHISTORY
The above suggests that human experience is neither 
wholly conceptual nor non-conceptual.^ 
wholly fact or fiction. Mythology expresses more adequately 
the non-conceptual and fictional elements of human experience, 
history the factual and conceptual. A continuum, however, 
must be assumed, for these elements are never totally disjoined. 
Although history is the working of the mind of the historian, 
objective factual elements are not thereby eliminated. Nor
mythological elements eliminated by the conscious narrowing
Consequently the historian, Toynbee 
believes, must confront history in the context of the total
Nor is human knowledge
are
of attention to facts.
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human situation.
In addition to the problem of objectivity, there is
the problem of the nature of events themselves, and the
generalizations that may be suggested by them. Toynbee
believes that phenomena which are the grist of history are
unique and therefore incomparable in some respects but
nevertheless members of a class and therefore comparable in
other respects. Relatively valid generalizations are not
impossible because events are comparable as well as unique.
With Freeman, he believes that,
to master analogies ... to grasp the laws which 
regulate the essential likeness and not to be led 
away by points either of likeness or unlikeness 
which are merely incidental, is the true philosophy 
of history.4l
Though relatively few in number as compared to 
primitive societies, societies that have left historical
records also lend themselves to comparative study within 
limits.^2 Toynbee argues that,
the facts encountered in the study of social life in 
civilizations are not unique intrinsically but only 
accidentally and provisionally, pending the multipli­
cation of the data to a quantity suitable for the 
application of the technique in which laws are eluci­
dated and formulated through the process of comparative 
study [as in the anthropological study of primitive 
societies]. In fine, the facts encountered in the 
study of social life in civilization are not incompar­
able essentially or a priori.43
Toynbee!s quarrel with historian Geyl issues partly from the 
latter's belief that the facts are too plentiful and there­
fore too complex with respect to civilized societies to 
yield reliable or intelligible generalizations. Toynbee, on
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the other hand, argues that because of the relative scarcity 
of facts about civilizations, only tentative insights are
Yet, he continues, it is precisely this challenge 
of a limited knowledge about "man-in-process-of-civilization" 
to which the historian should respond.
Spengler and me, has a chart,” he argues,
possible.
"Geyl, too, like
we all of us have one, whether we own up to it or not, 
and no chart is more than one man's shot at the truth.
f s ] isBut surely, of those three the blank [of Geyl 
the most useless and the most dangerous.44
Geyl, Toynbee continues, is guilty of a serious misunder­
standing of the nature of the operation of the human mind:
One cannot think without mental patterns. All 
historians are bound ... to have general ideas 
about history. . . . Without ideas, they couldn*t 
think a thought, speak a sentence or write a line.
. . . Historians who genuinely believe they have no 
general ideas about history are . . . ignorant of 
the workings of their own minds. . . 
oneself . . „ at the mercy of any fool ideas, if 
they happen to have taken possession of one *s un­
conscious, is surely 
irresponsibility.45
The truth ... is that the Human Intellect is so con­
stituted as to be intrinsically incapable of ever 
thinking about anything at all except in terms of 
uniformities, recurrences, regularities, laws, rhythms, 
plot, and patterns.4^
Hence, Toynbee believes, it is the historians responsibility— 
aside from the accumulation of facts--to examine and articu­
late his assumptions—implicit or explicit.
To do this he must come to grips with the problem of 
the recurrence and uniqueness of phenomena in history:
Overemphasis on recurrence in history may lead to 
either a mystical or a rationalistic interpretation, 
in which perhaps the Buddhist cycle or the Western 
scientific "law" is the key to understanding the
To leave
the height of intellectual
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historical process. . . . [On the other hand] over­
emphasis on the uniqueness of events in history may 
lead to one of many results: miraculous chronicle, 
a literalistic apocalypticism, crass predestination, 
or a theory of automatic linear progress.47
Toynbee carefully avoids both mechanistic meaninglessness and
unintelligible spontaneity. Thus he speaks for those aspects
of human behavior subject to law—that is, regularity or
pattern—and those aspects or conditions which are not. He
recognizes that both the unique and the recurrent must be 
taken into account in any generalization, 
are factors in the human field of action.
Both, he insists, 
They reveal them­
selves in the perennial problem of freedom vs. determinism, 
and since human freedom is a psychic emergent--an optimum
psychic functioning of human personality--it is related to 
the unique, the unpredictable, and the creative, 
hand, lower levels of psychic functioning--the more primitive 
patterns of behavior--in human personality exhibit recurrent 
elements, laws, or regularities which possess a degree of 
predictable uniformity and thereby give the appearance of 
being determined.
The laws of which Toynbee speaks are the observed 
patterns of regularity or recurrence which characterize the 
lower levels of human behavior in the human field of action. 
At these levels, the human field of action is more nearly 
that of the Subconscious Psyche or Organic Nature.
On the other
It is
important to note that Toynbee's laws are not prescriptive
World Mechanism. They aredecrees of God, Nature, or a
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descriptive and relative. Toynbee cautions us that in using 
the term law we tend to transfer its prescriptive function in 
human society to the enigmatic workings of a mysterious
universe and an equally mysterious human psyche. Were we to
take this error seriously, freedom would vanish. Some form
of determinism would be inevitable. Indeed, the failure to
recognize this use by Toynbee of the term law has led some
of his critics to the erroneous conclusion that Toynbee*s
philosophy of history is a form of spiritual determinism.^®
Transfer of the notion ,TlawTf from the human social 
context to the non-human realm of events led to the 
idea of the inexorability of the "law" or an om­
nipotent God of a machine-like Nature. This was 
encouraged by the predictability and control that 
could be ensured through the knowledge of these 
so-called "laws.11 Yet paradoxically the knowledge 
of these "laws" has by no means given Man the measure 
of control he has imagined should be possible.4-9
For Toynbee, therefore, freedom for Man--the unique and
creative aspects of his behavior—is to be found in the
transfer of his field of action from the lower order of
uniformity, conformity, and habit to the realm of creativity 
and freedom which, in its theoretical perfection, is the Law
Law and Freedom in the ideal and ultimateof God Himself.
sense prove, thereby, to be identical because Man*s growth 
to Freedom through etherialization is the Law of God.
Toynbee *s laws or patterns constitute a synthesis of 
the detection of recurrent aspects of human phenomena and 
the subjective sense-making function of ego-consciousness.
In short, both objective and subjective elements enter the
As "human psyche," theformulation of his laws and patterns.
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historian joins life within to life without. He is part of
his own environment and therefore in some sense runs the same 
11 track11 as his world. Insofar as he can get on this "track11 
he is "in the world" in the realistic sense. But the "wheels"
that roll on the track are the unique functionings of the 
elements of his own psyche. These functionings are crucial, 
and the patterns they take are by no means uniform. Thus the 
tracks determine the movement of the "cart" no more or no
less than the "cart" determines the nature of the tracks on
which it must make its way..
The patterns found by the historian are not solely 
Denial by what Toynbee calls the "post- 
Bossuet historians" of patterns in history reflects an 
intellectual dishonesty of serious consequences.
Christian antinomian * nonsense1 historians," Toynbee says, 
lack the essential honesty of bishops Bossuet and Augustine
Instead they employ
wishful thinking.
These "post-
who clearly articulated their patterns.
patterns like the concept of "Europe" with impunity.
assumption of progress, for example, is but "the classical
Jewish-Christian-Muslim [chosen people] pattern thinly
,r50
The
According to Toynbee, 
They are related
disguised in secular modern dress, 
patterns in history are psychic phenomena, 
to the level of human psychic functioning, 
the "human psyche" functions within a continuum of a field of 
action which embraces both "Laws of Inanimate Physical Nature"
This is because
51 The Law of God,and the "Law of God" or "Freedom" Itself. 
says Toynbee,
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reveals the regularity of a single constant aim pursued 
unwaveringly, in the face of all obstacles and in 
response to all challenges, by the intelligence and 
will of a personality. "Laws of Nature” display the 
regularity of a recurrent movement. . . . [This is a 
"vain repetition” unless] they are pictured as being 
the laws of Nature, the wheels that God has fitted to 
His own chariot.52
:
The argument of the Western antinomian historian 
against generalization and patterns is encouraged, says 
Toynbee, by a confusion arising from an identification of 
society during growth with its widespread differentiation of 
culture with the character of history in toto. 
uniqueness--characterizes societies in growth whereas 
uniformities—patterns--are more evident during disintegration 
when ”Laws of Nature” and the ”Laws of the Subconscious” tend
Variety—
to dominate human behavior. Influenced by belief in the
essential Unity of Civilization, antinomian Western historians 
centered attention on the phenomena of growth and therefore 
wrote history in terms of the advance of Civilization as the 
touchstone of value.
Reluctance to seek out the patterns of history is also 
the outcome of a particular development in the history of
Toynbee explains this development as 
The historian deals with unique historical events.
historiography itself.
follows:
As unique events, these would include the miracles of the
But the new ”post-Christian rationalist” 
historian did not wish to embarrass his scientific histori-
He therefore shied
Christian tradition.
ography with these questionable phenomena.
from the unique toward phenomena from which dependableaway
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scientific laws could be deduced--particularly those that 
would support the idea of progress. For a time, progress 
became the guiding principle of historiography as well as of
the social sciences. The assumption was made, Professor 
Teggart says,
that the scientific study of change must have for 
its aim the determination of the "natural” or normal 
course of development of social groups, abstractions 
being made from the "accidental" interferences or 
hindrances occasioned by historical "events". . . . 
[which were] irrelevant for the purposes of scientific 
inquiry in the investigation of "progress."53
In short, nothing could make sense if it could not be framed
in terms of Western values.
The uniqueness of historical events, however, could 
not be denied—even though they could not be accounted for. 
Accordingly the historian who aped the natural scientist in 
his search for facts and laws confined himself to the more
secure task of simply collecting the facts alone to the 
exclusion of discovering patterns as well as to the exclusion
This led, Toynbee believes, 
to the development of "nonsense" historiography which,
of the miraculous or unnatural.
ironically, became the most unscientific of all the sciences.
By abandoning the search for patterns or laws, the embarrassing 
necessity of explaining facts was precluded, 
interesting situation arose, says Toynbee, in which sociologists 
took over the task of trying to make sense of "man-in-process- 
of-civilization" while historians persisted in trying not to make
But when the antinomian historian
But then an
sense of this phenomenon.
81
boasts that,
he is unconscious of any plot, rhythm, or pattern 
in his panorama of the Universe, he is telling us 
in effect that he is at the mercy of whatever pattern, 
rhythm, or plot that may be in invisible occupation 
of his professedly empty . . . mental house.5lj-
And this, to be sure, Toynbee continues, is the antithesis of
"One of my aims in A Study of History."
he says, "has been to try out the scientific approach to human
affairs and to test how far it will carry us [in the study of
history].
in historiography, Toynbee believes, has in fact been a timid 
and fearful caricature of it.
the scientific attitude.
What has been advanced as the scientific attitude
What one may call the nonsense view of history has 
been fashionable among Western historians for the 
last few generations*. The odd thing is that some 
holders of this view . . . defend it principally on 
the ground that it is scientific. . . . But how strange 
to suppose that one is being scientific by despairing 
of making sense* For what is science? . . 
science of man [may be ] . . . difficult . .
"the proper study of mankind is man."56
The
. [but]
These antinomian Western historians, charges Toynbee, made
a still more overweening assumption that was even 
more unwarrantable. . . . [They] denied the validity 
of "laws of Nature" as well as . . . "the Law of God" 
in the realm of the affairs of Man in Process of 
Civilization.57
In view of the dilemma in which Toynbee believes that 
historians had placed themselves, he sought a fresh approach 
that would combine the insights of mythology with the precision 
of the scientific method.-^® He also turned to the comparative
"This comparative treatment can be extended
"It is . . . the method
case study method.
to the whole of history," he said.
ii 59of the human sciences.
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The comparative method is not original with Toynbee.
In applying it, he attempts a careful study of the specific 
content and conditions of a particular problem in different 
societies as, for example, the intensification of fratricidal 
conflict in a particular society. He imposes categories which 
serve as functional guides to the comprehension of otherwise 
imponderable or opaque historical configurations. An example 
is the idea of etherialization. Etherialization is not a 
physical entity or a quantifiable phenomenon as such.. Yet it 
serves as a heuristic device for the study of growth. It
becomes, in a sense, an ideal-typical generalization—an
abstract ion--which Max Weber (l86ij.-1929) believed could nbe
made that [was] not entirely limited to specific historical
„60complexes at specific times and places, 
parative method runs counter to the more critical methods of
Toynbee!s cora-
the social sciences because he gives a freer play to imagin­
ation and speculation and because he does not absolutize his
cultural relativism.
Toynbeefs generalizations follow from his conviction
that as content of thought, history cannot be rendered
Toynbee f s objective,intelligible apart from guiding ideas.
therefore, is to establish, to articulate, and to apply the 
most useful and most adequate of these ideas, 
a qualified objective reality because they are embodied in 
real events as well as in thought, but they should not be
Moreover Toynbee attempts to avoid the
They possess
taken too literally, 
insularity of historicism and its absolute relativism. An
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ideal-typical generalization lfis never a statistical mode or 
mean; it is a deliberate accentuation of even distortion of 
empirical reality for the purpose of gaining scientific control
In other words, it is a useful device 
for rendering unique events amenable to constructive analysis. 
It is a device not unknown to the physical as well as the 
social sciences.
t.62over that reality.
Because Toynbee uses this particular technique,
Collingwood asserted that his "great Study of History repre-
1,63 Insents a restatement of the positivistic view itself, 
reality, however, Toynbee*s method is one of compromise, 
combines the demand for an imaginative cultural relativism 
with the legitimate interest in the persisting or universal 
elements of human culture from which generalizations may be 
derived.^
It
The so-called Toynbeean scandal and heresy turns out 
to be somewhat less repugnant than it is sometimes made out
Like most students of society, Toynbee uses a model— 
in his case the Hellenic civilization--to which other cases 
fimile Durkheim (1858-1917), for example, 
directed attention to studies of primitive religion in
to be.
are referred.
Australia from which he projected generalizations, and 
Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942) and Margaret Mead (1884- )
The danger, however, is thatemploy a similar technique, 
intensive specialization and lack of perspective may lead to
Toynbee *s work on a broad canvasunreliable generalization.
suffer from glaring inaccuracies in particular instances.may
8^
But It is a nice question as to which is the greater offense. 
The remedy for subjectivity as well as for the inevitable 
distortions of historiography, is the development of a genuine 
historical consciousness which can replace the provincialism 
of particular history and particular social studies with ”the 
broad and salutary idea of universal history.
Of the objections to Toynbee!s Study, the charge that 
he fits the facts to a preconceived pattern is the most 
universal and perhaps the most serious.^
scrutiny. The charge that Toynbee is selective is difficult 
to support as a legitimate objection if one is not prepared 
to demonstrate that Toynbee consciously and deliberately 
subordinates the selection of data to a dogmatically precon­
ceived theory.
„65
It merits careful
Cognitive functioning of the human psyche is a 
selective process from the most elemental of physical sen­
sations to the most erudite of philosophical theory, 
abstractive process of selection--to say nothing of symbol 
associations--Is concomitant to the process of a posteriori
The
To say that the human organism learns 
from experience is to say, for example, that it selects or
Moreover it can be said that this
knowledge itself.
abstracts from experience.
is the very function which distinguishes man from the lower
Given the same physicalMan is more selective, 
or external situation, man Is superior--insofar as he can be 
said to be superior—in that he Is able to abstract and
forms of life.
!
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internalize more content from the raw data of experience.
Now it is said that Toynbee selects facts favorable to his 
theory as though he were functioning in the mechanical manner 
of the bee filling a honeycomb. But it is precisely the 
opposite that more nearly characterizes Toynbee*s approach. 
Toynbee develops an intimate association with a mass of 
historical information and from the whole of this intuits 
patterns which--in his intellectual context—appear to make 
sense. The patterns may be the product of poetic insight or 
of any other process which characterizes human psychic 
functioning. The important point is that by the time the 
particulars are reviewed with respect to where they will fit, 
Toynbee has already experienced them and integrated them into 
the whole of his thought and feeling about history. It would 
appear that it may be some of Toynbee*s critics rather than 
Toynbee who resort to the mechanical process of gathering or 
selecting facts on the basis of unexamined assumptions as to 
what is to be gathered or what is not to be gathered or the 
value-systems which are to be the criteria for the gathering.
It is they, rather than Toynbee, who in the process of fact 
finding force reality into a frame of reference which may be 
neither their own nor derived from the facts but an unconscious 
participation mystique in the prevailing Zeitgeist. Actually, 
Toynbee*s philosophy of history derives from considerable 
experience prior to 1921, and because of subsequent experience 
Is later altered.
Xf one were to attempt to explain misinterpretations
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of Toynbee--aside from analyses of his specific errors--three 
factors would need to be cited: the tendency to interpret 
him too literally in the application of his categories, a 
marked secular bias, and the failure to appreciate his 
psychological premises. Toynbeefs psychology is almost 
entirely overlooked by his readers. Yet it is the key to 
the understanding of his entire philosophy of history.
For Toynbee, the subconscious is the well-spring of 
human drives, the !ffount of Poetry, Music, and the Visual 
Arts, and the channel through which the Soul is in communion
..67with God. The dynamics of human personality are therefore 
the real contents of history, and the examination of these
dynamics leads Toynbee to the conviction that religion is 
the central fact in the life of man.
Not since Bishop Bossuet has the Western world pro­
duced a history so committed to this conviction, 
the great Christian scholars have not generally been great 
historians as well, and Western historians have either 
rejected Christian hypotheses or have set them aside to write
For nearly three hundred years, no Western
In the West,
their histories.
scholar of Toynbee!s caliber has so frankly sought to
Because of this,synthesize the two on so vast a scale, 
historians have been prone to doubt whether Toynbee is really 
a historian, and theologians whether Toynbee is really a
68Christian.
If we examine the objections to Toynbee's religious
note that a marked secular biashistoriography, however, we
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is the distinct and distorting factor, 
sees in Toynbee!s Study a "preconceived theology which has 
no empirical base in the facts of history, 
such obviously puerile charges that Toynbee believes that
It is the bias that
=
,,69 It prompts
9
-
<
"Western civilization has little hope of survival except in
70 Thea Second Coming of Our Lord under Anglican auspices."
late Irwin Edman, for example, erred grievously when his
naturalistic bias prompted him to object to Toynbee on the
ground that "it is unhistorical to treat other high religions
,,71as 'inferior1 forms of Christianity, 
stated that,
I am not entitled to call myself a Christian: I must 
call myself a Symmachan [if Christian exclusiveness 
is inescapable], Symmachus1s confession of faith—
"It is not possible to reach to the heart of so great 
a mystery by one road only"—is an article in my 
creed which neither my head nor my heart will allow
me to abandon.72
Positivist antipathy to Toynbee stems from an almost
73automatic antipathy to any form of religious expression. J 
Under the sterilizing spotlight of positivist scrutiny 
Toynbee's Study becomes dangerous—or perhaps harmless--
Yet Toynbee clearly
nonsense.
The contemporary intellectual lives in the memory of 
But the Age of Reason has passed.5 Thethe Age of Reason, 
pendulum has swung back to a new age of religious concerns. 
Where he has not returned to an ancestral religion, con-
.
=
temporary man has sought out and attached himself to new 
The situation is irksome to the traditional 
rationalist who can find no convincing answer for slave labor
faiths.
■
■
■
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! !and the concentration camp. Toynbee reflects the spirit of 
the times. His presence is as disturbing as his short­
comings are intolerable. Moreover, like Augustine who 
pointed to the medieval world and Machiavelli who heralded
!
.
1
i
!
the modern age, Toynbee points to the post-modern world in 
the offing. This is his real offense to the rationalists, 
for they prefer to cling to the wishful hope that religion, 
irrationality and myths will be abandoned in the new anti-
■
septic utopia of science. Instead, Toynbee points to 
religion and says that man cannot live by bread alone but 
will idolize whatever his value system sets up as ultimate.
Since the Renaissance, the Western World has tried 
to reconcile the classical and Christian views of history. 
This was achieved abortively by secularizing Augustine. The 
future hope and the dynamic creationism of Augustine's 
philosophy of history was made over into a naturalistic 
theory free of the pessimism of the classical world as well 
as Christian supernaturalism. Turgot, for example, expressed 
this spiritual tour de force when he described the physical 
universe of Newton as a natural "wheel" by which the "vain 
repetitions" carried the vehicle of Mankind along the road 
of Progress.^
;
Toynbee, however, has rendered more adequately the 
synthesis that has been the burden of Western scholarship
He has done this by invoking thesince the Renaissance.
realistically cyclical view of the ancients and a frankly
He deliberatelyChristian view of God, Man, and Destiny.
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circumvents the more palatable but less accurate secular view 
of history that includes the idea of progress. Like Jacques 
Maritain, he places God at the center of the historical
process, and the forces which oppose God "serve the work of 
God despite themselves . The goal of history becomes two-
nthe transfiguration of the temporal order" and a
"final transfiguration" whereby the redeemed "become gods by
*76
fold:
participation in the divine life. "History wins meaning
and value for Man in so far as Man co-operates in History 
with God."^ Toynbee1s major premise is that religion is 
the central and determining factor in the life and destiny
It is "higher religion" for which purpose Civili-of Man.
zations, Universal States, and Barbarian War Bands as well
All contributeas Universal Churches come into existence.
to the religious destiny of Man. The Universal State pro­
vides the source of the Universal Church. During social
disintegration, it splits into two alienated factions: 
Internal Proletariat that forms the Universal Church and a
an
Dominant Minority whose action channels creative energy to 
the Church. Barbarian War Bands no less contribute to the 
advance of higher religion:
The higher religions that . . . come to flower 
[are] created by the Internal proletariats of 
civilizations of the second generation which had 
been affiliated with their own predecessors of the 
first generation through barbarian war-bands.79
If we trace the genealogy of Christianity, for
Minoan Civilization-* 
etc. )
example, we note the following relations: 
post-Minoan barbarians (Philistines, Achaeans,
90
Hellenic Civilization (incl. Alexander and Rome) —7 Christi­
anity by the Hellenic Internal Proletariat, 
trated, this development becomes as follows:
Broadly illus-
80
CIVILIZATIONS IN 
GROWTH AS INTELLI­
GIBLE ENTITIES
CIVILIZATIONS IN DISINTE­
GRATION AS NO LONGER IN­
TELLIGIBLE ENTITIES
SOCIAL
ENTITY
FORMED
Creative Minority-^ Dominant Minority —v Universal State 
Quiescent Majority—^ External Proletariat —yBarbarian War Bands
Internal Proletariat—f Universal Church
The creative phenomenon of growth—etherialization—shifts 
from the Creative Minority to the Internal Proletariat and 
then to a Universal Church, The genealogy of human societies 
and their relationships to each other as well as to the 
emergence of higher religion may be diagrammed as illustrated 
on the following page.
The elaboration of this genealogy transcends the scope 
of this particular dissertation. However the diagram serves 
to illustrate several important points. It is noted, for
example, that the Universal Church is identified with Higher 
This identification is somewhat confusing becauseReligion.
one is never quite sure whether Toynbee is referring to the 
Universal Church as a higher species of human society as such 
or to the Universal Church as higher religion--the mystical
One should also observe that the chrysalis-goal of life.
church function of producing civilizations applies only to
Moreover, it should be observed thattertiary civilizations.
Universal Churches are not necessary for the emergence of
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ECUMENICAL TRANS-CHRISTIAN SOCIETY?
Rudimentary Secondary 
Higher Religions
\
■
TERTIARY CIVILIZATIONS
/ t :Christianity Mahayana Hinduism
t ^
HIGHER RELIGIONS (in four cases only—not every ca.se) 
(UNIVERSAL CHURCHES)
tInternal Proletariat
Rudimentary 
Higher Religion SECONDARY CIVILIZATIONS
External Proletariat or Dominant
Minority
PRIMARY CIVILIZATIONS (Failed to produce higher
religions. Primarily the 
result of response to 
physical challenges)i
PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES
t Main line of etherialization as progress
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primary civilizations. Neither are they necessary for the
emergence of secondary civilizations. Furthermore there is
no indication that they will perform the chrysalis-function
ft?for any fourth generation civilizations.
fifth volume of A Study. Toynbee observed that,
when we examine the universal churches we shall 
find ourselves led to raise the question whether 
the churches can really be comprehended in their 
entirety in the framework of the histories of 
civilizations, within which they make their first 
historical appearances or whether, we have not to 
regard them as representatives of another species 
"Civilization” as the civilizations are distinct 
from primitive socleties.^3
As early as the
Moreover:
Instead of seeing some new church spring from the 
ploughed-up soil of an internal proletariat [of 
Western civilization] in order to serve as the 
executor and residuary legatee of a civilization 
that has broken down and gone into disintegration 
[assuming ex hypo the si that it has], we may yet 
live to see a civilization which has tried and 
failed to stand alone, being saved, in spite of 
itself, from a fatal fall by being caught in the 
arms of an ancestral church which it has vainlv 
striven to push away and keep at arms1 length.“4*
In Toynbee*s later pronouncements (1955) the ancestral church—
that is Christianity—is chastened by its encounter with the
It is thereby transformed by thisother higher religions, 
encounter into what this writer has taken the liberty to
This new "religious"describe as a "trans-Christian" society.
society may exhibit characteristics not yet clearly discernible. 
It may—and Toynbee hopes that it will--exhibit a spiritual 
unity comparable to the technological unity which Western
It may, for example, revivescience has imposed on the world, 
the spirit of cosmopolitanism enjoyed by the Western world
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after the Treaty of Westphalia (l61j.8) until the French 
Revolution when the West gradually returned to the fanaticism 
of the earlier Wars of Religion and suffered the terrible 
events of the twentieth century. All this, of course, is not 
clear, nor can it be, for no one can predict which of several
possible alternatives contemporary man will take.
Returning to the genealogy, it is noted that Primary 
Civilizations are the response in special instances of 
Primitive Societies to physical challenges such as desiccation, 
floods, etc. as they are found, for example, in the Nile,
Tigris and Euphrates, and Yellow River Valleys, Secondary 
civilizations like the Hellenic are formed by either a 
Dominant Minority or, in the case of the Hellenic itself, by 
Barbarian War Bands comprising the External Proletariat of 
an earlier Primary Civilization, The fact that in four cases 
higher religions as universal churches performed the chrysalis 
function and in four cases only suggests to Toynbee that this 
may not be as significant as he had earlier thought it to be. 
Toynbee’s uncertainty on this point was resolved by a major 
reorientation of his theory from the position that higher 
religions perform the chrysalis function for civilizations 
to the position that, on the contrary, the significance of
civilizations stems from the fact that they are the vehicles
11 The history of Religion,” hefor the advance of religion, 
says, “appears to be unitary and progressive by contrast with 
the multiplicity and repetitiveness of the histories of
“Religion is the true end of Man, and . .t,86civilizations.
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civilizations have their raison d'etre in ministering to 
spiritual progress.”®^
The function of secondary and tertiary civilizations 
in ministering to the advance of religion is clear: the 
secondary civilizations—in four instances—produced genuine 
higher religions through the spiritual trauma of their 
respective internal proletariats and the tertiary civili­
zations have all yielded to one tertiary civilization—the 
West—whose technology has made possible—if not necessary— 
a greater spiritual unity of man in the ending of war even 
as slavery was earlier abolished. In contrast to the 
apparently increasing importance of the contribution of 
later civilizations to religion, Primary Civilizations played 
a lesser role. They arose as responses to physical challenges. 
They were the first accomplishments of Man-in-Process-of- 
Civilization. Their function in Toynbee!s scheme is to
prepare the way for greater things to come by providing the 
rudimentary experiments in higher religion which through the 
Internal Proletariat of the next generation of Civilizations
No longer is religion—asbecome genuine Higher Religions.
Toynbee earlier viewed it—a mere cultural plane within
That the secular serves the higher end ofcivilizations.
religion suggests itself to Toynbee by virtue of the fact 
that Western Civilization is becoming increasingly ecumenical — 
particularly in its economic and political planes, 
cultural aspects are in dynamic encounter with the surviving 
remnants of other civilizations all of which are in
Its
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disintegration. The outcome that suggests itself to Toynbee 
is an order of society which transcends both Higher Religion
and Civilization as they are known today. This is the 
immediate destiny of Man—if he survives his present crisis—
In short, Toynbee 
does not believe that the pattern of the fall of the West and 
the rise of a new civilization after the manner of the fall 
of the Hellenic and the rise of the West will be repeated.
A new phenomenon is in the making.
Toynbee^ historiography is unique. It is geared to 
the data with which he comes to grips and the purposes for 
which his study of history is made. When prosaic methods 
fail, he does not hesitate to turn to poetry and myth. Yet 
he strives to be scrupulously empirical. The insuperable 
task of charting events, 11 the intolerable wrestle with words 
and meanings” do not discourage him.
The price of greatness is the risk of offense and 
error. No worthwhile venture is sure. Its failures are but 
invitations to greater effort. Toynbee!s offense is that he 
has ventured into the unknown. He has risked error in order 
that he might gain wisdom. His conclusions are not final, 
nor is his method infallible. No one is more aware of this 
than Toynbee himself. Whatever may be his wrongs, his 
monumental Study has challenged the modern scholar to plumb 
for new depths and to reach for new horizons in grappling 
with the mystery of man.
88and Toynbee rather thinks that he will.
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we can foresee the precise shadow of particular coming events 
only a very short way ahead." (Arnold Toynbee, Civilization 
on Trial [New York: Oxford University Press, 1948 J, p. 201+. ) 
Toynbee in numerous passages throughout A Study denies that 
he is a prophet.
39Renier, op. cit 100.P-• 9
1+0J. Pollard, !,An Inquiry into the Status of Non- 
Conceptual Experience," The Christian Scholar, XXXVI (1955), 
PP. 6ff.
^Freeman, op. cit., pp. 32f.
/ ^Toynbee believes that compared to "facts" about 
primitive societies--about which societies over six-hundred 
are known--"facts" about "Man-in-Process-of-Civilization" 
are relatively scarce. Man has lived on the earth well 
over 300,000 years, yet civilizations have existed only 
around 6,000 years, and the highest number of successive 
generations is only three. As a human phenomenon, civili­
zation is relatively recent. This fact cannot be ignored.
(A Study. I, op. cit., 173, 233, and L+6X; IX, op. cit., 210.) 
Cf. studies by L. T. Hobhouse, et al., in The Material 
Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples
(London: Chapman & Hall, 1915), PP- 30-lj-4 in which the
authors list 650 contemporary primitive societies.
i
43 1+58.Toynbee, A Study. I, op. cit • 9
^Pieter Geyl, A. J. Toynbee, and Pitirim Sorokin,
The Pattern of the Past (Boston: The Beacon Press, 191+9), 
p. 7H7” Geyl argues that the "facts" are too plentiful and 
too complex to yield meaningful "patterns." Hence history 
can give no guidance for the future in the sense that 
Toynbee believes that it can. ("Toynbee the Prophet," 
op. cit.. pp. 271f.) Cf. "Toynbeefs System of Civilizations," 
Journal of the History of Ideas. IX (January, 1948), 93-124; 
and "Prophets of Woe,Tr Virginia Quarterly Review. XXVI 
October, 1950), 587-602.
^Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," op. cit
Pattern of the Past, op. cit..
P. 3.• 9
Cf. Toynbee in Geyl, et. al 
pp. 91f.
• 9
^Toynbee, A Study, IX, op - 
historian Collingwood argues that the cyclical view of history
cit., 201. Idealist
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is [itself] . 0 . a formulation of the limitations of 
historical knowledge. Everyone who has any historical know­
ledge at all sees history in cycles [of some sort]," ("The 
Theory of Historical Cycles: II, Cycles and Progress," 
Antiquity; A Quarterly Review of Archaeology, December,
1927, pp. Renier, op. cit., p. 221 adds: "Every
historian holds [and imposes] a systematic and generalized 
view about the course taken in the past by human affairs."
^Harris E. Harbison, "The Problem of the Christian 
Historian," Theology Today, V (October, 1948), 391. Harbison 
observes that "when Toynbee writes as a student of con­
temporary international affairs, he emphasizes uniqueness; 
when he writes as a historian of civilization, he emphasizes 
re currence." (Ibid
problem in Civilization on Trial, op. cit
^®The .charge that Toynbee’s philosophy of history is 
a form of determinism is a grievous error. Yet it is not 
infrequently encountered. Some examples may be found in 
Ernst Zahn, Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte (Zurich: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, Koln und Opladen, 195h);Geyl, loc. cit.; 
Barnes, loc. cit. Professor Barnes, for example, sees irhis 
whole work [as J ", a majestic effort to establish the reality 
of a creative, spiritual determinism." (Introduction to the 
History of Sociology [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
I9IJB J, p. 719); and Wolfe, loc. cit.. charges Toynbee with 
"an unconscious ’Calvinism.1u .
^Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit 
to the ’Law of God’ to resolve his dilemma, a human soul has 
to abandon certainty in order to embrace Hope and Fear for 
a law that is the expression of a [personal, theistic] will 
animated by a spiritual freedom . . . [and] is the very 
antithesis of the saeva necessitas of laws of Nature."
(Ibid., p. 173.)
PP. l+03f. ) Toynbee discusses this
Chaps. V and XII.• 9 • f
172. "In appealing• 9
^°Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," op. cit 
^Toynbee, A Study. IX, op. cit 
^2Ibid
P. 3.• )
pp. 300-404.• 9
lux,.. p. 174. Cf. A Study. IV, op. cit., pp. 34“48. 
Toynbee appears to be influenced by Turgot at this point.
-^Frederick 
Yale University Press
of History (New Haven:J. Teggart, Theory c 
, 1925), PP. 85-87.
-^Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 197.
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^Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," loc. cit.
56 Pattern of the Past, op. citGeyl, et. al • f• 9
PP. 79f.
57Toynbee, A Study. IX, op. cit 217.
.. p. 288, re Toynbee1s 
"For Mr. Toynbee, history
• 9
58See Thompson, op. cit 
synthesis of science and myth, 
and the techniques for studying it are a curious blend of 
science and fiction." (Ibid.)
59Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," op. cit., p8 3. 
Toynbee believes that the "academic division between history 
and the social sciences is an accidental [and unfortunate] 
one. ... We need to throw history and the social sciences 
together into a single comprehensive study of human affairs." 
(Ibid.) Ralph Barton Perry addresses himself to the objection 
that history is not like science in that it is ideographic 
rather than nomographic with the. comment that "knowledge, 
whether scientific or historical, is ’ideographic1 [and] 
both [science and history] . . . are [also] tomographic1. . . 
The difference lies in the fact that while natural science is 
primarily for the purpose of verifying the law, the historian 
is primarily interested in the individual and in the law as 
a means of knowing the individual." (Perry, op. cit.t p. 387.)
Quoted in Barnes and Becker, Contemporary Social 
Theory, op. cit.. p. 768. Cf. Barnes, Historical Sociology, 
op. cit., pp. 60f.
61Ibid., p. 769. The idea of "etherialization" is, 
for example, an "ideal" construct..
62Ibid.
^collingwood, Idea of History, op. cit., p. 159. 
Collingwood charges that Toynbee’s method is derived from the 
natural sciences. He says that Toynbee’s "principles are 
based on the conception of external relations . . 
discrete facts, ... If the scientist’s methods are to work 
the first thing necessary is that a clear line should
. . These are the 
(Ibid.,
. [of]
at all,
be drawn between one fact and another. . 
principles on which Toynbee deals with history, 
pp. l6lf.) Collingwood believed that Toynbee cut history into 
sections dealing with distinctly and mutually exclusive 
societies after the manner of Spengler. This is the positivist
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conception of individuality,” he argued. "The inner and 
outer are mutually exclusive [as] the individuality possessed 
by a stone. . . . Toynbee* s . . . general conception of 
history is [therefore] naturalistic. ... He regards 
history as a mere spectacle, something consisting of facts 
observed and recorded by the historian.” (Ibid., pp. l63f.) 
In rejecting subjectivism, however, Toynbee did not win the 
plaudits of orthodox objectivists.
reviews of Toynbee see in his Study a "theology employing 
selected facts of history to illustrate the will of God, 
the medieval bestiaries utilized biological fantasies to 
achieve the same results.” (Barnes, Historical Sociology. 
op. cit.. p. 110.) Elsewhere Barnes laments the "mystical 
fog currently being spread by . . . Professor Toynbee,"
(Ibid.. p. 119), and Geyl asserts that Toynbee writes in the 
spirit of Augustine. (Pattern of the Past, op. cit., p. 13.) 
Other examples of this kind of criticism appear in Ashley- 
Montagu (ed.), op. cit.
Positivist and realist
as
^Although Toynbee and Max Weber arrive at vastly 
different conclusions—Toynbee discovering a religious destiny 
for man and Weber a secular one—both stress the use of the 
culture case study method. This method is essentially a 
compromise between historicism and social Darwinism. See 
Barnes and Becker, Contemporary Social Theory, op. cit.,
Chap. 15, and Barnes, Historical Sociology, op. cit., p. 59.
^H. Berr and L. Pebvre, "History,” 
the Social Sciences, ed. E. R. A. Seligman and A. Johnson 
(New York: The Macmillan Co
Encyclopedia of
193k), VII, 357f.• 9
66Barnes, Historical Sociology, op. cit., p. Ill, 
speaks of Toynbee * s "erroneous method of . . . [thinking] 
out in advance a pattern of cultural development and [seeking] 
ethnographic data ... to confirm [his] thesis." Cf. Sir 
Ernest Barker, "Dr. Toynbee*s Study of History: A Review 
[of Vols. VII-X incl.]," International Affairs. XXXI (January, 
1955), 7. Perry observes--and rightly so--that Toynbee is a 
victim of the task he essays to accomplish--to take in the 
entire sweep of history and to avoid having to force the 
facts on occasion. "[Toynbee*s] very temper of empiricism, 
and his scrupulous scholarship," says Perry, "emphasize the 
difficulty of escaping dogmatism in the attempt to make a 
unified drama of the totality of historical facts." (Realms 
of Value, op. cit., p. 387.)
67Toynbee, A Study, VII, QP. cit., £00. In this view, 
therefore, "the principles of historiography are not to be 
discovered by a comparative study of the procedures actually
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followed by students of history. They are embedded in ethics 
and metaphysics. Before settling down to his task the 
historian must have made up his mind as to what he is to think 
of human nature.” (Helmut Kuhn, dialectic in History,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas. X (January, 191+9), 29.
68A particularly worthwhile study of this problem 
will be found in Harbison, op. clt. Cf. Edmund D. Soper, 
"Arnold Toynbee and the Preacher,^ The Garrett Tower. XXX 
(March, 1955), 1-5; and Martin Wright in Toynbee !s A Study, 
VII, op. cit.. Annex, 737.
"pan-Hinduism..” Toynbee, however, steadfastly reaffirms what 
he believes to be the essential articles of the Christian 
faith: ”1 believe that the Jewish-Christian belief that
individual human souls are of supreme value in the sight of 
God is the historical origin and the abiding—though now 
submerged--f oundation of our Western belief [s], .. . . Our 
surest hope lies in the appeal of this religion to all men 
at all times everywhere." (Arnold J. Toynbee, Will Herberg, 
and Hans Morgenthau, "The Revolution We Are Living Through," 
Intercollegian. LXXII (February, 1955], 1+. )
69Edward J, Ryan, "A Critical Evaluation of A. J. 
Toynbee as Historiographer of Chinese Civilization Before 
500 A.D.” (Unpublished Master*s thesis, Claremont Graduate 
School, 191|8), P. 217. Hughes, op. cit., p. llj.0, also 
charges that "as a good Christian, Toynbee cannot ... be a 
historical or ethical relativist. For him, Christianity . . 
represents final truth."
70' Barnes, Historical Sociology, op. cit., p. 110.
^Irwin Edman, "Review of A Study of History,” 
Saturday Review of Literature, XXXI (May, 1948), 9.
Soper and Wright lament Toynbee*s
"^Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. clt.. Ij.28, n. 2.
'^A good example of this "positivist antipathy" is 
the treatment of Toynbee in Charles Frankel, The Case for 
Modern Man (New York: Harper and Bros., 1935), Chap. IX.
37, n. 3.7kToynbee, A Study, IV, op. clt
"^Jacques Maritain, True Humanism (London: Centenary 
Press, 1939), p. 8L|.. Cf. pp. tSb-lUb'.' An excellent study may 
be found in Mueller, op. clt. Actually Toynbee reflects the 
creative dynamism of Bergsonian and Jewish metaphysics.
• 9
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76Jacques Maritain, Freedom in the Modern World (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), pp. 49, 8l. Cf. pp. l56f
^Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. clt
78rbid., p. 449. Cf. pp. 445-48.
7<^Toynbee, A Study. VIII, op, clt
756..• 9
89.• f
80Ibid., p. 88 et passim. I8i
^Toynbee, A Study, VII, op.. cit. , 1|1l8 et passim.
The term "ecumenical trans-Christian society" is not Toynbee's
but the writer's. It appears to best describe what Toynbee 
believes to be emerging. He is confident of a unification of 
the world either through voluntary cooperation or the coercive 
action of a Universal State. To outline Toynbee's entire 
philosophy of history would be impractical within the limits 
of this dissertation. Moreover, a summary statement would 
add little to those already available and no summary would be 
free from misleading generalizations. For summary treatment 
of Toynbee, therefore, see Edward D. Myers, "Some Leading
bee's A Study of History," Theology Today. I 
378-94 and "The Unity of History: An Epitome
T7- ____ __ ~ -P m ^ I « A G4---./4'**- TJ-? f ovrrr T1
:
i
Ideas from Toynt 
(October, 1944-),
of the Concluding Volumes of Toynbee's A Study of History. 
Theology Today. XI (October, 1954-) 9 312-34- For Vols. I-VI 
incl., cf. also the "Argument of the Somervell abridgement of 
Toynbee's Study, pp. 567-89,
:
:
1
:
82Ibld.. pp. 4llff., Table IV.
8^Toynbee, A Study, V, op. clt 
169 and VII, op. clt.. 392.
8^Ibid.. p. 193.
8^Toynbee, A Study. VII, op. clt.. 423.
23. Cf. VI,• 9
op. clt • 9
86Ibid/, p. 4-85.
87Ibld.. p. 448. cf. p. 445.
88Cf. Jaspers' thesis, The Origin and Goal of History, 
trans.. Michael Bullock (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 
that there is emerging the dawn of "world history.
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CHAPTER IV
TOYNBEE’S THEORY OF MAN, SOCIETY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
History is the story of the life of human societies 
and, in the final analysis records the deeds of men as 
individuals and in groups. Hence some theory of man and 
society, explicit or implicit, must undergird a philosophy 
of history. Toynbee’s philosophy of history is grounded in 
the conviction that man, institutions, and society share a 
common destiny insofar as the personal and the social inter­
relate. Hence he devotes considerable attention to a theory 
of man and a theory of society.
For Toynbee, the problem of human society is essen­
tially the problem of human personality, and human personality 
is part of a vast psychic continuum which embraces sub- 
consciousness as well as consciousness. Human personality 
embraces also an external field of action. Its dimensions 
are therefore infinite, and its roots reach into the biological 
and social origins of human life itself; in the final analysis, 
human personality is grounded in God."1" 
directly influences Toynbee’s view of the nature of society 
and the dynamic of personal and social processes.
Theories of society are limited by two extreme positions. 
The first is that society constitutes an aggregate of autonomous
This view of man
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Individuals. The second is that society is a superorganism 
from which are abstracted individuals. Both these extremes
Toynbee rejects:
A human society is not a whole of which the indi­
vidual human beings are parts, any more than it is 
an aggregate of individual human atoms that are 
free to associate or dissociate at will. . . .
Human society is, in itself, a relation; a particu­
lar kind of relation between human beings who are 
not only individuals but are also social animals in 
the sense that they could not exist at all—or at 
any rate not humanly—without being in this social 
relationship with one another.2
Man is neither a selfless ant nor an Ismaelitish 
Cyclops, but a social animal in whose nature there 
is not a Frazerian [or Freudian] 
disharmony1 between the individual and society. . . .
The individual can only express and develop his 
personality through relations with other personalities, 
while, conversely, Society is nothing but the common 
ground between one individual's network of relation­
ships and another's.3
Toynbee's view of man and society is not incongruent 
with contemporary social theory. Social psychologist Solomon
:
!
pre-established
-i
Asch, for example, defines society as Mthe inclusive content
of the processes that occur between men;
Aberle and his associates define society as,
a group of human beings sharing a self-sufficient 
system of action . . . a 
the actors participate.5
Indeed, their participation is the basis of their humanity.
Man's essence is not to be found in isolated indi­
viduals, but in his bonds with his generation and 
his society. ... It is in inter-personal communi­
cation that man becomes a self, a persona. ...
The biological individual becomes a self in personal 
existence when and insofar as he steps into a living 
relation with other selves.6
and Professor
system of action in which
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The significant fact about human personality and
social processes is that these,
processes occurring between entities both of which 
have a psychological structure will differ from 
interactions between things or between person and
thing.7
Men live together in a world of meaning [and value] 
only because there is a prior undergirding social 
process within which their biologic lives are set.
. . . The primary situation for observation, therefore, 
is a field in which one1s self is present in the same
way that other selves and physical
[and to which the self responds].°
objects are present
This approach to the nature of society leads directly
to Toynbee*s "society as the interaction of fields-of-actionn
theory. For Toynbee, the essence of humanity lies in what
happens in and between men, and the primary data for study
is the human "field of action" and its interaction with other
"fields of action." Thus Toynbee defines society as,
a relation between individuals; and this relation of 
theirs consists in the coincidence of their individual 
field of action; and this coincidence combines the 
individual fields into a common ground; and this 
common ground is what we call society. Inasmuch as an 
individual*s field of action is a part or aspect of 
the individual himself, each single individual is in 
a sense coextensive and indeed identical with the whole 
of society. ... On the other hand, inasmuch as the 
Microcosm is distinct and distinguishable from the 
Macrocosm--and it is only in the field of the Macrocosm, 
and not in the fastness of the Microcosm, that the 
different individuals interact—it cannot be said that 
every individual is identical with every other, in 
spite of their being each identical with the society 
through which they are related.9
In short, Toynbee believes that man is both individual and
social as a human personality.
Toynbee*s field of action embraces a vast continuum.
{
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It includes an "internal,11 or social "field." Internally man
possesses an Ego "with a consciousness and a will moving on
,.,10 :the face of the waters of a subconscious psychic fabyss. 
Externally, man encounters other "fields-of-action" in the 
interaction which Toynbee defines as society.
As an explanation of the interactions which Toynbee 
defines as society, he suggests a "social geometry" in the 
form of an analogy based on the intersection of light cones^ 
Through this analogy he hopes to demonstrate that the inter­
actions which are society occur at various levels and that 
in the infinite sense they become a "supreme identity."
:•
;•
i
■
i
:
SUPREME IDENTITY
SOCIETY
EXTERNAL FIELD OF ACTION
EGO-CONSCIOUSNESS
PERSONAL UNCONSCIOUS
COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS
SUPREME IDENTITY
The value of the conical analogy above is that the field of 
action can be extended inwardly or psychologically as well as
The lower levels of the subconsciousoutwardly or socially.
thereby merge at infinity pointing to a psychic unity and
A social origin of individualmonogenetic origin of man.
!
:
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Ego-consciousness Is also suggested. Toynbee is not explicit 
about this inward extension, but his acceptance of Jungian 
psychology suggests it. He does, however, refer to organismic
12philosophy and to the ultimate interrelationship of all events. 
The conical analogy also suggests variations in the nature and 
levels of the interactions that comprise society. Thus there 
is no necessarily fixed notion of the social nature of man or 
the nature of society itself.
Other analogies such as the,
biological and psychological analogies are . . . 
least harmful and least misleading [as heuristic 
devices] when they are applied to primitive societies 
in their present static condition or ,. . . [to] 
civilizations . . . [in] a state of arrest. But they 
are manifestly unsuited to express the relations in 
which the growing civilizations stand to individual 
human beings.13
Thus Toynbee distinguishes between society in growth, wherein 
certain dynamic personal and social relations hold, and a 
relatively static society which may, on occasion, be likened 
to an organism with a predictable destiny. The important
I
:
1
point is that the nature of a society is determined largely 
by its internal conditions, by what is going on within and 
between human personalities. Moreover these events possess 
a wider significance than the social alone, 
they involve the totality of Reality—even the Life of God 
Himself.Thus all events are interrelated in some manner
The individual
In some sense
even as they are also unique in some sense, 
is both an autonomous entity and a part of a larger
15relationship.
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On the basis of this view, Toynbee stresses the 
importance of psychic phenomena in the life of society.
Psychic aberrations which distort or in any way affect the 
individual's field of action exert a profound influence on 
the life of society. On the other hand, the social field 
may profoundly alter the nature of the interaction by which 
the individual field of action encounters other fields of 
action. The powerful TTcone of influence” or social dissolvent 
of a creative personality penetrates many levels of society, 
involves widespread social relationships, and becomes the 
vehicle of social solidarity--so great is its influence. In 
all cases, personal and social processes are mutually related.
Not only is the life of man and society profoundly 
affected by the psychic processes which reverberate between 
them, but values relate to and are established by the nature 
of these processes. For Toynbee, the higher values are those 
individual achievements which carry important social and 
religious implications. This is because of the essentially 
social and religious nature of man and the mutual Inter­
dependence of human phenomena.1^
Because of the differentiation of values, society 
tends to stratify into a number of planes. Toynbee identifies 
these as the economic, the political, and the cultural. ”The 
cultural plane,” he says, ”is not only deeper but fundamental.” 
It is the most highly resistant to penetration, and undergirds 
the political and economic planes of society.
Cultural elements are also basic because of their
i
i
>
■
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psychological and religious significance. Toynbee believes 
that the destiny of man and society depends primarily on the 1
outcome of encounters of "challenge-and-response11 in the realm
1 ftof cultural elements, 
dependent however.
All planes of society are inter- 
Hence all societies—insofar as they are 
societies—exhibit some of the characteristics of an organism. 
While a civilization as a species of society is in growth, it 
is a distinct unit of human geography reflecting distinct 
elements of social solidarity.
"civilization" only insofar as it retains this healthy state 
of growth as a "whole."
"in-process-of-civilization" are generally synonymous in
It retains its identity as a
Hence the terms "growth" and
Toynbee. A society loses its identity as a society when it
"breaks down," when it suffers a "schism of the soul."
"Civilizations are wholes whose parts all cohere with one
nl9another and all affect one another reciprocally, 
coherence or solidarity is essentially social and spiritual.
It does not imply a causally unified whole in the mechanistic 
sense of the term.
It is one of the characteristics of civilizations in 
process of growth that all aspects and activities of 
their social life are co-ordinated into a single social 
whole, in which the economic, political, and cultural 
elements are kept in a nice adjustment with one another 
by an inner harmony of the growing body social.^0
It Is Important to note Toynbee1s emphasis on personal
and social psychological phenomena in the "growing" state of
society, particularly In the case of civilizations.
Sorokin, for example, fails to appreciate this emphasis
This
Professor
Ilk
because he has not allowed Toynbee the full play of his 
psychology. Sorokin sees in Toynbee a restatement of the 
"organic11 view of civilization. The root of Toynbee's
difficulties, he believes,
consists in [his] acceptance of . . . "civilization" 
as a real unity, in the sense of either a causal or 
causal-meaningful system. . . . [He] assumes that 
the total culture of each . . . "civilization" is 
completely integrated and represents ... a causally 
unified whole.
Sorokin, on the other hand, believes that,
"Civilizations" are a sort of dumping ground where 
billions of diverse cultural phenomena are thrown
together.21
If civilizations are merely cultural congeries, he continues, 
they are "neither born . . . nor can they grow or disintegrate. 
The point that Sorokin disregards, however, is Toynbee's belief 
in the social nature of man and the profound psychic processes 
which link man and society. For these psychic processes 
Sorokin tends to substitute a mechanical system of cause and 
effect. Toynbee, instead, has in mind a relationship of 
"challenge-and-response" in which the outcome is not pre­
determined by antecedents.
It is to the drama of challenge-and-response, Toynbee 
believes, that social action must be traced, and this drama 
is resolved in individuals. It is these psychic processes of 
personality brought into play by challenge-and-response that 
so profoundly influence the nature of society, 
source of action in society must be an individual "agent."
IS
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Hence the
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A field of action—and a fortiori, an intersection of 
a number of fields of action--cannot be a source of 
action. .
society, but can only be each of some of the indi­
viduals whose fields of action constitute a society.
. • - A "field" merely provides a locus for the 
action of an agent who operates in the field but who 
is not the field itself; a "relation” merely provides 
a common ground for the interaction of two or more 
agents with one another. . . . The society is not 
. . . anything more than a medium of communication 
[like space] through which the individual human beings 
interact with one another. It is human individuals and 
not human societies that make human history.23
The source of action cannot be the
i!
i;
i
j
!This "agent" within the field of action is the "psychic 
energy" of human personality. "The Macrocosm," says Toynbee,
is apprehended and acted upon by the Microcosm: 
the action which is the theme of human history is the 
action of individual human beings on that common 
ground of their respective fields of action which we 
call a society.2k
!
l!
and :
:!•;'
;;Personality, then, is the agent rather than the vehicle 
of cultural or social growth.
happenstance of this or that individual as the inevitable
means by which social growth is realized, but social growth
results from the unique events within and between unique and
individual human personalities.
behalf of Toynbee as against anthropologist Alfred Kroeber that,
although most persons are little more than mediating 
agents, exceptional persons are the main creators.
I do not think, as Kroeber does, that the large 
probability that one person will make the creation 
if another fails to do so eliminates the creative 
function of the human personality. 2->
:
ti
What confronts us is not the
i
i
;
.
Rushton Coulborn argues on
The fate of society depends on what happens within and between
"If we had the knowledge and patiencehuman personalities, 
to analyze a culture retrospectively," argues Alexander
Goldenweiser,
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every element of it would be found to have had Its 
beginning in the creative act of an individual mind. 
There is, of course, no other source for culture to 
come from, for what culture is made of is but the 
raw stuff of experience, whether material or spiritual 
transformed into culture by the creativeness of man.
An analysis of culture, if fully carried out, leads 
back to the individual mind.26
This conviction should not lead us, Toynbee warns, 
to a "great man" theory of history. Since man is both indi­
vidual and social in the psychological sense intended by 
Toynbee, neither the individual as an atomistic organism nor 
any aspect of the environment as such can be viewed as the 
sole cause of action in the "field of action." Toynbee 
rejects the excesses of the "great man" theory as well as 
the excesses of environmental determinism. The members of 
Toynbee!s "creative minority" are not the product of a 
hereditary determinism as are Carlyle's "great men," nor are
.
'
:
i
!
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they the recipients of a "cosmic grace" as Spengler believed 
Nor can they be said to be "products" of bio-
Instead, for Toynbee,
:
them to be.
logical and social factors as such, 
the "creative minority" emerges from the psychic drama of
the human situation in which all participate--in varying 
degrees--depending on the nature of the responses to the 
challenges of life.
"The 'great man theorists of history," observes
Goldenweiser:
often fell in [the] error, as did almost all systems 
of psychology, from the subjective analytical attempts 
of the classical associationists to the semi-experi- 
mental folk-psychologists of the Wundtian variety, and 
to the modern [Freudian] psychoanalysts [of rendering 
an] . . . absolutistic view of history which explain all 
happenings either through the individual or through the 
group.27
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Toynbee has the support of Goldenweiser at this point in the 
belief that although the locus of creativity and history is 
the individual, the individual psyche does not respond to or 
move within a vacuum—material, spiritual or otherwise, and 
although cultural content and environment do condition indi­
vidual responses, individuals modify their particular situ­
ations by bringing to bear specific conscious and unconscious 
psychic contents and attitudes which in turn condition the 
specific aspects of the environment to which they respond. 
Goldenweiser continues:
The effectiveness of some individuals as social factors 
necessarily moulds and determines other individuals; so 
that the very significance and conspicuousness of some 
persons imply the passivity and relative unimportance 
of others.28
MIn every manifestation of Life,” says Toynbee,
we find empirically . . . that a creative power is 
exhibited ... by some, but not by all representatives 
of a given species.29
When we consider that a number of human beings who are 
in social relations with one another share more or less 
the same social background and social heritage and are 
exposed to more or less the same social challenges, it 
would rather be surprising if more or less the same 
response were never hit upon by several people at 
once. . . . [Yet] while it is true that a new creative 
thought or plan does often occur to more than one 
member of a society simultaneously, it. is also true 
that it never occurs simultaneously to more than a 
minority.30
For Toynbee, history is made by men who are neither 
the pawns of historic or social process (as in von Ranke or 
hegel) nor the 61ite of Carlyle, Neitzsche, and Spengler. 
”In a growing civilization," says Toynbee:
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A creative personality comes into action by taking 
the lead in making a successful response to some
challenge. 4°
This is the "man-in-process-of-civilization.”
Although they may be conditioned by the influence of
a relatively advanced culture, most individuals within any
given society or civilization exhibit psychic characteristics
differing little from those of primitive men. "In every
growing civilization,11 says Toynbee,
even at the times when it is growing most lustily, 
the great majority of the participant individuals 
are in the same stagnant quiescent condition as the 
members of a primitive society which is in a state 
of rest.32
On the other hand, no civilization or particular society of
men enjoys a monopoly of "creative minority.” The most
humble African village may have,
individuals who have lived and died obscure because 
they have failed to break "the cake of custom" and 
have therefore failed to win for their potential 
genius the field which it needs in order to realize 
and manifest itself in action.33
After any creative act, says Toynbee, the major
problem confronting the creative personality is the securing
of "mimesis” on the part of the uncreative majority. To
effect progress in any form, the creative personality must
be able to evoke a felicitous response in the majority. At
'
••
■
its best, this response involves something more than mere
If it involves a spiritual identi-3^me chanic al imit ation. 
fication, "mimesis” constitutes a response of the highest
As a society grows, "mimesis” becomes progressively 
Paradoxically, the greater the advance, the
order.
more difficult.
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greater the difficulty of continued advance--not alone because 
the creative personality in any particular field may not be 
able to effect continued "etherialization," but also because 
it cannot effect a sustained "mimesis.n
Toynbee refers to Bergson*s observation that there are 
two paths open to the "education of the human race11—that of
drill (dressage). that is, mechanical imitation, and that of
33 Thespiritual identification through mystical experience, 
latter defies conceptualization.
The transmission of creativity in the life of society must 
come about chiefly through mechanical imitation, 
unfortunate "mechanicalness of mimesis," dooms it to almost 
certain failure, Toynbee believes, for the creative spirit
Yet through the tenuous phenomenon of 
"mimesis," civilizations may flower--for a time--with unparal­
leled greatness.
It is a rare phenomenon.
This
defies imitation. '
The faculty of mimesis is the characteristic possession
of the majority of any society.
[It] is the acquisition, through imitation, of social 
"assets"--aptitudes or emotions or ideas—which the 
acquisitors have not originated for themselves, and 
which they might never have come to possess if they 
had not encountered and imitated other people in whose 
possession these assets were already to be found.
Mimesis ... is a generic feature of social life.
Its operation can be observed both in primitive 
societies and civilizations.
It is the means by which creative achievements are diffused 
throughout society, the means whereby creative influence is 
felt in the interactions of "fields of action" which comprise 
Notwithstanding its superficial nature and itssociety.
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ultimate Incapacity to sustain growth, mechanical mimesis
It is the only means by 
which the majority of any society can share the process of 
civilization.
serves a useful social function.
Toynbee is not the first to speak of social imitation. 
Plato referred to it, and modern writers like Gabriel Tarde 
(1814.3-19014.) have given it considerable attention. Its 
fortunes in social thought have varied. David Hume, Thomas 
H. Huxley, Walter Bagehot, William James, and Josiah Royce--
to name a few--supported the doctrine of social imitation in 
varying degrees.^® Toynbee appears to accept the doctrine 
as a natural psychic function and a necessary social phenomenon. 
Imitation, however, is only incidental to social growth, for 
creativity is genuinely imitated only through mystic identi­
fication. But the process of mimesis—however mechanical— 
points up the role of psychological processes in society. It
suggests that social phenomena bear an intimate relationship
39with psychic phenomena.
In its broader aspects, mimesis is the means whereby
social qualities are acquired by the majority of any society.
Relatively rare occurrences of genuine creation may enrich
the culture of a society, but cultural reception is the means
by which a society acquires most of its traits and patterns.
Cultural reception, says Toynbee, is ,fa particular orientation
of the challenged partyfs faculty of mimesis". . . .
The Human Psyche1s ability to vary the orientation of 
its mimesis is one manifestation of a general versa­
tility which is characteristic of Human Nature and is 
perhaps its most distinctive gift.4-0
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In primitive societies mimesis tends to be directed toward 
the past. Primitive societies are custom dominated. They 
are essentially static. On the other hand, societies in
process of civilization follow the lead of a creative minority. 
They tend to be future oriented, that is, "in dynamic motion 
along a course of change and growth."
however, are the recipients of culture "radiated” from other 
societies. 
cultural diffusion.
41 All societies,
This is Toynbee!s equivalent of the sociologist's
According to him,"Radiation-and-Mimesis" is distinct 
from "Challenge-and-Response" in that the former is a means 
whereby novelty is diffused whereas the latter is the means 
whereby novelty may be created, 
and-mimesis—is more effective in the spread of the relatively 
trivial aspects of culture.
Diffusion--that is, radiation-
The Hindu, for example, acquires 
Western technique in transportation more readily than he
acquires the Western world-view. Cultural diffusion, there­
fore, is not the principal source of social growth, 
process of Radiation-and-Mimesis," Toynbee says,
through which Diffusion works in human affairs, is 
vigorous and effective in inverse ratio to the value 
and importance of the social properties that are 
conveyed. . . . The process operates . . 
potently of all on the cultural or sp 
ideational or psychological] plane.4-2
In Toynbee, therefore, the profound aspects of social 
growth are attributed to the independent activity of a creative 
minority. Toynbee favors the theory of the independent origin 
of culture. The ubiquity of the modern rifle, he says, due
"The
. least 
iritual [i.e.
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to the diffusion of a particular material cultural trait does 
not provide an explanation for a similar ubiquity of the bow 
and arrow. In other words, Toynbee rejects the generalization 
that growth is principally a function of cultural diffusion.
We are influenced by the more obvious material elements of 
human culture to overlook the less obvious but basic spiritual 
and psychological elements, he says.^ 
the root error of Western theories of man, society, and social 
change. As Toynbee sees it, the problem is essentially 
spiritual. It involves relations that do not reduce to 
simplistic solutions, and it involves relations that must be 
articulated within a framework of an adequate theory of human 
nature.
I
i
This, he believes, is
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CHAPTER V
TOYNBEE'S DEBT TO CARL G. JUNG
Failure to grasp Toynbee*s psychology is a major 
reason for conflicting and ambiguous interpretations of his 
philosophy of history. Part of the difficulty arises from 
the fact that Toynbee himself has only recently pointed 
specifically to the Swiss psychologist Carl G. Jung as his 
"navigator psycho-pompus" who added a "new dimension to [his] 
mental universe" and guided him "from a surface-craft to [a] 
submarine in order to sound the PsycheTs subconscious abyss.
Most of Toynbeefs philosophy of history was formu­
lated on assumptions which--though similar to Jung!s--were 
distinctly original. Toynbee*s associate, Professor Edward 
D. Myers, believes that,
Toynbee was feeling his own way, through his own 
reading and experiences, to the set of conceptions 
about "the supreme identity," the Unconscious, etc, 
when he came on Jung and found in his writings a 
formulation of the sort towards which he had been 
groping, thereby saving himself the labour of having 
to make his own formulation.2
Toynbee himself says that when he parted with the "would-be 
scientific impersonal explanations" of history and turned 
instead to mythology he,
might have been less diffident if [he] had not been 
ignorant, as [he] was at that date [1920], of the new 
ground broken by [Jung*s] psychology during the war of
•*
:
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1914-18. ... If I had been acquainted at that time 
with the works of C. G. Jung, they would have given me 
the clue [to the interpretation of history].3
Instead he found the clue in Goethe*s Faust. ;
;
In his search for a clue to a theory of man that 
would adequately support his philosophy of history, Toynbee 
discovered that,
the Will is only effective to the degree in which it 
succeeds in inducing the Subconscious Reservoir of 
the Psyche to lend itself to the Will^ aim by 
suffering the Will to draw upon this amorphous yet 
exclusive source of psychic energy and to put it to 
work by canalizing it into a deliberate effort to 
attain some definite objective.4
This subconscious ground of the human Will has only
recently commanded recognition in Western thought. It was
known to the Greeks and was discovered earlier by the Hindus,
but to Westerners preoccupied with the conscious and the
rational, the notion of a subconscious smacked of pre-
scientific superstition. For Toynbee, however, the rediscovery
of this older intuition presented fascinating possibilities.
It broadened the base of historiography as well as of
psychology and philosophy. He believed that he had,
lived to see the subconscious well-spring of Poetry 
and Prophecy restored to honour in the Western World 
by the genius of C. G. Jung; but, before Jung*s star 
at last rose. . . . Plato*s example . . . [had given 
him] courage to part company with an early twentieth- 
century Western Zeitgeist whose . . . only realities 
those that could be weighed and measured.5
The significance of these new theories of the sub­
conscious and particularly that of Jung lay in the fact that 
they might be employed to clarify the mystery of the phenomenon
were
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of the creative genius. "One of the puzzles which meets the
philosophic historian,” writes H. A. L. Fisher,
is the capricious and apparently unaccountable 
appearance of men of genius. When a man of genius 
has arisen, the historian is able to trace the causes 
which facilitate or obstruct the spread of his 
influence. What no one has yet succeeded in doing 
is to account for his emergence at all.®
The answer is to be found, perhaps, in a better understanding
of the dynamics of human personality. And when it is found,
it may also enlighten the student of human affairs concerning
phenomena associated with individual and social progress.
Various hypotheses have been advanced, but Jung!s psychology
is particularly instructive. Bergson’s 61an vital was not
unknown to Toynbee. He refers to it frequently, but he does
not find in the notion of a "vital force" the basis for an
adequate theory, and turns, instead, to the Jungian "concept
of life energy."^
One may wonder why Toynbee did not employ the Viennese 
genius, Sigmund Freud, as his "navigator psychopompus." One 
reason is that when Freud’s libido is examined in the light 
of Toynbee’s view of man, society, and history, it becomes 
altogether too limited.
Freud’s theories are in general too biological, too 
narrowly hedonistic, and they fail to give adequate recog­
nition to what Toynbee believes to be the social origin and 
nature of man. In rejecting Freud for Jung, Toynbee joins 
with Gerald Heard in asking:
Is not Jung’s concept of the Libido—a fundamental 
undifferentiated psychic energy—more true to the 
facts? . . . [Is not] sex [or affection] but one of 
its manifestations?^
!
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In its original formulation, the Freudian hypothesis attempts 
to explain all psychic activity as the outcome of a highly 
individualistic and biological drives—essentially the sexual 
or affectional libido.
this force is actually a factor, it explains nothing.
Jungian idea of "libido,” on the other hand, "psychic energy," 
possesses no such limitation because it is not a "drive" or 
an "instinct" as such but the "function" of life itself.
Freud tries to trace the creative aspects of person­
ality dynamics in terms similar to those by which he explains 
He starts from individual behavior as such--not
Except in those instances in which
The
neuroses.
with the social nexus as does Jung, 
society suppresses human impulses and that the social order 
arises from the need for instinctual repressions.
At the other extreme from Freudian individualism is
His thesis is that
the social determinism of Emile Durkheim. Durkheira believed
that universal biological tendencies, equipment, and indi­
vidual capacities in man cannot be employed to explain 
differences between men. He proposed, instead, a special 
category of independently real social facts based on inde­
pendent principles which could not be reduced to individual 
biological or psychological data. These principles would 
reveal the social factors that determine the nature of man.
In short, man is a socially determined creature whose humanity 
derives from his social circumstances. This organic view of 
society and man Toynbee rejects. Instead, Toynbee prefers
132
the approach suggested by Solomon Asch who says:
People act with reference to each other. Interactions 
that are among the most unique events in nature occur 
between persons. They produce results of great 
diversity, which are the basis for all further social 
happenings. Each person is a source and center of 
psychological effects that extend into the lives of
All . . . relations between groups orothers. .
between an individual and a group rest upon the primary 
events that take place between person and person.9
In steering between the extremes of ’'internal11 or 
biological determinism and "external11 or environmental 
determinism, Toynbee seeks a psychology congruent with the 
facts of fate and freedom as he discovers them in history.
He finds it in the psychology of C. G-. Jung who reveals, he 
says, "the equivalents, in the experience of the Soul [Psyche], !
of a number of phenomena that I . / . observed ... in the
..10experience of Society.
In Jung, the contents of unconsciousness are not only 
personal but derive from the primordial--and in man, racial— 
experiences of life.^
from Freud*s by calling it "complex psychology."
psychic," he asserts,
deserves to be taken as a phenomenon in itself, for 
there are no grounds for regarding it as a mere 
epiphenomenon, even though it is associated with the 
function of the brain; just as little as one can 
conceive of life as an epiphenomenon of the chemistry 
of carbon.12
Unlike Freudian theory--which is particularly adaptable 
to the analysis of individual psychic disorders—Jungian 
theory is particularly adaptable to the understanding of the 
creative personality and the social processes to which It is
Jung distinguishes his psychology
"The
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related. In discussing this distinctive character of Jungls 
psychology which appealed to Toynbee, psychologist Progoff
argued that,
Jung’is approach to society differs from that of other 
psychologists in one outstanding and fundamental way. 
The usual practice is to begin with the notion of the 
individual, conceived either as a biological organism 
or as a hypothetical primal man, and .... to gener­
alize a theory based on a multiplication of the indi­
vidual case. . . . Jung avoids the . . . tendency . . 
to regard society as merely the plural of the indi­
vidual, since he realized that the social 
man is something inherent to human nature
quality of
The Jungian view of man which Toynbee embraces is
the view,
that human personality consists of two things: first, 
of consciousness and whatever this covers, and second 
of an indefinitely large hinterland . . . [of] unknown 
factors [which] form what we call the unconscious.
Of what [these] factors consist, we have no idea, since 
we can observe only their effects.3-4
The unconscious and its dynamics, Toynbee believes, is the
"fount of Poetry, Music, and the Visual Arts, . . . the
channel through which the Soul is in communion with God."
Moreover,
the poetry and the prophetic vision that wells up 
out of the subconscious depths of the human soul 
[psyche] is not amenable to the law [of Nature]
. . . [for] we are in the presence of genuine acts 
of creation.15
Though vitally important, biological and environmental
factors do not alone account for human creativity.
Every creative person is a duality of contradictory 
aptitudes. On the one side he is a human being 
with a personal life, while on the other side he is 
an impersonal, creative process.16
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In outstanding cases of creativity, observes Jung, flthe 
creative force predominates [and] human life is ruled and 
moulded by the unconscious . . . the conscious Ego [being] 
swept along on [this] subterranean current,” as it were. ' 
But the ego is not submerged in the subterranean current. 
It is not engulfed in a participation mystique. 
the energy of it and channels it into creative activity. 
Indeed, the unconscious fount of poetry and prophecy is 
itself,
It captures
one of those statically perfect works of creation 
that are the Creator's "stopping places,” [and] the 
Conscious Human Personality [is]
imperfect approximation [of] a Being of an incommen- 
surably higher order, who is Himself the maker of 
both these divers Isle] 
the Human Psyche.l°
The Human Psyche is a psychic chronometer, continues Toynbee,
the Intellect [Ego-Conscious] and its partner the 
subconscious well-spring of Spiritual Creativity.
Human acts of creativity are [therefore] governed 
by a law of spiritual dynamics.19
The hands of the psychic chronometer link, on the one hand,
ego-consciousness and, on the other hand, "God the Dweller
Toynbee is convinced of the existence
of an "everlasting intercourse between the two members of
this indissoluble pair of psychic partners [the Ego-
21conscious and the Subconscious].”
The subconscious source of creative potential is
It is the fount of demonry as 
According to Toynbee, the human
an infinitely
but inseparable organs of
.,20in the Innermost.
both opportunity and threat, 
well as the fount of poetry, 
protagonist of the cosmic drama must live a life of dynamic
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tension, a life of challenges and responses, if, indeed, he 
is to "live” at all. 
learn to coax the ox within.
can destroy him but without which he would have no life. 
Toynbee speaks of a
Like the boy of Zen Buddhism, he must
He must live with that which
subconscious Psyche [which] enjoys the same effortless 
harmony with God that its innocence assures to every 
non-human creature. This negatively blissful Yin- 
state, in which the Psyche "was without form and void, 
and darkness was upon the face of the deep,” was 
broken up when human consciousness and personality 
were created through a Yang-movement. . . 
is perpetually prone [to live] in the unstable spiritual 
equilibrium which is the essence of Human personality.
. . . The recovered Yin-state in which salvation is to 
be’ found by Man is the peace, not of nerveless self- 
annihilation [of Nirvana], but of taut-strung harmony 
[between ego and subconsciousness].“
The Soul
For Toynbee as for Jung, therefore, man is animated
Psychic energy is the agent “within11by a “psychic energy.” 
man that is stimulated by and channeled through an 
environment--social or physical--which provides the “challenges.” 
In Toynbee, psychic energy finds its ultimate source in God
or in the cosmic process rather than in biological drives.
It relates to the functioning of the human psyche and comes
It “takes form only [within
this] social field, and . . . the changes . . . [it] produces
,,23
to life within a “social field.”
alter individuals at their center.
For Toynbee as for Jung, individuals possess distinc­
tive aptitudes which derive from and are altered by society. 
Yet man is not merely the reflection of a coercive social 
reality as Durkheim believed. He is not merely part of a 
larger social macrocosmos. He is the center of unique and
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autonomous psychic phenomena.
What is most distinctive in Toynbee and Jung is their 
account of the origin of human characteristics, 
experience and biological factors merely comprise the raw 
materials of the human psyche, 
absolutely determine its consequent nature, 
is more than the totality of its biological and social makeup.
It is more than the effects of biological and social causes.
It is a unique reality in itself.
Toynbee and Jung have not made the mistake of explaining 
man solely in terms of antecedent or consequent social factors 
or of any other factor which may happen to occupy the psychefs
This is because the elements of the psyche!s 
field-of-action comprise the challenges, 
must be the nature of challenge-and-response.
Social
They do not of themselves
The human psyche
field-of-action.
The final answer
The drama is
Thus man is neithernot resolved until the play is finished, 
free nor determined in the absolute sense of the term. Insofar
as "external*1 challenges determine his responses as cause 
and effect he is not free. Insofar as these challenges can 
be transmuted into "internal" challenges to which unique 
volitional responses are given, man becomes relatively "free." 
Insofar as the human psyche becomes its own environment, 
becomes self-determined, it acquires freedom.
Psychic energy in man points to a reality more basic 
than its several particular manifestations. Toynbee believes 
that God is at the root of all psychic activity although He 
does not bear a cause and effect relationship to it. The Law
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of Love which Toynbee believes to be the Perfect Law of God 
is reflected in nan's essentially social nature, 
its social context, this law of love would be meaningless. 
,!In the study of the individual," as Bergson reminds us,
Apart from
"one can never overestimate the fact that the individual was 
meant for society.
Through man, God expresses His purpose--not as 
predestination--but through the profoundly subtle reality of 
a humanity "created in the image of God"—a God whom Toynbee 
portrays as the God of agape.
The paramount fact is that men come into relations 
not alone with the objects of nature but also with 
other men, and that in this encounter they are 
transformed into human beings, 
others . . . becomes a powerful, comprehensive 
region of forces within which each individual moves 
and has his being. ... In the process the radius 
of his life undergoes profound extension.25
This extension is expressed in Toynbee's metaphor 
"field of action." 
action comprises society,
the decisive psychological fact ... is the capacity 
of individuals to comprehend and to respdnd to each 
other's experiences and actions . . . [and] the para­
mount fact about human interactions is that they are 
happenings that are psychologically represented in 
each of the participants.26
The environment of
In these fields of action whose inter-
The limits of this interacting influence are essen­
tially psychological. Human failure stems from what is 
"false within." Challenges are not insuperable because of 
their particular severity they are insuperable because they 
do not provoke a creative response in the human field pf action.
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The important Jungian concepts of "psyche” and 
"psychic energy" require accurate definition. They bear a
particularly significant relationship to Toynbee1s general 
theory. For Jung,
the psyche is indistinguishable from its manifes­
tation .... [It] is [both] the object of 
psychology and—fatally enough--its subject at the 
same time.27
In the conventional sense, it is spaceless and timeless; it
must be conceived metaphorically and described functionally.
"Psyche is existent," Jung says, "it is even existence
But, he continues,
it is quite impossible to define the extension and 
the ultimate character of psychic existence. . . .
The psyche reaches so far beyond the boundary line 
of consciousness that the latter could be easily 
[compared] to an island in the ocean.28
The psyche is rooted in the social, racial, and primordial
experiences of life.
Roughly speaking, the "psyche" is Toynbee *s "field 
of action," a kind of non-physical space In which psychic 
phenomena occur. When speaking of the psyche, neither Jung 
nor Toynbee have in mind metaphysical substance. One can 
only say that the psyche functions, that a field of action 
is active—not what the psyche is in itself. This account 
of the psyche echoes current conceptions of the nature of 
physical reality according to which "matter" is what it 
does; to "define" it is to describe its functional behavior. 
And description of activity involves relationships and 
structures.
itself."
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The psyche is not a ,!piece,! of physical reality— 
whatever that may be--but an element in a continuum beginning 
with the "Supreme Identity" and including Life, Subconscious­
ness, Consciousness, and Society. For Toynbee, God the 
Creator is clearly the ground of this continuum--the ground 
of a continuum in which consciousness is but a minutely 
differentiated ego. The ego lives and moves and has its 
being in encounter with the contents of its own field of 
action, with other psyches, with life in general, with nature 
as a whole, and finally with Ultimate Reality or God.
Ego-consciousness, Toynbee and Jung insist, is 
functionally different from, yet coexists with, unconscious­
ness. Jung describes their relationship as one of "reciprocal 
relativity"—a dynamic unity in which the individual psyche 
embraces in tension the unconscious, the conscious, and the 
social. This psychic unity is energized by its deepest 
elements, by what Jung calls the Objective Psyche or Collective 
Unconscious. As the creative well-spring of the psyche, the 
Collective Unconscious reflects the activity of God "within" 
even as His activity challenges the psyche from "without."
The "field-of-action," or "psyche," possesses an 
"agent"—better labelled, perhaps, by the Jungian term 
"psychic energy."' Like physical energy--whose ontology is 
by no means established—psychic energy can only be described 
in terms of what it does or is able to do, not in terms of 
what it is. Hence both the "field" and the "agent" are dealt 
with in terms of function and phenomena rather than in terms
114-0
of substance or metaphysical reality. The psyche and its 
energy are real however. They are by no means barren 
abstractions.
Psychic energy is associated with the rhythmic
processes of life. A parallel to the Bergsonian dialectic
is suggested in the suggestion of an opposition to the vital
on-going activity of God by a recalcitrant creation which,
having come into being, resists or challenges the on-going
spirit of the Creator in a continuous series of encounters.
This fundamental opposition is the resistance by creation of
the tendency to continue creation, a resistance which issues
29in further creation itself.
Theologian Paul Tillich1 s analysis of the Ttpower of
being1* is instructive at this point. Jung1 s psychic energy
is--in this sense--Tillich!s "power of being."
The power of being becomes manifest only in the 
process in which it actualizes its power. ...
Power is real only in its actualization, in the 
encounter with other bearers of power. . . . Life 
is the dynamic actualization of being. . . nothing 
is final except those structures which make the 
dynamics of life possible. Life includes continuous 
decisions [responses to challenges] not necessarily 
conscious decisions, but decisions , . . in . . . 
encounter. . . . [The] power of being remains hidden 
if actual encounters do not reveal it.30
In Jung, psychic energy is the totality of that which
activates and integrates elements of the psyche. It stands
for the character and intensity of the psychic processes
which "we probably do best to regard ... as the process of
life itself." The psyche, on the other hand, is the field
In which psychic energy is manifest--"the totality of all
lip-
psychological processes, both conscious as well as unconscious, 
Psychic energy becomes available through the dynamics
of personality.
In Life there is aleays an irreducible minimum of 
psychic energy that will insist on discharging 
itself through some channel or other.32
For some, Jung and Toynbee revive animism. Professor
Sorokin argues, for example, that when,
psychical experiences are made the agencies which 
govern the dynamics of the trans-subjective process, 
cause, determine, and control them, we are simply 
reasoning in the fashion of Moli6re*s quip that 
"opium makes man sleepy because it has a sleeping 
power. "*33
Sorokin here recognizes the difficulty of bridging the gap 
between the "psychic" and the "physiological" through which 
psychic activity must take place. He recognizes the intermin­
able complication of the problem of causation. "If a psychical 
agency is regarded as the cause of an overt action,” he
argues,
the whole chain [of causation] represents an incessant 
mental salto mortale from the realms of psychic 
experience to that of the trans-subjective phenomena, 
and vice versa. . . . The very character of such a 
chain is a denial of the causation known to other 
sciences . , . [and] is sheer mysticism.34
The basic objection in this instance is that psychic vari­
ables defy analysis, that they are in a constant state of 
flux, and that there are no reliable means of measuring them. 
"When only these [psychic] circumstances are taken into 
consideration,” Sorokin continues,
it becomes quite clear that even the greatest mathe­
matician cannot keep account of [them] . . . and their
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fluctuations; therefore, a computation of their 
"function11 that is, a single overt action, becomes 
impossible.35
But Toynbee and Jung do not assert that opium makes-- 
or "causes"--men to be sleepy because it has a sleeping power. 
They simply describe observable phenomena in the most approp­
riate language at hand: men getting sleepy on taking opium.
The Jungian psychic energy which is the modus operand! of 
psychic processes is not a vital force or power to be explained 
in turn by reference to some more primal animalistic force or 
power in an analysis of cause and effect. The only assumption 
made is that God is the ground of a process that is occurring. 
This, to be sure, explains nothing, but metaphysics is not 
their problem. What is sought is insight into the dynamics 
of personality and society—particularly as they deal with 
the growth process. Whether God is in the process, beyond 
the process, or the process itself is not the point at issue.
The error which both Toynbee and Jung combat is the
failure to appreciate the depth of human personality and the 
means by which this depth is to be understood, 
account of "time" as well as "psychic" depth, 
that the experience of the race is latently contained and 
unconsciously expressed in each individual, that once having 
occurred, an event has "immortally occurred.” 
human psyche is concerned, the "event is what it is by reason
of the unification in itself of a multiplicity of relation- 
n36
Both take
They believe
So far as the
They believe that Bergsonian intuition is asships.
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necessary as is Cartesian analysis for an understanding of 
the total human problem.
The psychic processes which bring into action psychic 
energy in man involve polar tensions—opposites in dynamic 
tension--a continual "running counter to” as, for example, 
in Toynbee*s challenge and response motif. Speaking of this 
motif, Tillich says:
Categories such as challenge, reaction, withdrawal, 
return, belong to a phenomenology of encounter. . . . 
Toynbee*s example leads to an analysis of the relation 
of the power of being in an individual to the power of 
being in a group.37
If one examines Toynbee*s "phenomenology of encounter,” 
one will discover the Jungian view that the psyche comes to 
grips with a Heraclitean reality in terms of contrasts and 
opposites. Insofar as the psyche can deal with its own and 
other manifestations of psychic energy, it must speak, describe, 
and comprehend them in terms of the "principle of opposites.” 
Historically this is illustrated in the Yin and Yang of 
Chinese thought, in the Shiva-Shakti theme of the Hindus, as 
well as in the anima-animus images of Jung*s own system. In 
the Hindu concept of maya, for example, the dynamic encounter 
of the opposites of being and non-being issues in the "world” 
of becoming. Becoming is in turn swept away in the never 
ending flux of Samsara, This dynamic view of the world of 
the psyche is also the basic intuition—with variations to be 
sure--of Chinese, Egyptian, Zoroastrian, and Hebrew thought
qO
as well as much primitive thought.
"The psyche Is a self-regulating system," says Jung.
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There is no equilibrium and no self-regulating system 
without opposition. . . . Ever must high and low, 
hot and cold, etc., proceed in order that the process 
of equalization, which is nothing but energy, can 
take place. . . . All that lives is energy and is 
therefore based upon antithesis. . . 
version into the contrary but a conservation of the 
former values together with a recognition of their 
contrary.39
,?The energy charge of the unconscious,11 says Jung* s interpreter
Jacobi,
Not a con-
rises in the same measure as consciousness loses 
energy. It follows further that the energy is 
capable of being transformed.4°
The functioning of the psyche as Jung views it can 
best be portrayed by reference to a model. Hence the following 
is suggested. It should not be interpreted strictly or 
literally, and it should be interpreted in terms of Jungian 
definitions.
The ego constitutes the ,,selfn which enjoins con­
sciousness and the external world via a “persona.”
Jung says,
[is] subordinated to, or contained in, a super- 
ordinated self as a center of the total, illimitable 
and indefinable psychic personality.M-
The persona or personal “masks” offers ITa compromise between
the individual and society.”
that changes in the encounter with changing social 
environment. ^
”The ego,”
r
It is that portion of the ego
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The personal unconscious contains forgotten, repressed, 
and sublimally perceived contents of all kinds. It embraces 
Freud*s preconscious (Vorbewusstsein) on the border of con­
sciousness and Dessoir*s subconscious (Unterbewusstsein) which 
consists in unrecalled or repressed contents. As compared to 
the collective unconscious which carries the imprint of common 
human experience, its contents are personal experience# The 
collective unconscious is that part of the psyche which can 
never be made conscious but from which eruptions may occur.
Jung prefers to call it the Objective Psyche and Toynbee the 
Racial Unconscious. It is the residence of the archetypes 
or primordial images. Collective unconsciousness is indifferent 
to the ego*s attempt to adjust to the external. It partici­
pates in the impersonality of nature as a whole. It corres­
ponds in part to the Freudian Superego—the collective social 
attributes consciously but unreflectively followed which give 
direction to the group. It is in consciousness, however, that 
functions affecting internal and external adjustment exhibit 
their varying degrees of differentiation and individuation.
On the basis of this view of the psyche Toynbee
speculates that,
in between the uppermost and lowermost of the layers 
of the Subconscious . . . there might be intermediate 
layers deposited neither by [strictly] racial exper­
ience nor by [strictly] personal experience but by 
corporate experience of a supra-personal but infra- 
racial range . . . common to a family . . . community 
. . . society; and if, at the next level above the 
Primordial Images common to the whole Human Race, there 
should be images expressing the peculiar *§thos of a 
particular society, the impress of these . . . might 
account for . . . periods [of] . .
processes [i.e. rhythms exceeding single life spans
in time],44
. certain social
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It is then possible, he continues, that this understanding
of the psyche might provide,
a psychological explanation of regularities in human 
affairs [which] account for the uniform recurrence 
of social processes . . . [which] expand over periods 
which are many times longer . . . than ... a single 
life time ... on the level of personal consciousness.^
These and other possibilities intrigue Toynbee.
that he should embark on a "scientific exploration of [this]
psychic underworld that . . . [was] familiar to Indian and
He believes
Sinic contemporaries of the Hellenic discoverers of the 
Intellect. His exploration brings to light "primordial 
images"--the Jungian archetypes. These are the subsistent
modes or "axial systems" of human experience—the basic modes 
of psychic functioning. They determine as limits the possi­
bilities of human experience in general in the manner that 
the environment determines as limits which possibilities shall 
be realized in particular. Toynbee speaks, for example, of 
the rhythm of withdrawal-and-return as,
a motif of cosmic range . . . [which] has furnished 
one of the "primordial images" of Mythology [and] 
which is [in turn] an intuitive form of apprehending 
and expressing universal truths.*4-7
The Jungian archetypes are not Plato !s Forms nor are 
they innate ideas. They embrace a dark as well as a light 
side. Platofs Forms are perfect; how they participate in 
life Plato never clearly explained. Instead, Jung!s archetypes 
are "psychic organs":
forms or images of a collective nature which occur 
practically all over the earth as constituents of 
myths and at the same time as autochthonous, individual
Ili8
products of unconscious origin. . . . Even complicated 
archetypal images can be spontaneously reproduced with­
out any possible direct tradition.
The archetypes function in individuals of every age and place
and social environment.
The form of these archetypes is perhaps comparable to 
the axial system of a crystal, which predetermines as 
it were the crystalline formation in the saturated 
solution, without itself possessing a material exis­
tence. The existence first manifests itself in the 
way the ions and then the molecules arrange them­
selves. . . . The axial system determines, accordingly, 
merely the stereometric structure, not however, the 
concrete form of the individual crystal . . . and just 
so the archetype possesses ... an invariable core of 
meaning that determines its manner of appearing always 
only in principle, never concretely.14-9
Man-in-process-of-civilization develops his culture
creatively and self-consciously. Its differentiation is
considerable. The archetypes are much less immediately
evident. Primitive man on the other hand, lives closer to
his subconscious. Archetypes are more evident in his culture.
Uniformities are more pronounced.
In particular the data for the thoughts and inferences 
of Primitive Man are very limited and are much the 
same everywhere. The nearer we come to the earliest 
type of Man, the more the means to his ends tend to 
coincide over the whole Race, as is shown by flint 
tools and weapons scattered all over the world and 
in many strata of Time. Hence the similarity of the 
means he takes in various places and ages to express 
his early religious and social ideas, 
his crude moral and spiritual ends.50
The archetypes are significant for two reasons: they 
are the key to the form of the psychic processes, and they 
express fundamental intuitions about life. "They represent 
or personify," says Jung, "certain instinctive premises in 
the dark, primitive psyche, in the real but invisible roots
and to attain
1.
i
!
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of consciousness .I!^ They are not innate or inherited ideas 
but inherited modes of the functioning of the ideas of
experience.
The archetypes may find expression through energy 
transforming symbols.^
Put to their right use they make possible a re­
direction of energy and, by so doing, progressively 
transform the man who uses them.53
They are, in brief, the means whereby the ego can consciously
tap the resources of the psyche.
The transforming symbol, unlike the autonomous com­
plex, does not tend to take over and run the man.
On the contrary, consciousness has to recognize and 
use it if it is to have effect; in which case it 
performs the invaluable function of mobilizing the 
combined energy of consciousness and the unconscious.
In contrast with the transforming symbol there is the
autonomous element of unconsciousness which acts as a center
54
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of functional disturbance. It is the autonomous complex. 
The complex is important to psychic functioning because it 
represents,
something ununited, unassimilable, conflicting. . . 
perhaps a hindrance, perhaps a stimulus to greater 
efforts and even to fresh successes. Complexes are 
thus In this sense focal and nodal points of psychic 
life with which one would not wish to dispose, indeed, 
which one could not do without, for 
activity would come to a standstill
If a complex breaks into consciousness, however,
psychic disorder may lower the threshold of consciousness.
The psyche may become "possessed” in the very literal sense
of the word. It may "fall from an active, conscious state
Into a passive !possessedf one.
^se psychic
,,56
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When consciousness loses energy it goes over Into the 
unconscious, activates its contents--archetypes, com­
plexes, etc.—which thereupon commence a life of their 
own, and breaking into consciousness, can cause dis­
turbances, neuroses, and psychoses.5?
A distinction must be made, however:
The autonomous complex normally tends to possess the 
man; but provided a right relationship is made with it, 
can become a means of wholeness. The transforming 
symbol [on the other hand] normally makes possible a 
more developed attitude: but if misused can become a 
means of disintegration [breakdown]. Autonomous 
complexes and transforming symbols alike may be 
personal in character—in the main an outcome of the 
living experience of that particular individual. Or 
they may be archetypal, part of the psychic condition 
In practice they are likely to be both.58
Consciousness is precious. "Even an emotion," cautions Jung,
"can cause a considerable loss of consciousness.
of man.
i.59
Jung describes experience in terms of four points of 
a psychic compass: Feeling, Sensation, Thinking, and 
Intuition. Thinking and Feeling are rational functions in 
opposition whereas Sensation and Intuition are opposing non- 
rational functions. Sensation is immediate experience which 
may provoke thought. Thought in turn gives rise to evaluation 
or "feeling." In addition, the psyche acquires direct insight 
through Intuition which is distinctly unthoughtout or 
unmediated. The manner of the response of the psyche is 
described as Introversion and Extraversion. Introversion is 
the direction of psychic energy toward the psyche itself. 
Extraversion is the direction of psychic energy toward the 
outer world. In Jung, "movement" of psychic energy is 
described as "progression" when there is a shift of energy 
from unconsciousness to consciousness, and "regression" when
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energy shifts from consciousness to unconsciousness. 
Regression, for example, may be introverted or extraverted 
depending on whether the psyche withdraws to the inner or to 
the outer world.^
Challenges which confront the psyche from without and
from within provoke responses which call into play the dominant
or more highly differentiated function of the particular
personality. The psyche utilizes this function because it is
more effective in rendering successful adjustment. Insofar
as the psyche responds successfully to these challenges, the
dominant function of the four becomes more sharply differentiated.
The very conditions of society force a man to apply 
himself first and foremost to the differentiation 
of that function [or "faculty” in Toynbee] with 
which he is either most gifted by nature, or which 
provides his most effective means for social success.
Very frequently, indeed as a general rule, a man 
identifies himself more or less completely with the 
most favored hence the most developed function. 61
Over-differentiation of a function, however, reaches 
a point of diminishing returns. The very quality which 
renders most effective release and application of psychic
:
;
energy becomes—by the nature of the psychic process itself—
This is because the oppositea threat as well as a challenge, 
function is suppressed into unconsciousness where it may
activate contents of unconsciousness and provoke an eruption
from below.
In Western society, over-differentiation of the 
"thinking" function has tended to isolate Western man from 
the creative source of his being and to destroy his sense of
«
?
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The tragedy of civilization, warns Gerald 
Heard, results from a "fissure and specialization in conscious- 
ness,n Hyper-rationalism and individualism has led to a mass
personality.
sense of alienation and anxiety, 
matic of social breakdown and constitutes a phenomenon which 
cannot be safely ignored in contemporary society.
The isolation and subsequent alienation of individual 
psyches is the prelude to the formation of those pseudo­
social relationships which characterize dehumanized totali­
tarian collectivism.
This condition is sympto-
A mechanically and forcefully cemented 
community is substituted for genuine community in depth.
"One of [Jung's] major contributions regarding the 
'diagnosis1 of the condition of modern man," says Progoff, 
"is [his view] that consciousness has been overstressed to
the point where an unbalanced situation has developed in the 
n63psyche. With Jung he believes that theToynbee agrees, 
emotional life of man cannot be denied.
The rapid increase of science and technics [has] 
attracted human consciousness to such an extent that 
it forgot the unaccountable forces of the unconscious 
mind.64
In personality development, Jung continues,
the goal is always totality--the Ideal solution in 
which all four psychological functions and both 
forms of attitudinal reactions are at the indi­
vidual's command in as nearly the same degree of 
consciousness and disposability as possible.
This goal of "individuation" constitutes a condition in which,
the conscious and the unconscious are joined together. . .
in a living relation to one another. . . 
turbed functioning of psychic life is guaranteed by the 
fact that unconsciousness can never be made completely
The undis-
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conscious [yet] always possesses the greater .. . 
energy. r"
and we have an opportunity to work 
our life long.66
Individuation—Bewusstwerdung—is self-realization or 
Mbecoming conscious”--not of specific objects, but of a more
^ It is a living inte­
gration of consciousness and unconsciousness--a discovery and 
full employment of energy transforming symbols.
The aim of individuation is to achieve a balance, 
a harmony, in which conscious and the unconscious 
complement each other in a relation of "reciprocal 
relativity." It involves integration of. the psyche 
as a unity.68
Consciousness rests on the unconscious in a constant 
tension, out of which individuality emerges .... 
Individuation involves a release of tension by means 
of balancing opposites and setting up of a relation 
of harmonious dependence between consciousness and 
unconsciousness.69
The wholeness thus remains always relative,
on it further all
intense awareness of life as a whole.
Moreover:
Just as the process of bringing psychic contents to 
consciousness involves a sharpening and clarifying 
of the ambiguities of the unconscious, so the indi­
vidual emerges out of society by the process of 
differentiation and individuation.70
In conclusion, Jung*s idea of the depth, breadth, 
and dynamic of human personality is congenial to Toynbee.
With encouragement from Jung, Toynbee has extended the 
dimensions of human personality to include time and social 
relationships customarily ignored, 
natural creativity of human personality, and both believe 
that this creativity is a manifestation of a more basic 
reality which is active in and through human personality. 
Moreover they link the dynamics of personality to the dynamics
Both believe in the
of history.
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Like Jung, Toynbee ascribes to myth psychic reality— 
a reality fully as significant to life as material reality, 
and, in the ultimate sense, more basic. Yet the material 
and the psychic are functional distinctions of what is 
actually a continuum in human experience. The world as man 
experiences and evaluates it is a function of psychic
processes.
The goal of life is individuation or self-realization— 
a "transfiguration” of human personality. When achieved, 
human personality shares in the creative life of God.
The tensions that confront the human psyche are the 
challenges which may give rise to creative responses. For 
Toynbee, the life of man must become more nearly identified 
with the life and creative purposes of God. Since the life 
of man is social as well as individual, society and man share 
a mutual destiny in achieving this goal.
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CHAPTER V
Footnotes
^"Toynbee, A Study, X, op, clt_______ _____________ 20. In response to
an enquiry concerning this influence, Toynbee wrote that 
”Jung»s influence though now great is fairly recent. . . . 
[It] has been specially great since the Second World War.” 
(Letter from Toynbee, loc. cit. ) What Toynbee says is 
substantiated by the fact that only one reference to Jung 
is to be found in the first six volumes of A Study, i.e., 
in Vol. V, pp. £67f. wherein Toynbee refers to Carl G.
Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, trans. W. S. Dell and 
Cary F. Baynes (London: Routledge and Kegal Paul, 1934)•
• 9
Letter from Edward D. Myers, December 22, 1955.
^Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1947), p"! 11. Professor Percival 
William Martin observes that ”as he [Toynbee] was assembling 
the comprehensive data on which it is based, Jung, in com­
plete independence, was working out the psychological means 
by which the withdrawal-and-re turn can be made.”
(Experiment in Depth: A Study of the Work of Jungt Eliot, 
Toynbee [New York: Pantheon Books, 1955J, foreword.) Later 
Martin comments that ”in the withdrawal-and-return ... it 
is the Jungian approach that is especially relevant.”
(Ibid.. p. 7, n. 1.)
and
Toynbee, A Study. Ill, 
op. cit., 116.
172. Cf. VIII,op. cit • 9
^Toynbee, A Study. X, op. cit., 228. On the Western 
rediscovery of the Subconscious, see VII, op. cit., pp. 468, 
497-98; IX, op. cit., pp. 328, 336, 377, 396, and 698, n. 1; 
and X, op. cit., l2. Regarding the suggestion of the exis­
tence of the Subconscious by the Hellenic writers, see IX, 
op, cit., 327P. and 332. Regarding the original discovery 
of the Subconscious by the Indie and Sinic worlds, see VII, 
op. clt., 468; IX, op. cit., 185, 328, and 332f.
^H. A. L. Fisher, ”A Universal Historian: Review of 
Vols. I-III, A Study of History,” The 19th Century and After. 
CXVI (December, 1934), 667."
^Jolande Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung, fore­
word by Dr. Jung, trans. K. W. Bash (rev. ed.; New Haven:
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Yale University Press, 1951), p. 68: Jung!s "concept of 
life energy has nothing to do with a so-called vital force.11 
According to Martin, op. cit., both Toynbee and Jung use 
"what Eliot once termed the 1 mythical method1--the explor­
ation of those symbols, visions, idees-forces which, acting 
powerfully from the unconscious depths, enable men and 
communities to find new energies, new values and new aims..” 
(Foreword.)
8Gerald Heard, Social Substance of Religion (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1931), P. 54. Cf. Sorokin1s attack on 
all "psychological theories." "Needless to say," he observes, 
"an all-embracing concept like the Freudian libido ceases to 
have any definite contents and becomes scientifically useless.” 
(Contemporary Sociological Theories [New York: Harper & Bros., 
1928J p. 654, 83.T It is important to note, however,
that "psychological theories"--as Sorokin describes them— 
vary. There are important distinctions. Alternative "non- 
psychological" theories are in general much less adequate.
9Solomon E. Asch, Social Psychology (New York: 
Prentice Hall, 1952), p. 139. Cf. also Chap. V, "The Problem 
of Human Interaction.”
Gestalt viewpoint. Concerning the excesses of Durkheimian 
social determinism or "sociologism," see R. M. Maclver,
Social Causation (Boston: Ginn & Co
Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories, op. cit 
Chaps. VIII-X; H.. Alpert, "Durkheim and Sociological 
Psychology,” American Journal of Sociology, XLV (July, 1939), 
6I|_—70; A. Salomon, "Sociology and Sociologism," Journal of 
Social Philosophy. Ill (April, 1938), 210-22.
Asch approaches the problem from the
1942), PP. 76f.j• 9
• 9
■^Toynbee, A Study, X, op, cit., 225^.
11Carl G.. Jung, Collected Papers on Analytical 
Psychology.- trans. Constance Long (London: Baillifere, 
Tindall & Cox, 1916), Chaps. VII through XV; Modern Man, 
op. cit Chap. VI.• 9
12Carl G. Jung, Contributions to Analytical Psychology, 
H. G. and C. F. Baynes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,trans.
1928), p. 6.
■^Ira Progoff, Jung's Psychology and Its Social Meaning 
(New York: The Julian Press, 1953), p7 161.
^^Carl G. Jung, Psychology and Religion (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1938), pp. 47**.
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15 _____ p. U-;
The italics are the writer1s. 
_______ nThe unconscious is not funda­
mentally a menace, a source of fear and misgiving. It is 
the well-spring of life”; Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal 
of History, trans. Michael Bullock (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1953), p. 271+: 
unconscious, it is a continual growth out of the unconscious 
and sliding back into the unconscious. ... In every 
creative act ... we are aided by an unconscious. . . .
Pure consciousness is incapable of doing anything. Conscious­
ness is like the crest of a wave. ... We live . . . from 
out of it. . . . The more lucidly consciousness renders it 
manifest, the more ... it becomes actual itself. ... By 
entering into the unconscious . . . [we] attain heightened 
consciousness.11
Toynbee, nWhat I Am Trying to Do,” op. cit 
500. 
p. 207:
• 9A Study. VII, op. cit 
Cf. Martin, op. cit • *• 9
”0ur consciousness is borne by the
■^Jung, Modern Man, (Harvest Book ed.), op. cit • f.
P. 168.
17Ibld., p. 170.
18 1+.98.Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit 
^Toynbee, A Study, X, op. cit
• 9
40.• 9
20Like Plato, Toynbee tries to hitch Reason and 
Intuition side by side to the winged chariot of the Human 
Psyche--"to formulate in the language of reason the truth 
of Poetry and Prophecy."
501, n. 1.) 
and 626.
(Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit 
Cf. pp. 498, 508j and IX, op. cit
• 9
399, 401,• 9
PIToynbee, A Study, X, op. cit 
and VII, op. cit.., 506. Jacobi, op. -__
that creative individuals have an "extraordinarily close 
relation—as it were 1 direct contactr—with the unconscious.” 
Concerning the relationship of subconsciousness to conscious
personality in Toynbee see: VII, op. cit., _____
203, 317, 332ff., 31+8, 361, 380, 391, 403, and 629; X, op, cit., 
12i|f.
113. Cf. pp. 113-25• 9cit., p. 34, observes
501-06; IX,- op. cit • 9
22Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 508. Cf. pp. 498 
and 501-502; ”The subconscious,” says Toynbee, ”is nearer to 
God than the Conscious Self.” (VII, op. cit., 508, n. 3.)
The significance of the Jungian hypothesis is also recognized 
by anthropologist Paul Radin. Radin observes that ”it is 
application of the psycho-analytical theories of Jung [rather
158
than Freud] that is most likely to have the most profound 
Influence upon ethnology.11 (Social Anthropology [New York: 
McGraw-Hill Co., 1932], p. 16..) With Jung and Toynbee, Radin 
believes that the "primitive mentality” is an essentially 
psychological rather than a chronological phenomenon. (Paul 
Radin, Primitive Religion: Its Nature and Origin [New York:
The Viking Press. 1937J> passim.) Progoff, op. cit.. pp. 276f. 
reminds us that ”in interpreting Jung . . . the question of 
a stage prior to the development of consciousness does not 
involve a distinction between primitive and modern thought as 
such, but rather a distinction as to the nature and degree of 
differentiation of psychic contents. The levels for Jung 
[and Toynbee] do not fundamentally involve types of [material] 
culture but rather aspects of the change that occurs, in the 
movement from the unconscious [primitive mentality to [the] 
consciousness [of Man-in-Process-of-Civilization]. The 
processes of the psyche . . . [are] the hub of the question.” 
There is in Toynbee the view congruent with Jung that the 
contemporary uncreative majority reflect an essentially 
"primitive mentality” contrasting to the creative "Men in 
Process of Civilization" who share more in common, psycho­
logically, with the creative individuals of earlier epochs 
than with their own uncreative contemporaries.
23Asch, op. cit.t p. 79. What Asch rejects as well 
as does Toynbee in deterministic theories is the elementar- 
istic doctrine that "units of behavior are specific anatomical- 
physiological paths of excitation and that action is a sum 
of elementary units of reflex-arcs, some of which are innately 
conductive [instinctive] and others of which are strengthened 
during the life of the individual [that is, learned].”
(Ibid., p. 76.)
^Henri Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, 
trans. R. Ashley Andra, Cloudesley Brereton, and Horsfall 
Carter (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935), P. 95.
2^Ibld.. p. 119.
26 pp. 127, 11+2.
27'Jung, Psychology and Religion, op. cit
Ibid • 9 .
p. 62.• I
28 Cf.. Jung, Modern Man.12, 100-102.Ibid 
Chap.#IX.
29Cf. the analysis of the Bergsonian dialectic by 
Ernst Zahn, Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte (Zurich: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, Koln und Opladen, 1954)9 PP* 16-23:
PP.• 9op. cit * 9
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"Die Natur als der Inbegriff der materiellen Welt—’A la fois 
docile et rebelle,’ instrument et obstacle,1 'raassacreuse 
des individus en rrieme temps que g£n6ratrice des espfeces1— 
hat dabei den Charakter einer Herausforderung. Die Heraus- 
forderung rausz vom Leben beantwortet werden. Sie ist das 
Bc5se, ohne das sich das Gute nicht verwirklichen kann."
(p. 22.) Zahn quotes from Bergson’s LEvolution Cr6atrice.
^°Paul Tillich, Love Power and Justice (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1954), p. ljl.%
^Carl G. Jung, Psychological Types, trans. H. G. 
Baynes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1923), p. 588*
“^Toynbee, A Study, IX, opB cit., 639.
^Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories, 
op. cit.. pa 6^6.
3i4Ibid., p. 614.8.
33Ibid., pp. 6U9f. Cf. balance of Chap. II and H. 
Kluver, "Max Weber’s ’Ideal Types’ in Psychology.11 Journal 
of Philosophy, XXIII (January-December, 1926), 29-35^
-^Alfred Whitehead, Science and the Modern World 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925), p. l80. Cf. pp. 93ff9, 
133.
■^Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, op. cit
3®Carl G. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, 
trans. H. G. and C. F. Baynes (London: Bailli&re, Tindall &
Cox, 1928), pp. 62, 79. Cf. Jacobi, op. cit., pp. 68ff. For 
an excellent study of "The Way Between the Opposites"- 
Jungian "principle of opposites1—enantiodromia, or "running 
between opposites," see Martin, op. cit., Chap. VII. The 
basic opposites at work in the human psyche, says Martin, 
are the claims of the conscious and the unconscious. The 
psyche must steer a course between inner and outer necessity, 
inner and outer demands. "Visible and invisible, two worlds 
meet in man." Martin distinguishes four categories of 
opposites: those of attitude—yes and no, plus and minus,
pleasure and pain, etc.; those of self-contradiction-body 
and spirit, Dionysiac and Apollonian, etc.; those of society- 
ego and ethnocentricity, individual and group, etc.; those 
of time and eternity (existential)—subjectivity and objectivity
P. 1+3.• *
-the
f
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of values, naturalism and supernaturalism, This World and the 
Other World, et cetera. Opposites reflect themselves in the 
dynamics of human personality on the basis of what Jung terms 
a "reciprocal relativity"—a theory of the complementariness 
and compensatory nature of psychic relationships. For 
example, the unconscious tends to compensate for an "over­
differentiation" of a conscious function. Suppressed 
functions of the psyche act as stimuli which set in motion 
psychic processes that tend to redress imbalance--to restore 
equilibrium.
' 39 p. 62.Jung, Two Essays, op. cit • 3
^Jacobi, op. cit Cf. Jung, Two Essays._______ P. 71.
op. cit. / p. 71, and Modern Man, op. cit., p. 21+2.
• 3
41Jung, Psychology and Religion, op. cit.. p. lj_8.
^Jung, Two Essays, op. cit., p. 165. See also the 
analysis by Martin, ’op. cit., pp. l69f. wherein he observes 
that there is a serious danger in the complete identifi­
cation of the ego with the persona, i.e., 
believes that he is actually his persona, 
he becomes the victim of his unconscious, projecting his 
"shadow" self on others. Cut off from awareness of the whole 
self, he is "left high and dry . . . bloodless and sterile 
• • . a mere simulacrum." The latter becomes a personal 
tragedy, the former a social tragedy." (Ibid.)
the individual 
In this instance
43Jung, Psychological Types, op. cit.. Chap. I; and 
Jacobi, op. cit.. Chap. I, "The Nature and Structure of the 
Psyche." The structure of the unconscious is inferred from 
manifestations--empirically—of symptoms or complexes, dreams, 
fantasies, and visions. Compare, says Jacobi, "the parallel 
with the methods of physics and its hypothetical construction. 
. . . There too the waves and atoms themselves are not 
perceived, but they are inferred [as constructs] from their 
observed effects, and hypotheses are sought that are able to 
explain as comprehensively as possible what has been observed 
and postulated." (op. cit., p. \\%9 n. 9.) In physics one 
observes the activity of the "particle"—not the "particle" 
itself, yet these forms of scientific shorthand are uni­
versally accepted as valid scientific fictions. Likewise 
one does not "see" the collective unconscious.' It is a useful 
hypothesis designed to cope with realities more complex, 
perhaps, than any aspect of physical reality.
^Toynbee, A Study, IX,
'
cit*., 328. Toynbee also
discusses a personal and collective unconscious and appeals
op.
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to the use of Jungian analytical psychology. 
n* 1, 329, and 698; also VIII, op. cit., 
detailed description of the unconscious, 
Psychological Types, op. cit.. pp. 6l3ff.
^Ibld.. p. 327.
^6Ibid., p. 328.
Cf. pp. i|.8f., 
For a moreH5f. 
see Jung,
^Toynbee, A Study. Ill, op. cit.. 259f. Cf. I, 
op. cit.. 4J4.2; Carl G. Jung and Carl Kerinyi, Essays on a 
Science of Mythology, trans. R. F.. C. Hull (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), p. 105: "What an archetypal 
content is always expressing is first and foremost a figure 
of speech."
kQJung and Kerenyi, op. cit 
Psychology and Religion, op. cit".
T^pes, op., cit.. pp. 379, 55^7;
Bergson, Two Sources, op. cit., 
of the species [manJ subsist, immutable, deep within all of 
us."
., p. 110. Cf. Jung, 
p. 63f.; Psychological 
Jacobi, op. cit., pp.36f.; 
p. 262: "The dispositions
Il9^ Carl G. Jung, "Die psychologischen Aspekte des 
Mutter-Archetypus," Eranos-Jahrbuch 1938 (Zurich, Rhein-Verlag, 
1939), p. 410, trans. and quoted in Jacobi, op. cit.. p. 57.
^J. Murphy, Primitive Man (London: Milford, 1927),
The theory of primordial images is by no means
It is
PP. 8f.
limited to the creative imagination of Dr. Jung, 
suggested in the psychology of Alfred Bastian who wrote 
during the nineteenth century..
that "in our sleep and in our dreams we pass through the whole 
thought of earlier humanity. . . . This atavistic relic of 
humanity manifests its existence within us, for it is the 
foundation upon which the higher rational faculty developed." 
(Human. All Too Human, trans. Alexander Harvey [Chicago:
C. H. Kerr & Co., 1908), II, 27) quoted in Jung, Psychology 
and Religion, op. cit., p. 64 wherein Jung also cites many 
other sources or the idea of archetypes including Durkheim!s 
notion of the "collective representations." Jung discusses 
the archetypes in Psychological Types, op. cit
Modern Man, op. it______________________
Personality, trans. S. M. Dell (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 194°), Chap. Ill, "Archetypes of the Collective 
Unconscious." In Progoff, the discussion concerning arche-
______pp. 68-73; in Bergson, Two Sources,
p. 262; and in Toynbee, VII, op. cit
Friedrich Nietzsche believed
pp. 55kff.; 
Chap . IX; and in The Integration of the
• 9
• 9
types is found op. cit 
op. cit • > 413;• 9 • 9
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IX, op. clt., lj.8f., 328, and 698. 
of their role in the fine arts,
Concerning Toynbeers view 
see IX, op. cit.. 697-701|«-
51Jung and Ker6nyi, op. cit p. 110.• j
92Jung, Psychological Types, op. cit Chap. XI.• 9
-^Martin, op. cit 
%bid., p. 162.
P. 115.• 9
55Jung, Modern Man, op. cit
op. cit.. p. 1621 ,rThe autonomous complex . . . consists of 
a twisting-together of psychic contents, having its own 
energy and operating in its own fashion. The human psyche 
contains many such autonomous complexes. Any one or combi­
nation of these, whether in the form of projection or of 
’invasion, is liable to take over and run the man for anything 
from a split-second to years at a time.11
56 Jacobi, op. cit.a p. Ij.7.
p. 91* Cf. Martin,• 9
57Jacobi, op. cit.t p. 72.
58 p. 163.Martin, op, clt i• 9
59^ Jung, Psychology and Religion, op. cit P. 19.• 9
60
££-!_2At., pp. 27ff.; and Martin, op. cit.. Chap. II.
61 P. 564.Jung, Psychological Types, op. cit • 9
62Heard, Social Substance of Religion, op. cit 
PP. 30, 38. For an excellent study of this problem see 
David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1950); and Rollo Mav Man's Search For Himself (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1953).
•^Progoff, op. clt
^Jacobi, op. cit
• 9
p. 98.• 9
pp. 33f.• 9
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6^Ibid.. p. 139. Cf. Martin, op. cit.. Chap. VIII,
"The Individuation Process." Martin summarizes individuation 
as: a way of living life, an "inward transforming experience"
transcending self-achievement, unique for each individual, 
distinct from "individualism" per se, and a continuing activity 
of the psyche. (Ibid., pp. l61ji*. )
66Ibid., pp. 60f.
67 p. li|6.Progoff, op. cit • f
68 Ibid.,. p. 166.
69Ibid p. I6I4... Jung borrows from L6vy-Bruhl the 
concept of participation mystique which the latter applied 
bo the primitive mentality and which Jung applies to the 
psyche submerged in the collective mass. Failure of the 
psyche to individuate is characterized by a thinking and 
judging with the mind of some group with which the person­
ality happens to share a common ground as with a family, 
clan, nation, etc. "Instead of a man working out his own 
unique experiment in living there is a kind of underground 
collective life ... in which the individual ... is 
submerged." (Martin, op. cit.t p. 171.)
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CHAPTER VI
TOYNBEE 1S THEORY OP ETHERIALIZATION
Arnold J. Toynbee*s philosophy of history has been 
characterized as a saga of sin, suffering, and doom.
Professor Sorokin speaks of Toynbee as a self-styled 
"undertaker of civilizations,11 and Professor Harry Elmer 
Barnes adds that "Toynbee buries [his] civilization[s] in 
an Anglican churchyard."^ Yet Toynbee*s detailed treatment 
of disaster is no necessary indication of morbid concerns; 
much less is this treatment a necessary indication of the 
limit of his contribution to historiography. Nor does his 
religious interest necessarily transgress the legitimate 
prerogative of the historian to report history as he sees it. 
Toynbee*s secular colleagues see in the Renaissance, in the 
Enlightenment, or in Modern Science a particular significance
pfor history, 
emergence of higher religion.
The issue of religious versus secular historiography 
is not new. Lucretius, for example, saw progress in the 
decline of religion much as V. Gordon Childe does today. 
Toynbee, on the other hand, sees progress in the advance of 
religion as did Augustine.
Toynbee finds this significance in the
l6i|.
165
The purpose of this chapter is not, however, to 
defend Toynbeefs philosophy of history as religious histori­
ography. It is to focus attention on ToynbeeTs analysis of 
the nature and meaning of growth and progress. In particular, 
attention is centered on his idea of etherialization which he 
advances as a criterion of growth and progress.
The rise and fall of individuals, societies, civili­
zations, or constituents thereof may be likened to the 
meteorological phenomenon of convection in the one case and 
subsidence in the other. The analogy is manifestly crude, 
but nevertheless instructive. We note that within any air 
mass heated from below there may be found rather sharply 
differentiated convection currents which ascend rather spec­
tacularly. These currents rise with varying degrees of 
rapidity and achieve varying degrees of height. Occasionally 
they are accompanied by sharp downdrafts. More often the air 
mass as a whole tends to settle slowly over a wide area in 
its return to earth. This gradual subsidence better charac­
terizes the average state of affairs within the air mass.
The spectacular updraft capped by a resplendent cloud is the 
exception rather than the rule although on occasion clouds 
may predominate in a particular area.
If we apply this crude analogy to the affairs of men, 
we note that regardless of the nature of the ultimate destiny 
of man, the totality of human experience embraces great 
individual and collective achievements, achievements which 
have been and continue to be accompanied by a relative and
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widespread inactivity. Moreover, the analogy suggests that 
for most men most of the time, life is not a great creative
venture but a striving to resist the forces of physical or 
spiritual decline, to sustain a modicum of happiness in the 
face of suffering and ennui. For many, the object of life 
is sheer physical survival. For others—perhaps less 
fortunate--life is an urgent flight from boredom arising 
from the enervation of creative potential.^ Yet for all of 
its anomalies, life is good. So it seems to the healthy 
mind and soul. For most men, zest for it is never wholly 
lost. Hope for the better is continually buttressed by a 
belief in the possibility of an amelioration of the worst 
either in this world or the next. Otherwise human effort
would be a treadmill of futility..
If we return momentarily to the analogy, we note 
that the mass of air—or shall we say of mankind—possesses 
a potential for growth but exhibits instead, a tendency 
toward quiescence or actual subsidence. This relative
quiescence, however, is intermittently punctuated by genuine 
surges of effort accompanied by genuine creative achievement. 
According to Toynbee, these particular instances reflect the
In more generalized casesactivity of a creative minority, 
these creative surges may be likened to the great social
upheavals known as civilization. In any instance, growth 
applies to activity rather than to the physical extension of 
this or that institution, human trait, or social entity as 
such. This is the important distinction between Toynbee* s and
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Spengler*s civilizations, 
not apply to Toynbee.
The latter*s organic analogy does 
For Toynbee, any creative activity—' 
when it appears--is growth, and insofar as it has spiritual 
significance it is progress, 
disintegration may evoke creative spiritual responses which
Even the challenge of social
are genuine instances of progress in the life of man.
Indeed, Toynbee*s criterion of creativity is the presence of 
significance or value in a particular activity. And signifi­
cance or value vary as the quality of the human situation.
The greater values are those which are more enduring or are 
ultimate in their significance, or whose presence supports 
or renders possible other values. These Toynbee believes to 
be spiritual. Hence his emphasis upon spiritual significance.
Toynbee believes that the potential for creativity 
is germane to the human situation. Countless variations of 
creative activity are manifest in the life of man. The most 
humble African village may include,
individuals who have lived and died obscure because 
they . . . failed to break "the cake of custom" and 
have therefore failed to win for their potential 
genius the field which it needs 
and manifest itself in action.4
in order to realize
There is no Slite blessed with a copyright on cosmic grace.
This widespread creative potential suggests religious 
intonations. It is related to the cosmic drama, to ultimate 
concerns. Indeed, the secret of history is to be found, 
Toynbee believes, in the dramaturgical overtones of mythology, 
for mythology expresses in living metaphor the most basic 
experiences of the human race. In his deepest intuitions,
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man has learned that perfection is neither the ideal nor the 
goal of existence. Faust is perfect in knowledge, Job perfect 
in goodness, and Adam perfect in innocence. But perfection 
is stasis. Even the perfection of God requires a challenger 
to disturb ,fthe waters of the deep,” as it were, so that out 
of the turmoil and incompleteness of Yang, a fresh act of 
creation may restore the temporary perfection of Yin.
In these mythological expressions of the cosmic drama, 
the Devil symbolizes the challenger whose force of disequi­
librium moves the Creator to renew creative activity, to 
restore Yin. Mephistopheles flshapes and must create, though 
Devil.11 The cosmic encounter is archetypal. It is the clash 
between Satan and the Lord in the Book of Job, between Yahweh 
and the Serpent in the Garden, between Artemis and Aphrodite 
in Euripides1 Hippolytus. The human psyche discovers its 
tragic role. It discovers that in the drama of Life, it is 
human personalities who are the dramatis personae that perform 
the acts by which the "foundations of the great deep are loosed." 
Men share with the Creator the common concern of creation. In
becoming the cooperative vessels of the Creator (Wu Wei), men
"In the third stage," saysparticipate in the drama of Life. 
Toynbee,
the reversal of the cosmic rhythm from Yang towards 
Yin, which was initiated in the second stage is 
carried to completion. ... In this new creation, 
which the ordeal of one of God's creatures has 
enabled God to achieve, the sufferer himself returns 
to a state of peace and harmony and bliss [Yin] on a 
higher level.5
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Though the human protagonist passes through "the 
dark night of the soul," the challenges and responses of 
Life become the joyful labor of creation, 
perfect functioning or creative process--not Plato*s contem­
plation of Eternity.
Perfection becomes
For Toynbee, it is Prometheus rather 
than the philosopher who personifies the creative process—
symbolizes the ideal. Prometheus knows that unless Zeus is 
kept on the move, he will be overthrown even as Cronos before 
Prometheus therefore gives Zeus no peace.
In participating in the creative process, man not 
only fulfills God*s will but brings about human progress.
"The human protagonist in the divine drama not only serves 
God by enabling Him to renew His creation, but also serves 
his fellow-men by pointing the way for others to follow.^
The way of Life in This World—which is the way of 
creative growth—is what Toynbee calls etherialization. In 
the ultimate and therefore religious sense, etherialization 
is the way of transfiguration. Progress in all spheres of 
life possesses spiritual significance, Toynbee believes.
This does not mean that only the spiritual is real but that 
all values, all creative activity possess a spiritual as 
well as a mundane or more immediate significance, 
the condition of progress. Progress is a matter of ultimate 
significance as well as the increase of this or that, and 
ultimate concerns are ipso facto spiritual concerns. Indeed, 
if we view "terrestrial history sub specie aeternitatis,"
him.
This is
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asks Toynbee,
what significance shall we find in the idea of progress 
In . . . the progressive improvement of some terres­
trial institution: a tribe, a city-state, an empire, 
a church, a system of knowledge or "know-how" a school 
of art, a code of morals. . . .7
If. progress possesses spiritual significance, to what does
it point? Toynbee answers: full participation in the
creative process which is the "Life of God.11
The progress of individual souls through This World 
towards [cooperation with] God, and not progress of 
Society [Leviathan] in This World is the end in 
which the supreme value is found.8
Although Toynbee*s etherialization is "a conversion
of the soul from the World, the Flesh, and Devil, to a
o
Kingdom of Heaven," a doctrine of escapism is not intended.
This world is neither a Kingdom for Leviathan nor an 
irreclaimable spiritual wilderness, but a province 
of the Kingdom of God. It is a rebellious province 
which has been betrayed by the sin of pride into 
ungratefully and unlawfully declaring its independence 
and has thereby brought upon itself the self-imposed 
penalties of misrule and distress; but this act of 
rebellion has neither invalidated God*s sovereignty 
nor alienated His love.10
If God has not renounced and abandoned This World, Toynbee 
argues, why should man? 
quality of life processes. 
escape--is Toynbee*s goal, and "every example of human growth," 
he says, "will always be found to have a social as well as an
nil
Etherialization has to do with the
Transformation of life--not
individual aspect. No aspect of existence is beyond the
purview of the creative activity of God:
The phenomenon of "etherialization" asserts itself 
in the domain of Applied Sciences . . .
Mathematics . . . Art and Philosophy.12
 Theology . ..
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Indeed, when creative activity ceases in one sphere of life, 
It is likely to spring up in another.
psychic energy will not be denied, for its source is God 
Himself.
The dynamic of human
An example is to be found in the experience of 
contemporary Western man whose spirit is threatened by the
dehumanizing effect of mechanization and regimentation.
nOur prediction,” says Toynbee,
[is] that some revolutionary change in the Western 
Society*s religious life [is] likely to occur as a 
result of the revolutionary changes produced in 
Western Society*s economic and political life by the 
psychological effects of the mechanization of its 
technology. . . . Indeed, so far from the regimen­
tation of Western life on the economic and political 
planes being likely to induce a regimentation of 
Western life on the religious plane as well, it seems 
likely to militate against it; for one of the devices 
by which Life achieves the tour de force of keeping 
itself alive is by compensating for a deficit or 
surplus in one department by accumulating a surplus 
or incurring a deficiency in another. . . .
In Life there is always an irreducible minimum of 
psychic energy that will insist' on discharging itself 
through some channel or other. . . . Life*s device 
for economizing energy is mechanization. For example, 
by making the beating of the heart and the alternating 
inflation and deflation of the lungs automatic in the 
human body, Life had released human thought and will 
for other uses.^3
The creative activity of God is manifest in both the external 
growth of human societies and in the internal growth of 
human personality:
Civilizations grow through an felan that carries them 
from challenge through response to further challenge 
and from differentiation through integration to 
differentiation again. . . . This kind .of progress 
cannot properly be described in the spatial metaphor 
of "direction.f! For the progress which we call growth 
is a cumulative progress, and its cumulative character 
is apparent in both its outward and its inward aspects.
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In the Macrocosm, growth reveals Itself as a pro­
gressive and cumulative mastery over an external 
environment; in the Microcosm, as a progressive and 
cumulative inward self-determination or self­
articulation.
of growth--the external or the internal—we have a 
possible criterion of the progress of the 6lan itself*
A difficulty in grasping the nature of Toynbee!s 
etherialization as the Way of Life arises in part from 
failure to appreciate the significance of the psychological
Toynbeers critics tend to view etherial­
ization in strictly Platonic terms as, for example, in the
In either of these two manifestations
lij-
processes involved.
comment that for Toynbee "spiritual ends cannot be achieved 
through material means."15 Professor Barnes, for example, 
admits that Toynbee1s progress through etherialization "is 
almost exclusively a result of psychic and social forces,"
but laments that,
the soft mystical note that merely confuses the 
earlier parts of [his] work becomes so loud toward 
the end of the third volume [in which Toynbee 
introduces etherialization] that it almost drowns 
out the systematic-empirical strain. We therefore 
do not discuss his concepts of "etherialization" and 
"withdrawal-and-return" largely because we do not 
fully understand them. 17
Professor Feibleman also exhibits a typical difficulty in
grasping Toynbee*s psychology when he wonders whether,
the conception of "etherialization" ... is incon­
sistent with the movement of genesis [of civili­
zations], Why would a civilization whose genesis was 
social be enabled to grow only by a movement which is 
personal? That the elements of social growth may have 
their correspondent effect upon and interrelation with 
the individual is to be expected; but that they should 
be exhausted by that aspect of society is not logical. 
Does etherialization have no social and objective 
counterpart? Is there nothing in the objective 
relations between individuals, and between social
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groups, which corresponds to what is happening within 
the individual. ... It is curious indeed that 
etherialization goes into the individual and not up­
ward on a social basis at all. Toynbee . . . insist[s] 
that higher levels of cultural value must be exclusively 
confined to the individuals soul and that these higher 
levels can have no existence in the objective social 
and nature world.18
In a letter to Feibleman, Toynbee!s rejoinder was that higher
values are individual achievements which have social and
material implications and conditions by virtue of the nature
19of man and society.
A common and serious charge that must be carefully 
examined is the charge that Toynbee, revives Other Worldly 
interests with a view to escape from This World. Initially 
we must argue that because the cosmic drama works in and 
through human personality, it does not follow that the 
actions or concerns of human personality are confined to 
interest in escape from This World. Part of the error arises 
from the association of the human field-of-action with "mind” 
in the traditional dualistic sense as over against "body." 
There follow then the conventional dichotomies of individual
The erroneousand social, material and spiritual, and so on. 
notion arises that the cosmic drama of which Toynbee speaks
must be resolved in exclusively spiritual or individual terms 
without regard to material or social considerations. Toynbee's 
answer is that the human psychefs field-of-action embraces 
the material as well as the spiritual, the social as well as 
the individual. Spiritual values, Toynbee insists, are not 
necessarily antithetical to material or social values but
sustain them and in the ultimate sense give them their 
significance. In other words, these values are antithetical 
only in the sense that they distort or replace spiritual
value s. So long as growth persists and there is no idoli­
zation of the ephemeral, values are complementary, 
as values lose their complementary relationship so as to pit 
material against spiritual, individual against social--which 
is often the case—breakdown occurs.
Insofar
MIn seeking God," Toynbee says,
Man is performing a social act. . . . Man's efforts 
to make himself less unlike God who has created Man 
in His own image must include efforts to follow 
Christ's example. . . . The antithesis between 
trying to save one's own soul by seeking and following 
God and trying to do one's own duty to one’s neighbour 
is therefore false. ... It is a paradoxical but 
profoundly true and important principle of life that 
the most likely way to reach a goal is to be aiming 
not at that goal itself but at some more ambitious 
goal beyond it.20
"The spirit of higher religions," continues Toynbee, "so far
from being a social cancer [as Gibbon and Frazer have told
i.21us], is the bread of social, as well as spiritual life. 
Progress through etherialization implies qualitative advances 
to which value attaches, and the ground of all value is — in 
the final sense—spiritual. Moreover that which supports 
value also supports progress.
The religious emphasis in Toynbee does not consist 
in a repudiation of or an attempt to escape from the processes 
of Life. It is, instead, an attempt to restore purpose and 
value to these processes. Yet Toynbee is not simply reviving 
Aristotelian teleology or Augustinian otherworldliness. He
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is invoking insights from twentieth-century process philosophy.
MIn Life-in-Time, as human souls experience it in their
passage through This World,” he explains,
a finite human understanding, that cannot resolve an 
apparent moral conflict between divers laws reigning 
within the human ken, can at least discern that . . . 
these laws stand to one another in a hierarchical 
relation . . . and that this hierarchy of laws is [a]
Jacob!s ladder up which God is ever seeking to draw 
His Creatures towards Him.22
"Earthly existence is an ordeal,” Toynbee believes, that 
necessarily embraces all mundane activities, 
is not, therefore, removal of the human psyche from its 
field of action but a transformation of that field of action
Etherialization
itself. It ascribes significance to a process that would 
otherwise be meaningless, 
it possible to see in,
The idea of etherialization makes
the operation of "laws of Nature” in the histories 
of civilization ... a struggle between a dominant 
tendency at work which prevails in the long run against 
repeated and, in the short run, repeatedly successful- 
counteracting moves in which . . . the persistence of 
the weaker tendency . . . accounts for the repetition 
of the encounter in a series of successive cycles; 
the dominance of the stronger tendency makes itself 
felt by bringing the series to a close sooner or later, 
instead of letting it go on repeating itself ad 
infinitum.23
.
:
The ultimate significance of etherialization is not circum­
scribed by the nature of any particular manifestation of it.
In any analysis of [the] rhythm [of Life] we have to 
distinguish between the movements of the part and of 
the whole and between the natures of the means and 
of the end.t There is no law of pre-established 
harmony which decrees that the end must have the same 
nature as the means or the whole the same movement as 
the part; and this is immediately obvious in the case 
of the wheel. . . . The fact that the vehicle can 
only move in virtue of the wheel1 s circular movement
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round the axle does not compel the vehicle itself to 
travel like a merry-go-round in a circular track.2k
Unfortunately there can be no brief, all-inclusive
and definitive statement of etherialization. It must he
apprehended by examination rather than by definition. The
meaning of the term is relative to its context. Any simple
definition would be partial and misleading.
The idea is not altogether original with Toynbee.
Henry Adams spoke of the Ethereal in reference to pure,
abstract mathematical thought.
that he influenced Toynbee in any way. In a letter to this
writer, Toynbee ventured the opinion that his etherialization
was an original idea although—he hastened to add--all ideas
have origins, and the major source of inspiration for etherial-
26ization he believed to be the New Testament.
The term "etherialization is an unfortunate word11
It is improbable, however,
says anthropologist Alfred Kroeber, "[but] there is an
«|27important concept here in spite of the term, 
is an unfortunate word because it suggests a kind of ghostly 
quality not intended by Toynbee. Actually it stands for the 
essential character of the creative process. When one con? 
siders that "creative acts . . . defy description . . . even 
by the innovators themselves," one can readily appreciate
pO
Toynbee^s selection of the term etherialization.
One of the earliest hints of the idea of etherial-
Etherialization
ization is to be found in The Western Question in Greece and
Turkey (1922)—a major work which suggests many of Toynbee*s
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key Ideas.
OQ
essentially moral nature of growth. 7 Etherialization is 
suggested in the view that self-determination is the criterion 
of the growth and decay of civilizations.^
If the influence of the New Testament is disregarded 
momentarily, numerous possible sources of inspiration for 
the idea of etherialization suggest themselves. Professor 
Sorokin advances ,!H. T. Buckle* s dynamics of a * diminishing
In The Western Question, Toynbee hints at the
Influence of physical laws and of an increasing influence of
31mental laws* as time passes.”^ One might also point to 
Hobhouse*s belief that social processes tend to be increasingly 
determined by the self-conscious volitions of man. There is
a possible influence in the Russian sociologist, Jacques 
Novicow (1849-1912), who saw a progressive shift in the arena 
of human conflict from the material to the mental and the
spiritual. Toynbee himself cites the work of a Bishop Barnes 
who nput his finger on the principle ... of *Etherialization*Tt 
in his study of evolution, and "Mr. Heard,11 who,
suggests that the armour which saved the Mammals* 
lives was not physical but psychic, and that the 
strength of this psychic defence lay in a physical
defencelessness.32
Heard*s influence is suggested in the,
psychological hypothesis--the opinion that the con­
dition of civilization is the consequence of the ^ 
quality of the consciousness of its constituents. ^
A significant work by Heard entitled The Social Substance of
Religion appeared in 1931 during the period between 1929 and
1935 when Toynbee was writing the first three volumes of
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A Study, This work may have had a marked influence on Toynbee 
with regard to the idea of etherialization. Historian Bertram 
Wolfe seems to think so,^ However Professor James H. Nichols
is probably correct when he says that ,!Bergsonian evolutionism 
hit Toynbee 'with the force of a revelation.'"-^ Bergson's
influence persists throughout the writing of A Study. It is 
earlier and more germane than that of Jung. The latter became '
particularly influential in the four concluding volumes of 
A Study.^ But Toynbee had by then already developed his idea 
One can scarcely appreciate Toynbee 
unless Bergson--particularly his Two Sources--is read first.
of etherialization.
Rushton Coulborn believes that Toynbee's
interpretation of history is made in the light of 
Bergson's theory of ndynamic religion," a theory 
which is effectively sustained for primitive 
societies by the work of such anthropologists as 
Wilson Wallis and Philleo Nash . . . [and] is 
equally applicable to civilized societies.37
Toynbee's religious emphasis and its relation to
the life and destiny of man is suggested in both Heard and
Bergson. They believe with Toynbee that civilization
develops under the aegis of religion. Heard asks:
What is the force which preserves [civilization]
. . . which neutralizes [destructive] individuality?
. . . It is Religion.38
"The clue to the history of civilization," he continues,
must be looked for in the history of religion, for 
religion is the form in which psychic expression is 
found least adulterated, and psv 
fundamental causes of history.39
Even the manner by which Toynbee develops his thesis
concerning etherialization in the life of man is suggested by
chic forces are .the
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Heard In his Ascent of Humanity in which he speaks of a 
"systole and diastole of Time,T--a mystic evolutionary rhythm 
by which growth proceeds, 
sciousness, the co-conscious individuality of primitive man 
[or the primitive mentality] is followed by self-conscious 
individuality [of civilized man] from which may develop a
In the emergence of human con-
super or common self-consciousness in the next development 
of man.^ In his Source of Civilization, Heard strongly 
suggests one basic aspect of Toynbee*s theory of etherialization 
in the statement that,
Life evolves by sensitiveness and awareness; by
being exposed [challenged], not by being protected.^
Though not yet fully defined or described, Toynbee*s
etherialization suggests a qualitative and functional aspect
^ It is thisof process--an infusing of value into change, 
axiological problem that impoverishes most sociological 
theories of progress. The sociologist is obliged to deal 
with his categories in terms of ephemeral values. This does 
not mean that these values are unreal or insignificant but 
merely that they are contingent. The ephemeral values which 
the sociologist is likely to invoke derive their significance 
from a surreptitious introduction of an unacknowledged ground 
or ultimate basis of value. If the sociologist successfully 
avoids the issue of ultimate and therefore religious assump­
tions, his system of values and consequently his theory of 
progress will be groundless. On the other hand, if he chooses 
to come to grips with the value problem, he may find himself
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violating the principle of verifiability. The usual response 
is therefore to avoid the issue altogether and to accept the 
principle of progress merely as a preferential matter of 
faith rather than of fact.
Toynbee has clearly apprehended the inadequacy of 
naturalistic attempts at a definition of progress. Whatever 
may be the patent errors in the detail, outline, or appli­
cation of his theory, his insight into the importance of 
personality processes and values for any theory of progress 
is noteworthy. Moreover, what many of his critics have 
believed to be the basis of his difficulties--his religious 
axiology--is in reality the basis of his strength. The 
question is not so much what kind of a theory of progress 
one may prefer as whether any theory of progress is possible 
and, if so, on what grounds. When the sociologist attempts 
an explicit or implicit theory of progress, he is involved 
in a philosophy of history and a theory of values as well. 
Hence he is likely to avoid the issue altogether if he can. 
Toynbee, on the other hand, can approach the problem of 
progress head on.
For Toynbee, the history of man is punctuated by two 
events of climactic importance — the emergence of Homo sapiens 
and the emergence of l!man-in-process-of-civilization. n 
first event constituted a psychic revolution of vast impor­
tance not accompanied by evidence of any corresponding 
revolution in material technique.^ 
in the sense that it involves contemporary man.
The
The latter is contemporary
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Man-in-process-of-civilizatlon Is the result of a 
unique set of interactions between man and his environment— 
material, social, and psychic.. These interactions evoke 
unique responses in particular individuals. They are the 
universal possibility of all men in all environments. In 
actuality, however, they appear to be limited to the responses 
of particular individuals and groups to particular challenges. 
The particularity of etherialization is not a function of 
time, or culture, or external causal factors alone but the 
outcome of a unique interaction of psychic and non-psychic 
factors. Indeed it is a genuinely creative phenomenon.
The Genesis of man-in-process-of-civilization is con­
ditioned but not determined by physical environment:
Any kind of climate and topography is capable of 
serving as an environment for the genesis of a 
civilization if the necessary miracle is performed 
by some [other] positive factor. . . . The genesis 
of a civilization can take place in any kind of 
human environment or—on the evidence of the 
"unrelated11 civilizations—without any human environment 
at all. . . „ The cause of the genesis of civilizations 
is not simple but multiple; it is not an entity but a 
relation. . . . Moreover this relation is not one of 
Harmony but of opposition. 44
An "inner creative factor," suggests Jan Smuts--whom Toynbee 
quotes--
in a measure acts directly under the stimulus of the 
external factor, and the variations which emerge are 
the result of this intimate interaction.4-5
This kind of relation of environment to human personality was
recognized by the American sociologist Arthur Todd who
argued that,
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climate, topography, soil are hardly to be set down 
as "causes" of human evolution or progress [or civili­
zation] . They are merely conditioning phenomena. . .. 
They have the same relation to human association that 
the temperature of 
symphony ..4°
"Life is a maze of social stimuli," says another American
sociologist, Emery Bogardus:
Stimulation of one human being by another is the 
fundamental element in all mental and social growth.
. % . [Moreover] stimulation is naturally followed 
by response. . . . [Although] physical environments 
determine many social stimuli. . . within limits, 
self control and trained judgment enable a person to 
determine the stimuli to which he will respond.47
a hall has to the rendering of a
The Genesis of man-in-process-of-civilization must therefore 
be sought in factors other than the simple cause-and-effect 
relationship of man and environmental stimuli. This is 
because the environment in which man lives and moves and has 
his being is psychic as well as physical. "Action is never 
fought solely on one field in any of those successive bouts 
of Challenge-and-Response . " Environmental determinism in 
any form which is confined to the stimulus of the external 
environment alone is incapable of accounting for the dynamic 
character of man-in-process-of-civilization.
The environmental determinist tends to treat 
phenomena of the human psyche as effects of external causes 
and psychic activity as epiphenomenal. Toynbee, on the 
other hand, suggests that environment does not consist solely 
in the raw materials of an external challenge but in the 
entire content of the human field of action--internal as well • •
To the degree that man frames his own environment, self-
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determination is possible--perhaps inescapable. Thus we can 
only say that man is determined--whatever the form of deter­
mination may be--when we are prepared to accept his fate as 
self-determined as well. If we insist on a doctrine of 
causality on the basis of either probability or determinism, 
we must be prepared to accept the conclusion that it is the 
environment that shapes itself. Are not the contents of the 
human psyche--the human field of action--a part of this 
environment? Is not man in a sense a part of his own environ­
ment? If so, is not man himself a factor in his own determin­
ation? Is it reasonable to conclude that the material aspects 
of existence which possess little if any sentience are the 
sources of their own determination whereas relatively sentient 
organisms must forego the privilege of self-determination? 
Biological or environmental determinism must confront the 
fact that if man and all that he accomplishes is solely the 
product or instrument of his environment, his actions and his 
thought which attempt to formulate these environmental laws 
or his theories about the environment must themselves be
subject to the very laws or theories he is trying to establish..
Toynbee prefers the theory that man himself is part of the
environment he transforms. Quoting Professor Murphy, he says:
Man may remain within a certain integration [resting 
place] of his life for immense ages, provided the 
adaptation of his needs and powers to the environment 
continues substantially the same and no differenti­
ation in his own life, or in that of his fellows, or 
in the external conditions of existence, calls for a 
new effort to secure survival or for an advance to a 
further stage in his development
18 k.
One answer which Toynbee gives to environmental 
determinism is that the effective environment confronting 
the human psyche is so vast that no particular portion of 
that environment can be credited as the sole cause of human 
motivation or activity, 
relationship with creative behavior is to be ascribed must 
speak to particular human situations as a whole.
!*
Moreover any factor to which
We cannot,
therefore, exclude the mystic, for example, whose environment
and responses have been transformed.
Because of the failure to grasp this theory of the 
human field-of-action and its processes, some of Toynbee!s 
critics take too seriously Toynbeefs references to the role 
of climate or geography. Toynbee was no doubt impressed by 
Ellsworth Huntington1s geographical hypothesis, but he was 
by no means persuaded to embrace a geographical determinism.
For Toynbee, human freedom has to do with the quality 
of the functioning of human personality. Attention is 
centered on the nature of the life processes — the challenge- 
and-response rhythm. No human activity is solely determined 
or free in the absolute sense of either word. Only in full 
transfiguration of the human personality does Toynbee recognize 
an approach to the absolute freedom or self-determination of 
God and then only as God is in direct encounter with human 
personality.
The genesis of civilizations is therefore the outcome 
of psychic as well as physical factors in the environment of 
In the case of primitive men, the mind is less self-men.
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articulated; it is more subject to the laws of the sub­
conscious . Stimuli are mostly external or subconscious, and 
There is less creative behavior. 
The primitive is the slave of habit, the subconscious, and 
the cake of custom—all of which buttress each other in a
responses are mechanical.
participation mystique. He lacks the ability to shift his 
field of action. The struggle to survive may exhaust his 
energy. Survival alone may become the all-consuming 
tour de force. Absence of the dynamic of growth is reflected 
in the absence of self-determination in general. Toynbee 
notes that,
in a case where a civilization is in an exact, and 
therefore static, equilibrium with its environment, 
a change in the physical environment, a rising [e.g.] 
from a shift of the climatic zones, may act upon the 
society in question in a mechanical way instead of 
through the vital give-and-take of Challenge-and- 
Response. This is to be expected, because a society 
that is !farrestedn in static equilibrium is inhibited, 
ex hypothesi. from exercising the vital mobility and 
free will and initiative which the movement of 
!lChallenge-and-ResponseM involves. In this condition, 
a society must either remain unaffected by the impact 
of an external force or else react to this impact in 
a merely mechanical fashion [of primitive mentality].
Etherialization is discouraged in the primitive 
society. The security of stasis is preferred. Yet the 
creative spirit of God is not to be denied. Prom primitive
man emerges man-in-process-of-civilization, the stage in
On this vast scale of time,which contemporary man lives, 
exaggeration of the significance of the scientific method 
melts down to more modest pretensions, and Toynbee can 
confidently assert that it is the emergence of Homo sapiens
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and nman-in-process-of-civilization!f that are the two events 
In the total life of man that eclipse all others.
The break from the bonds of primitivism occurred when 
man began to 11 internalizeM his environment, and the entire 
process by which this transfer of the field of action is 
achieved is what Toynbee has chosen to call etherialization 
by internalization.
A given series of successful responses to successive 
challenges is to be interpreted as a manifestation of 
growth if, as the series proceeds, the action tends 
to shift from the field of the external environment— 
whether physical or human--to the for int6rieur of 
the growing personality or the growing civilization. 
In so far as this grows and continues to grow it has 
to reckon less and less with challenges delivered by 
alien adversaries . . . and more and more with 
challenges that are presented by itself to itself in 
an inner arena. Growth means that the growing 
personality or civilization tends to become its own 
field of action. . „ . The criterion of growth is 
progress towards self-determination; and progress 
towards self-determination is a prosaic formula for 
describing the miracle by 
Kingdom. 5l
which Life enters into its
E therializa tion, Toynbe e c ontinues,
is the cumulative success [of man] in responding 
to challenges which is rewarded, not by an exemption 
from challenge which would be tantamount to a dis­
charge from the active service of Life, but a transfer 
of the field of challenge from a Macrocosm where God 
challenges Man through the agency of Non-Human Nature 
or of Manfs fellow human beings to a Microcosm where 
God challenges Man through the agency of Man!s own 
soul by an ineffable epiphany of God the Challenger
Himself.52
The distinction that Toynbee makes between primitive 
homo sapiens and man-in-process-of-civilization is a crucial 
Ability to etherialize is the distinguishing factor.
In short, the life and death of men and societies hinges on
one.
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Sthe Inscrutable working of psychic factors which lead to or 
from etherialization. ;On this basis, the creative minority 
are the men-in-process-of-civilization and the quiescent
!
majority are the vestigial remains of primitive man. Yet
with respect to creative potential,
the psychic make-up of all extant human beings, in 
all extant types of society, appears to be sub­
stantially identical.53
Toynbee!s categories are Bergson1s static and dynamic, closed 
and open. The creative minority are an avante garde of 
saints who open the way to the ultimate etherialization of 
Man. The quiescent majority follow by mimesis. They are 
unable to break the bonds of primitivism—psychically or 
socially. Jung clearly expresses what Toynbee intends when 
he comments that,
the primitive mentality differs from the civilized 
chiefly in that the conscious mind is far less 
developed in extent and intensity. Functions such
, etc., are not yet [fully]thinking, willing 
ferentiated.54
nSo completely [is] the individual subordinated to the com­
munity” in the primitive state, adds Professor Teggart,
”that art [for example] is just the repetition of tribal 
designs, literature the repetition of tribal songs.
Durkheim spoke of this phenomenon as collective representation.
But collective representations are not the monopoly 
of the Negritos of Central Africa or of any other particular 
segment of humanity. The creative personality of the 
Neolithic Age who could etherialize his tools or his thoughts 
is more modern in the psychological sense of the meaning of
as
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civilized mentality than the contemporary primitive who fails 
to etherialize his environment in spite of the challenge of 
vastly greater opportunity.
because of a stasis in material culture alone.
because of a state of mind.
In the most primitive as well as in the least primitive 
state in which homo sapiens is in any way known to us, 
we may conclude that the individual human being possesses 
some measure of self-conscious personality that raises 
His soul above the level of the waters of the collective 
unconscious.56
Progoff observes that 11 very often primitives [in the usual 
sense of the term] are more conscious . . . more highly
Primitive mentality, 
observed L6vy^Bruhl, wis not foreign to modern society, 
minds are also driven by collective thought.
Primitive culture is not static
It is static
ii 57individual . . than moderns.• •
Our
„58 Toynbee is
convinced that "there is an overwhelming majority of ordinary 
people in the membership of even the most advanced and pro­
gressive civilization „ . . [who are] virtually primitive 
humanity. ii 59
Civilization and progress are not, therefore, the 
rewards of fortuitous time and circumstance. They relate, 
rather, to the precarious undertakings of adventurous souls 
who convert hazard into opportunity and opportunity into 
actuality. Above all, civilization and progress through 
etherialization relate to the inner states of the human
psyche as it lives and moves and has its being in its human, 
social, and physical environment.
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Basic to etherialization are rhythms, and Toynbeefs
fundamental rhythm is the rhythm of challenge-and-response.
Growth through etherialization,
is achieved when an individual or a minority or a whole 
society replies to a challenge by a response which not 
only answers the particular challenge that has evoked 
it but also exposes the respondent to a fresh challenge 
which demands a fresh response on his part. And the 
process of growth continues ... so long as this 
recurrent movement of disturbance and restoration and 
overbalance and renewed disturbance of equilibrium ismaintained.60
The recurrent rhythm of growth is sustained by 
internalization of the challenges and responses.. Whatever 
may be the source, challenges may trigger the psyche into an 
activity of internalization. By internalization is meant the 
surveillance and control by ego-consciousness of a greater 
share of its environment. The field of action is widened. 
Psychologically, a qualitative change of perspective is 
effected--qualitative because a degree of simplification 
through integration is achieved. The world as a whole is 
seen more clearly, more steadily, and more meaningfully. 
Problems are transformed by a shift in the field of action. 
"It is only when human action is transmuted from the gross 
medium of [brute] will," says Toynbee, "into the etherial
media of perception and thought and feeling and imagination,
»t 61that it is able to transcend all limits of Time and Space.
And Professor Tillich observes that,
one transforms the resisting powers [challenges] or 
one adapts oneself to them. One is absorbed by them 
and loses onefs own power of being [or] one grows 
together with them and increases . . . one's . . . 
power of being. These processes are going on in every
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moment of life, in all relations of all being. They 
go on between man and nature, between man and man, 
between individuals and groups, between groups and
groups.62
Toynbee1s etherialization through internalization and 
the qualitative simplification it effects constitutes, there­
fore, a progressive shifting of the arena of human action 
from the order of non-human nature, from which life sprang, 
through the order of the subconscious domination of primitive 
mentality to the order of the ego-consciousness, which 
liberates the human spirit at the cost of the burden of the 
responsibility of a limited freedom, to the final order of 
the Law of God Himself—the Law of Perfect Liberty.^ 
encounter of the will of ego-consciousness with Godrs will 
evokes responses of the highest order.
Such challenges from God may evoke . . . creative 
responses that are genuinely free human acts; and 
this spiritual drama of Challenge-and-Response [now 
etherialized] is perhaps the key to an explanation 
of those human affairs in which human action wears 
the appearance of being . . . partially except from 
the dominion of laws of Nature.
As a shifting of the field of action, etherialization 
constitutes an ascent, so to speak, of "Jacobi ladder." In 
the lowest order of physical nature, man has achieved great 
freedom from the laws of physical nature. Continued progress 
in self-determination past the higher orders is less evident, 
however, because
freedom from the dominion of a law can be won only 
at the price of accepting the dominion of some 
other law that is higher in the scale
;
■
The
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But the effort is well worth the try, for
!,the glorious freedom of the sons of God,” which they 
enjoy under the Law of Love, is not merely the rela­
tive freedom of a release from the law of a compulsive 
Subconscious Psyche; it is also the perfect freedom 
possessed by God Himself.66
In the light of this "Jacobi ladder,11 history is seen to
move in a five-dimensional framework--a framework 
of Life-Space-Time. The physical cosmos moving 
centrifugally in a four-dimensional frame of refer­
ence, Life moving evolutionarily. Yet there is a 
sixth dimension--the vertical dimension of the 
existential situation--in which a spiritual contact 
with Ultimate Reality is realized and through which 
there is an exercise of freedom for self-transcendence 
[through etherialization] towards God.67
In short, etherialization through internalization
and qualitative simplification involves a transfer of the
field of action of the human psyche from an outer to an
inner and therefore higher level, a progressive change from
instinctive, habitual, and impulsive behavior to the
behavior of greater self-determination and self^awareness.
The etherialized personality becomes
the mystically illumined Personality . . . [who] 
stands to ordinary Human Nature as civilizations 
stand to primitive human societies. . . . [This] 
transfigured individual is impelled to action 
because of an internal coercion of the identity of 
Life and Action. ... No being can be what he is 
putting his essence into action in his field . . .. 
[which] lies in a society which [in turn] is common 
ground between his field and the fields of a host 
of other people.69
“Great innovations never come from above,” Jung reminds us,
?
68
“they come invariably from below, just as trees never grow
n70from the sky downward, but upward from the earth,
Freedom is the last stage of the tree of Life, can man be
and if
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doomed by any necessary fate? Toynbee believes not.
If Necessity is queen of the last act of the play . . 
[how] can Freedom have ever reigned at any stage? . .
If .
inexorable how can the doom which the pitiless mills 
grind out be identified with Justice? If we are to 
salvage our theodicy ,!we require a theory of human 
motives which will allow of our conceiving them, simul­
taneously, both as supernatural causes coming from 
without and also as integral parts in the working of 
the agent's mind. . . . Modern Psychology is . . . 
not equal to the task of this reconciliation. "71
But, Toynbee continues, this was the pessimistic conclusion
of Professor Cornford in 1907:
. . sin has been as inevitable as the punishment
Within the forty-six years [since] ... a post- 
Modern school of Western psychologists [by whom 
Toynbee means the followers of Jung] have rehabili­
tated as a scientific hypothesis the Hellenic 
religious belief that Cornford had diagnosed and 
expounded. In the "autonomous complex" erupting 
from the abyss of a Subconscious Psyche to challenge 
the sovereignty of a Conscious Will that must either 
subdue the intruder or suffer the consequences of 
becoming its slave, we are manifestly presented with 
a "scientific" name for the ker or daimon that 
assails the hero of an Attic tragedy.72
Man learns and he progresses by suffering the unrelenting
assault of challenges. We find, says Toynbee,
that in the growth-process a particular challenge is 
never presented more than once, and indeed, ex hypothesi, 
could not be presented for a second time, since, 
ex hypothesi, so long as growth is being maintained, 
each successive challenge in the series is being 
successfully met or, in other words, disposed of as a 
living issue.73
In our own day, for example, "it is [a difficult] moral 
challenge and no longer a technical challenge that confronts 
our . . . society."^
The qualitative nature of etherialization is emphasized 
in Toynbee by his conviction that material increase or
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expansion as such in any form is not prima facie evidence of 
Indeed, Toynbee submits a vast amount of evidence 
to support the idea that material increase or expansion 
accompanies social breakdown and decline rather than growth.
He says:
While the progressive and cumulative conquest of the 
human environment may perhaps be measured fairly in 
terms of geographical expansion, this geographical 
index is not a criterion of growth. And indeed the 
only social "law" apropos of geographical expansion 
. . . [is a] correlation . . . between geographical 
expansion and social retardation.75
Toynbee attempts to show that geographical expansion varies
as social decline ranging from slowing down of growth
through a full arrest of growth to actual retrogression.
One of the most striking examples of this correlation is the
case of the Hellenic world. According to Toynbee, Hellenic
civilization broke down during the Peloponnesian War and
proceeded, nevertheless, to expand geographically under
Alexander and Rome. This geographic expansion was accompanied,
he says, by an increasing ,fSchism of the Soul." There is a
positive correlation between improvement of material technique
and increasing command of the physical environment, but
neither of these are criteria of social progress. Technique
may advance or remain stationary while civilization, as
progress.
Toynbee defines it, advances, regresses or remains relatively 
stationary Numerous examples of a high state of material 
culture and technique in arrested civilizations are cited.
Toynbee rejects naturalistic and therefore ephemeral 
criteria of growth or progress, but he does not ignore the
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significance of progress in technique, 
that,
He says, for example,
the history of technique, which has not yet revealed 
to us any law of social progress, does reveal the 
principle by which technical progress is governed; 
and this principle may be described as a law of 
progressive simplification.77
Toynbee is indebted to Bergson for his insight on
progressive simplification. For Bergson, the external and 
material world exhibited staggering complexity. Life, on 
the other hand, introduced a certain unifying effort, a move 
toward simplification of purpose, function and design. At 
its highest level in personality, says Bergson, life "makes 
an effect of simplicity, whereas the material world [presents]
11 In each.,78a complexity that baffles the imagination.
sphere [of life],11 continues Toynbee,
this same fundamental tendency can be discerned under 
some different aspect. In morphological terms, 
"etherialization" appears as a progressive change in 
organization from complexity towards simplicity; in 
biological terms, it appears as a saltus naturae from 
Inanimate Matter to Life.79
Yet the process of etherialization, he cautions,
involves not merely a simplification of apparatus 
but a consequent transfer of energy of shift of 
emphasis from some lower sphere of being or sphere 
of action to a higher sphere.80
Etherialization, therefore, is not merely a progressive but 
also a qualitative simplification. As qualitative simplifi­
cation, it involves more than a mere reduction or omission 
and suggests instead the addition of value. Perhaps the 
clearest statement of the essential nature of etherialization
as qualitative simplification is that of the anthropologist
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J. Murphy who says:
What happens is that Man with his unifying tendency 
forms a primitive integration, whether in his mental 
or practical life. This integration, on the emergence 
of some new power or idea in Man, is found inadequate, 
and is broken through by a differentiation which applies 
the new power or idea to wider areas of experience.
Out of the more differentiated phenomena and relations 
thus arrived at, the mind with its determined search 
for unity creates a new integration, larger, richer 
and more organized than the former one. This again 
is followed by a differentiation; and so the process 
goes on, Man ever becoming more capable of more compre­
hensive, higher, and finer integrations both of his 
own inner life and of his outward social relations.”1
An example of progressive and qualitative simplifi-
;
i
;
cation may be drawn from technology in the instance of the
Q o
invention of the automobile* This particular invention
brought into synthesis six major antecedent inventions: 
internal combustion engine, the fuel tank, the chassis, 
running gears, the intermediate clutch, and the drive shaft, 
each of which were etherializations of earlier inventions.
the
The modern automobile has now become so etherialized through 
qualitative simplification of its mechanism that the problem 
is no longer primarily mechanics as it once was but the state 
of mind of the driver:
The old challenge of physical distance has been 
transmuted into a new challenge of human relations 
between drivers who have learned how to Annihilate 
distance11 and have thereby put themselves in constant 
danger of annihilating one another.^3
In addition to the example of the invention of the automobile,
there is the example—In transportation technology—of the
development of the airplane whose structure, power plant,
and instrumentation developed along a clearly rhythmic
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pattern of progressive simplification. The first airplane 
utilized a reciprocating internal combustion engine of 
relatively simple design, the invention of which was in 
itself clearly etherial. With the advancement of airplane 
design generally came a complication of the internal com­
bustion engine together with a proliferation of cockpit 
controls and instrumentation. These developments were 
followed by the invention of the qualitatively simplified 
turbo-jet power plant together with a marked simplification 
of cockpit instruments and controls. But this advance was 
almost immediately followed in turn by a renewed prolifer­
ation and complication of design and function in jet aircraft 
which may now only be relieved by the application of nuclear 
energy to aircraft power plants. Indeed, almost twelve 
years before Hiroshima, Toynbee noted that,
our more sanguine physicists look forward to 
exercising in our day ... a method for "breaking 
up the atom. ... [to provide] the ultimate form 
of human control over Physical Nature--the form 
which is to give Man boundless material power—
[and which] is conceived as being 
etherial in its mode of operation
Toynbee cites an example of etherialization from 
technology in his reference to the development and consequences 
of the cotton industry from its beginning to the present. He 
says:
;
!
^comparably
In [the history of] modern Western cotton industry we 
can detect . . . the tendency for the scene of action 
to shift from the external environment to the internal 
life of the society or the individual that is the 
subject of the experience.85
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One of the most striking examples of etherialization, 
however, is to be found in Cosmology. Here progressive and 
qualitative simplification of theory is evident.. The history
of cosmology is characterized by a tendency to proliferate 
theory to the point of unwieldly complexity until a new 
radically simpler and more aesthetically satisfying explanation 
is advanced. Witness the progression from Ptolemaic to 
Copernican to Newtonian to Einsteinian theory which has now 
brought into synthesis the concepts of space, time, gravity,
;
light, and magnetism. In each phase theory and practice 
tended toward a proliferation of ideas followed by a relative 
simplification of the theory embracing simpler patterns of
Einstein!s achievement exemplifies a86relationship.
brilliant internalization and simplification of a great 
quantity of scientific thought under a general theory that 
at once relates and unifies profuse and, in some cases, con­
tradictory theories. Newton performed a similar synthesis 
earlier.
In the area of linguistics a progressive and quali­
tative simplification is revealed in the development of 
modern languages which are considerably simpler in structure 
and more efficient in expression and function than most 
primitive languages.^ 
evidence of etherialization in the progressive shift in the 
meaning of words from the secular to the religious as, for 
example, in the use of the word ntransgression,,!
Toynbee believes that there is
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which had been a term of art in the Attic ,f01d Comedy,11 
in the physical meaning of a parade of the chorus from 
one side of the theatre to the other [but] had come to 
mean, in Christian language, a figurative "side-step" 
in the spiritual sense of sin. Edification had simi­
larly come to mean a figurative "building up" of virtue 
in the Soul in place of its original meaning of the 
construction of a material edifice in brick or stone
• • . [et cetera]—an example . . . [of] "etherialization"
• • , [which is] a symptom of growth.88
Another example in the area of language is in the use of the
word power. Toynbee says that this word carries with it the
Birds, but byGreek sense of military power in Aristophanes 
the time it is found in the Gospels, the same Greek word
n 89carries the connotation of "divine power, 
silent, however, concerning instances of a reverse trend in 
the usage of words from the religious to the secular. A 
possible exception is his reference to the vulgarization of 
meanings during periods of social disintegration. In this 
instance, however, Toynbee believes that etherialization 
shifts to the area of the religious where spiritual values 
emerge as a result of the trial and tribulation of learning 
through suffering.
In the development of Western music, etherialization 
is suggested in the emergence of the Sonata form, A.D. 174-0*
Toynbee is
:
i
which, according to Toynbee, is the highest and maturest form
The Sonata form, he says, made musicof instrumental style, 
the dominant art form of the periods
The sceptre passed from the art of Architecture 
to the art of Music . . . from a grosser medium 
of stone into the subtler medium of sound.90
In his study of the development of modern harmony in Western
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music from Florentine opera early in the seventeenth century 
to the present, Professor Sorokin discovers a distinct 
example of the rhythm of growth of which Toynbee speaks:
The preclassical phase is characterized by an in­
determinate confusion, incoherence, and complexity.
. . . The classical phase [beginning with Haydn] is 
marked by simplicity, pure internal harmony, and an 
organic unity of music with perfect technique . . . 
[followed by] the pseudo-classical phase . . . [in 
which] complexities begin to creep in. Finally, in 
the post-classical phase . . . "colossalism" . . . 
attempts to find "new ways" . . . which results in 
ever-increasing incoherence [and points to a new 
synthesis or qualitative simplification].91
In the area of philosophy, Toynbee suggests the
example of Taoist philosophy,
which—illuminated by knowledge born of suffering— 
had apprehended the truth of "etherialization," had 
resolved to live by it, and had acted on its own 
resolve by taking one of the highest and most arduous 
flights essayed by the Sinic spirit.92
Etherialization is suggested in Lao-Tse*s intuition of the
paradoxical Wu Wei:
!
that utter emptiness which is the acme of plenitude . . 
that utter immobility which is the acme of motion, . . 
that utter relaxation which is the acme of intensity, andg- 
that utter tranquillity which is the ecstasy of creation. ^
It is exemplified in the shift of attention by Socrates from
interest in cosmology to a consuming interest in the problems
of the good life, a shift from concern for the physical to
concern for the spiritual, a shift from concern with the
Macrocosm to concern with the Microcosm, from passion for the
true in science to a passion for the good In life.
specific examples of etherialization are sought in the field
of ethics, one need only to look to the ethics of Jesus or
Schweitzer in which a qualitative simplification of antecedent
. •
And if
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thought is clearly indicated. In Jesus, a complex Talmudic 
code is profoundly simplified into a code of love to God and 
man. In Schweitzer*s ethic of Reverence for Life, a quali­
tative simplification is suggested in the reconciliation of 
the demands of the subconscious will-to-live with the rational 
restraints of self-conscious reason--a reconciliation which 
issues in Reverence for Life. In both these instances, 
reason is not spiritually impoverished by being cut off from 
the source of its being in the will-to-live, nor are the 
unguided impulses of this will-to-live permitted to tyrannize 
the reason of consciousness. Instead of dynamic integration 
or wholeness is achieved.
For Toynbee, etherialization reaches its highest
meaning in the
In thetransfiguration of human nature in Jesus,, 
advent of "the second man who is the Lord from 
Heaven," Paul hails "the creation of a new species 
composed of one unique individual": the ad .tutor Dei. 
whose mission it is to raise the rest of Mankind to a
superhuman level by inspiring his fellow-men with his 
own inspiration from God.9q-
For human personality, etherialization is the self- 
realization of the moral philosophers, 
etherialization is social progress--the actualization of 
value in social relations, and always "the touchstone of 
[this] value . . ^ is whether it helps or hinders Man to
9 9find his way back to his Maker," back to the stream of Life,
For society,
Yet spiritual values are not alone real values, and non- 
spiritual values are ephemeral only insofar as they thwart
If "action is never fought solely on oneetherialization.
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field in any of [the] successive bouts of Challenge-and- 
Response,” then progress must be thought of as the progressive 
transformation of values--that is--a rendering of values more 
significant with respect to the creative process, 
of progress moves the human personality from the order of 
determined responses to mechanical causes to the order of
This kind
the self-directed and relatively free responses of the 
etherialized personality to internal or spiritual challenges. 
The measure of progress is whether the creative process--as
Since values arewe discover it—is furthered or hindered, 
the significant qualities and relationships of the human 
situation which enjoy an independent as well as relevant 
significance, they not only share the fate of that situation 
but maintain na spiritual contact with Ultimate Reality.” 
They “help . . . Man to find his way back to his Maker.”
The human personality contacts Ultimate Reality
- 1,96 itthrough the mechanism of “Withdrawal-and*-Re turn, 
withdraws from the limitations of the "cake of custom”--
differentiates itself from the herd as it were—and returns
The profound social implications of withdrawal 
and return are suggested by social psychologist Solomon Asch 
in the observation that,
transfigured.
the capacity to perceive a situation that includes
. . is a remarkable achievementothers and ourselves . 
which involves transcending one’s own viewpoint 
[withdrawal] by bringing it into relation with that of 
another [return]. This transcendence [etherialization] 
is ... a process that occurs in the individual; it is 
a product of his activity . . . [it is] a psychological 
. . with an intrinsic social direction 
that has its locus in individuals. Phenomenally we
interaction .
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objectify the process of transcendency by placing it 
in the field of action. As a result we tend in theory 
to distort the character of a social act in one of two 
opposed ways: to consider it either as the sum of 
individual acts or as a new product that transcends 
individuals. It is precisely the achievement of 
psychological interaction to be neither of these. . . . 
The individual is the seat of social events. It is 
individuals with [a] particular capacity to turn toward 
one another who in concrete action validate and con­
solidate in each a mutually shared field.
i
!
Withdrawal and return may be precipitated by an actual 
physical withdrawal from and return to the life of a society— 
but not necessarily so.
than a physical phenomenon although, to be sure, the two are 
not unrelated.
98 It Is essentially a psychic rather
Toynbee cites the lives of the historians 
Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, Josephus, Ibn Khaldun, 
Machiavelli, Clarendon, and Ollivier as,
conspicuous examples of [the] process of "etheriali- 
zation". ... In the "practical11 first chapter of 
their careers, these future historians have all set 
themselves to produce an effect upon their fellow men 
by the obvious and crude and finite "direct method" 
of bringing their wills to bear upon the wills of 
their neighbours. Their compulsory withdrawal, which 
. . . inhibited . . . activities on [the] "practical" 
plane . , . compelled them to find a new vent by 
transferring their action to another plane and trans­
muting their energies into a new [and more bracing] 
medium. ... In this subtler form of interaction 
* . . . [others responded to them] by a spontaneous 
movement that arises from within, and not under a 
duress that has been imposed upon it more mechanico 
or manu militari.99
The new plane on which these men made their etherialized 
returns penetrated deeper into the life of society than their 
original and more practical planes. Who would remember 
Thucydides today had he not failed as Athenian naval commander 
in a crucial naval battle and been forced to withdraw in exile
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so that he could return as the immortal historian of the 
Peloponnesian War? Toynbee cites other examples in the lives 
of great men:
David and Philopoemen withdraw as soldiers and return 
as statesmen; Solon withdraws as a merchant and returns 
as a statesman; Caesar withdraws as a politician and 
returns as a statesman; Loyola withdraws as a soldier 
and returns as a saint, and all these changes of 
capacity are in the direction of ”etherialization.
In withdrawing on one plane to return on another, 
they have found [a higher] life in losing it.101
,!The creative personality,” Toynbee continues,
takes the path of Withdrawal-and-Return in order to 
rise to some occasion of social crisis; in order, 
that is to say, to cope with some challenge that is 
confronting the society to which the individual or 
minority belong.102
In our own day there is the example of Albert 
Schweitzer who withdraws physically from civilization in 
terms of conventional participation to return as etherialized 
spiritual Influence. As organist, pastor, physician, college 
teacher, or college administrator, his influence could not 
match the influence he commands today. The subtly etherial­
ized influence of Schweitzer1 s living example constitutes a 
return only surpassed, perhaps, by the Immortally resurrected 
spirit of Jesus of Nazareth himself. ”In the concept of the 
Second Coming,” Toynbee’s ”motif of Withdrawal-and.-Return 
attains Its deepest spiritual meaning, 
doctrine of the Second Coming,
is manifestly a mythological projection into the future 
in physical imagery of the spiritual return in which 
the Apostles’ vanished Master reasserts His presence 
In the Apostles’ hearts when the Apostles take heart 
of grace to execute, in spite of the Master’s physical
..100
,.103 The Christian
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departure, that audacious mission which the Master, 
when he was actually present in the flesh had once 
laid upon them.l°4
Toynbee* s withdrawal-and-re turn is not the withdrawal
of the ascetic. Only compulsion can bring Plato*s philosopher 
back to the cave of the everyday world of action.
Hellenic philosophy from Platonism through Stoicism to
The goal of
Neoplatonism was withdrawal to a life of contemplation 
without return. "This negative, weary melancholy temper,11 
says Toynbee,
is manifest in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, 
the historic philosopher king who dutifully carried 
on his shoulders the burden of governing the whole 
Orbls Romanus.TOJ?
With true Platonic sense of duty, Aurelius assumed his burden 
of social responsibility. But not so Plotinus. For him the 
return was unthinkable. Plotinus withdrew permanently to 
become the apologist par excellence of the defunct creative 
minority that had transformed themselves into the Hellenic 
dominant minority. With Plotinus etherialization ceased.
The rhythm of withdrawal-and-return was broken. Disintegration 
set in.
;
■
I
This ultimate refusal of the Hellenic philosophers 
to return from the world of contemplation into the 
world of action . . . may explain why it was that 
the breakdown which the Hellenic civilization had
Plato1s gener-suffered in the generation preceding 
ation was never retrieved.106
"Mysticism," warns Schweitzer,
must never be thought to exist for its own sake.
It is not a flower, but only the calyx of a flower. 
Ethics is the flower. 107
And ethics for Schweitzer is the life of action. "Detachment
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of spirit,” says Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan,
not renunciation of the world is what is demanded 
from usc The knowers of Brahman remake the world.
. % . The Christian command to love one1 s neighbor 
as yourself because you are [in this sense] your 
neighbour,108
As a social creature, man derives and sustains his 
personality from interaction with his fellows. In the 
rhythm of withdrawal-and-retum, return is necessary. No 
human psyche can permanently estrange itself from the social 
field without repudiating its humanity.
Toynbee believes that the rhythm of withdrawal-and- 
return is also found in the life of groups as well as in the 
life of individuals. He believes that the life of society 
exhibits a rhythm of equilibrium-and-disequilibrium and that 
this rhythm is linked to the rhythm of withdrawal-and-return 
of groups within that society. Momentary equilibrium occurs 
in history, he says, when the response of a society at large 
to the return of a creative minority approximates the optimum. 
This occurred in the West, he believes, in the thirteenth 
century during the five years when St. Dominic and St. Francis, 
the Emperor Frederick II, and St. Louis, King of France, 
helped to achieve an ideal synthesis in the relationship 
between the Medieval Church and Feudalism. It occurred again
during the 17th and l8th centuries between the Treaty of 
Westphalia (I6J4.8) and the French Revolution during the general 
period of the Enlightenment when cosmopolitanism permeated
Rhythms are not necessarily the function 
They may occur, Toynbee says,
109European culture, 
of any particular time span.
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on the time scale of the subconscious and exceed, therefore, 
the life 110span of any particular individual.
The equilibrium of Yin is but a temporary respite in 
the life of a society as it is in the life of an individual— 
a "moment of reconciliation between the real and the ideal," 
says Toynbee,
which is the sequel to a successful movement of 
Withdrawal-and-Return in the history of a society 
In process of civilization [but] is bound to be 
ephemeral a priori.HI
It is ephemeral because it is but a temporary prelude to the 
ultimate transfiguration of human society, 
idolized as the epitome of human achievement, 
allusion to the thirteenth as "the greatest of centuries," 
or idolization of the Age of Reason. • The creative minority 
of any period are not "able to evoke the creative change 
from Primitive Humanity to Sainthood in Mankind at large.
Through the idea of etherialization, Toynbee brings 
to bear new light on the nature of progress, 
by clarifying the relationship of the growth of human person-
By rejecting the secular view of 
progress he avoids the futile attempt to ground progress on
But whether etherialization
It is erroneously
Thus there is
..112
He does this
ality and human society.
the advance of ephemeral values, 
can be advanced as a criterion of progress is doubtful unless 
by criterion he does not mean a quantitative measure or index. 
Yet an ambiguity remains, for if etherialization is purely a 
qualitative aspect of change dealing solely with values—and 
Toynbee suggests that it is — then it hardly qualifies as a
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criterion in the strict sense of the word. It is a criterion
only insofar as it can demonstrate the degree to which values 
contribute to the creative process. Etherialization suggests 
the nature of progress and performs, therefore, a descriptive 
and normative rather than a definitive function.
To be meaningful, a doctrine of progress must be 
grounded in a faith of an ultimate and therefore religious 
nature. It must be articulated by an axiology which is also
grounded in this faith. It must account for the tragic
realities of the human situation without subsuming human
effort to some inexorable and impersonal cosmic process.
It cannot ignore or explain away the reality of human evil
and suffering. Toynbee accomplishes this when he envisions
a creative harmony in the chaos of existence. For him,
the work of the spirit of the Earth, as he weaves and 
draws his threads on the Loom of Time, is the temporal 
history of Man as this manifests itself in the genesis 
and growths and breakdowns and disintegrations of human 
societies; and in all this welter of life ... we can 
hear the beat of an elemental rhythm ... of Challenge- 
and-Response and Withdrawal-and-Return. . . 
elemental rhythm is the alternating beat of Yin and 
Yang, and in listening to it we have recognized that, 
though strophe may be answered by antistrophe, victory 
by defeat, birth by death, creation by destruction, 
the movement that this rhythm beats out is neither the 
fluctuation of an indecisive battle nor the cycle of a 
treadmill. The perpetual turning of a wheel is not a 
vain repetition if, at each revolution, it is carrying 
a vehicle that much nearer its goal; and, if 
,! pal ingene sia” signifies the birth of something new, 
and not just the rebirth of something that has lived 
and died any number of times already, then the Wheel 
of Existence is not just a devilish device for inflic­
ting an everlasting torment on a damned Ixion.1^
This
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CHAPTER VI
Footnotes
Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social Philosophies of an Age 
of Crisis (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950), p. 11^7 Cf •
P. 235 and Chaps. V and XII; Harry E. Barnes, Historical 
Sociology (New York: The Philosophical Library, 191|£), p. 107; 
Charies Frankel, The Case for Modern Man (New York: Harper & 
Bros., 1955), Chap. Ill; H.. Stuart Hughes, Oswald Spengler 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1952), PP. 59-52; and 
James K. Feibleman, The Revival of Realism (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 19I4.6), p. 189: 
Civilizations are born only in oraer to break down and 
decline, and they break down and decline only in order to 
give rise to universal churches11; Bertram D. Wolfe, 
,!Dissenting Opinion on Toynbee," American Mercury, LXIV 
(June, 191+7), 7U8-56. Cf. p. 7531 Cor three reasons 
Toynbee is more deeply and extensively preoccupied with 
breakdown than with growth: first, because the civilizations 
he deals with (all but one) are either dead or dying; second, 
because the very tests he gives of breakdown suggest % . . 
that our own civilization has already climbed over the great 
divide; and third and emotionally most important, because his 
inquiry is intended to’ culminate with a demonstration that 
civilizations do not always perish utterly but often bequeath 
to their successors something exempt from the process of 
decay.** So impressed are most of Toynbee’s reviewers with 
his sober and provocative pronouncements on the prospects of 
Western civilization that they overlook the significance of 
detailed aspects of his theory and his keen interest in and 
treatment of the problem of growth. By no means is Toynbee 
merely another "prophet of doom overcome by the imagination 
of disaster." If pessimism be defined as the belief in the 
prospect of unmitigated doom, Toynbee is no pessimist. If 
it is the neglect of positive elements in man, Toynbee is 
still no pessimist. If it is the willingness to "stare at 
chaos in the face," to reckon with the realities of human 
history and the human situation, then Toynbee must confess 
his pessimism. One suspects, however, that Toynbee shares 
the fate of the prophet and that in this instance the prophet 
is the victim of a disenchanted and belligerent secular bias.
2See particularly Frankel’s reaffirmation of the 
faith of the Enlightenment. Op. cit., Chaps. Ill and X.
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^Rollo May, Man13 Search for Himself (New York.
W. W. Norton & Co., 195377 ChaP- I» The L°nellM33 md
Anxiety of Modern Man": ''Boredom is the 'occupational 
disease' of being human." There is a considerable amount of 
literature on the subject of the threat of 7rand
boredom in contemporary life. For excellent li *7 -
expressions, see the poetry of T. S. Eliot and W. H. Auden.
^Toynbee, A Study. Ill, op. clt.. 244. The question 
with Toynbee is not why there are creative minorities who 
respond in similar fashion to similar situations but why 
more people sharing these situations do not respond creatively 
as do the few. He believes that Stagnation of the masses 
is the fundamental cause of the crisis with which our Western 
Civilization is confronted in our day.*1 
Cf. p. 1*06.)
(Ibid., p. 242.
^Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit 297. Cf. p. 291+.• 9
6Ibid., p. 298. That man is the creative agent of 
God appears to be clear in Toynbee. Insofar as man works 
out his freedom, he participates in the life of God. "The 
movement of the Psyche,w he says, "is not *directed, 1 either 
by a deterministic push or a teleological pull.” (Ill, 0£. 
cit., 125.)
^Toynbee. A Study, VII, op.t— 
human level [of "etherialization"J . 
human endeavours.** (Ill, QP. cit
cit.. 56l. "The super- 
. .is the goal of our 
172).• 9
8 Ibid., p. 564. Cf. Arnold Toynbee, Civilization on 
Trial (New York: Oxford University Press, 194^), pp. 260-63:
11 In what sense can there be progress in this world? 
progress wibh which we are here concerned is a progressive 
improvement, continuous and cumulative from generation to 
generation in our social heritage. . . . Progress . . .is, 
of course, impressive in the field of scientific knowledge 
and its application to technology. . . . This, however, is 
a side issue [for] . . . cumulative progress is the improve­
ment of our social heritage in terms of the spiritual life 
of mankind--which means the spiritual life of individual 
souls [as well, is the question. On these terms] a con­
ceivable kind of progress [would be] ... a cumulative 
increase in the means of Grace at the disposal of each soul."
The
QLetter from Arnold J. Toynbee, December 15, 1955. 
Toynbee wrote to this writer that "etherialization1* is not
Geyl, for example, believes thata form of escapism.
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"etherialization" is merely lfa conversion of the soul from 
the World, the Flesh, and the Devil, to a Kingdom of Heaven. 
(Pieter Geyl, A. J. Toynbee, and Pitirim Sorokin, The Pattern 
of the Past [Boston: The Beacon Press, 1914-9], p. 13• ) Geyl 
quotes Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 192, but out of con­
text and thereby misrepresents as well as misinterprets his 
"etherialization" as a restatement of Christian asceticism.
10 558. Cf. Civili-op. citToynbee, A Study, VII, -_____
zation on Trial, op. cit., p. 2o3.
11Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 170. The charge 
by Sorokin that "Anglican Christianity [is] Toynbee rs 
terminal point of a spiritualization and etherialization of 
man" (Social Philosophies, op. cit., p. 339, n. 3) Is 
questionable in view of Toynbee*s own opinion that it is the 
"Indian standpoint . . . from which [the] last four volumes 
of my book [A Study] have been written." (Arnold Toynbee,
"A Study of History: What I Am Trying to Do," International 
Affairs. XXXI [January, 1955], k-)
• ,
12Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., l81j.. Toynbee 
speaks of "the wide range and extreme diversity of the 
spheres in which the phenomenon of 1etherialization1 
manifests itself.” (Ibid., p. 191.)
.■^Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit.., 638-39.
^^?oynbee, A Study, III, op. cit
1%dward J. Ryan, "A Critical Evaluation of A. J. 
Toynbee as Historiographer of Chinese Civilization Before 
500 A.D.," unpublished Master*s thesis, Department of 
History, Claremont College, 191}.8, p. 13, n» 28.
^ H. E. Barnes and Howard Becker, Social Thought 
from Lore to Science (Washington: Harran Press, 1952), II,
Ibid., I, 756-57. Cf. p. 765.
128.• 9
8o8.
17
18Feibleman, op. cit., p. l8l. Cf. other similar 
misinterpretations of Toynbee in R. H.. S. Crossman, "The 
Faith of Arnold J. Toynbee," The New Republic. CXVTII 
(July, 1914-7), 2l4ff. Even Lewis Mumford--who is among Toynbee's 
more discerning critics—fails to grasp the meaning of 
Toynbee's "etherialization" when he accuses Toynbee of 
failing "to see that it implies a complementary process of 
materialization." ("A Study of History." Diogenes, XIII
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[Spring, 1956], 20.) But Mumford does recognize that unlike 
Spengler, Toynbee associates spiritual vitality with growth 
rather than with disintegration. Yet Mumford errs when he 
says "that Toynbee fails to recognize William James1 insight 
that in life the ideal and the real are dynamically con­
tinuous." (Ibid.)
19Letter from Arnold J. Toynbee to J. W, Friend and 
J. K. Feibleman, January 16, 1940* quoted in Feibleman,
°P« cit.f p. 182.
^Toynbee, A Study. VII, op. cit., 388. Cf. I, 
op. cit». 173, n-. 3 and 434, n. 3; HI, op', cit., 174-230; 
and VI, op0 cit,, 170. Spiritual progress "brings mundane 
progress in its train, [and] the mundane progress that will 
be made in this incidental way will be far greater than the 
utmost that could be attained by aiming directly at a 
mundane [and therefore ephemeral] goal." (A Study, IX, 
op. cit.. 562.) Cf.,pp. 388, 510, and 546-1+8^ Indeed,
"we shall find it impossible to cite a case of challenge- 
and-response in which the entire action takes place on . . . 
one . „ . [or another] field exclusively." (Ibid., p. 328.)
21Ibid. p. 392. Because the Universal Church thrives 
when the UrUversal'state is suffering its worst and because 
the Universal Church "can open up new channels for e 
baulked spiritual energies of Mankind, (Ibid. ) it is regarded 
by the Dominant Minority—whose interest it is to sustain the 
Universal State—as a social cancer. This interpretation of 
the emergence of a Universal Church is that of the ldth 
century historian Edward Gibbon as it is also of e a
19th century anthropologist Sir James G. Frazer. we
looking for a social cancer," Toynbee answers we shall find 
it, not in a church which supplants a civilization, but in a 
civilization which supplants a church. (Ibid., P* b •/
22Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit 
k02.
^Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 295.
2^Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 3k->
2%enry Adams, Degradation of the Democratic Dogma
1919), p, 30$:
^Letter from Arnold J. Toynbee, December 15, 1955. 
The passages of "the New Testament in which the principle of
298. Cf. IX,• ,
op. cit •,
(New York: The Macmillan Co •,
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"etherialization" has received its supreme expression . . . 
[are] Matt, vi 25-6, 28-9, 31-3," (A Study. Ill, op. clt
^Alfred Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1952), PP. 373^.
2®L. W. Doob, Social Psychology (New York: Henry Holt 
& Co., 1952), p. 523. In a doctoral dissertation on Toynbee, 
Ernst Zahn interprets Toynbee's view of progress as the 
substantial enlargement of a social-cultural inheritance 
which enjoys an objective and continuing value in every 
cultural epoch. (Ernst Zahn, Toynbee und das Problem der 
Geschichte [ZUrich: Westdeutscher Verlag, K31n und Opladen,
1954 J, pT37.)
191.)• 9
^Arnold Toynbee, The Western Question In Greece and 
Turkey (2d. ed.; London: Constable & Co., 1923), pp. 296ff. 
and~“ja8ff.
30Ibid., p. 36. Many important Ideas of Toynbee!s 
are suggested in this work and in essays by Toynbee in The 
Legacy of Greece, op. cit. Cf. James H. Nichols, "Religion 
in Toynbee!s History." Journal of Religion. XXVIII (April, 
1948), 99-119, re early development of ideas later appearing 
in A Study.
p. 282.
32Toynbee, A Study. IV, op. clt.. 427. Toynbee 
quotes W. E. Barnes, Scientific Theory and Religion 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1933), P« 472: In Mammals,
developments resulting in greater simplicity [by contrast 
with reptiles are noteworthy]." Concerning parallel 
theories, see Barnes, Historical Sociology, op. clt., pp, 12of. 
and Barnes and Becker, Lore to Science, op. cit., pp. 730-34*
33Gerald Heard, The Social Substance of Religion 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931), foreword.
3^rfolfe,
31Sorokin, Social Philosophies, op. clt • 9
loc. cit.
35 P. 99.Nichols, op. cit 
-^See the preceding chapter of this dissertation.
• 9
^^Rushton Coulborn, "Review of A Study of History." 
American Historical Review, LX (July, 1955), o50.
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38
static religion'»SarHidsPgioups'as the
LifTof SSU10°ouSoS SrJs"“is°Lct?ine M^c^ 
religionl,--which is important to Toynbee - F of
Vico! (Rushton Coulborn, "Discussion: The Rise ana Fall ol 
Civilization," Ethics, LXIV [19541* 210.)
39Ibid.. p. 11|8.
J'°Gerald Heard, The Ascent of Eunanity (London:
The Cape Co., 1929), p. 2o0~. Cf. Schweitzer's idea of the 
growing sense of ethical solidarity and mystical reverence 
for life and. Maritain's belief that man's role is "ceasele 
effort ... to effect a transformation of man and society” 
to the end that men may "become gods by participation in tne 
divine life." (Jacques Maritain, Freedom in the Xoaern World 
[New York: Charles‘Scribner1 s Sons, I93&J , P- 81 •)
^Gerald Heard, The Source of Civilization (London: 
1935), P. 71.
^Hornell Hart believes that progress must be 
functionally conceived and defined. He spoke of a "proper 
functioning" as the criterion of progress in all phases of 
material and non-material culture. ("Is Progress* a 
Scientific Concept?" Sociolo^T and Social Research, XIII 
[March-April, 1929], 303-14-T
^Toynbee, A Study, III, c?. clt.. 172. Cf. Walter 
Bagehot, Physics and Politics (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, lc94)’, pp. 112f., 134fi IT °ne is to speak of axial 
events in the total life of man, there should be added to 
the emergence of Homo Sapiens and Man-in-Process-of- 
Civilization the event of God's revelation of Himself in 
Christ. The crucifixion, Toynbee suggests, is "a very 
recent event--perhaps the most recent significant event in 
history." (Civilization on Trial, op. cit«, p. 238.)
^Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit
^Jan C. Smuts, Holism and Evolution (2d ed.;
1927), p. 227.
^Arthur J. Todd, Theories of Social Progress (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1911(7, PP. 173f. Cf. Chap. IX; and 
William James, The Will to Believe (New York: Longmans,
The Cape Co * #
269-73.• 3
London:
The Macmillan Co • 3
21k
eivir^entalVoiigiSs!"e IlFundLentL s4f &Soclal^sjchologz 
[New York: The Century Co., 192ljJ, p. °«)
^Ibid., pp. 108f. Cf. an early work by David Hume 
on the potency of social stimuli entitled Of National 
Characters. 17I4.8.
^®J. Murphy, Primitive Man (London: Milford, 1927),
P. 26.
^Sorokin exaggerates Toynbee's dependence on geo­
graphical factors when he says "Toynbee's geographical 
factor is entirely questionable." (Social Philosophies, 
op. cit. . p. 231.) For Ellsworth Huntington's thesis, 
Civilization and Climate (3rd ed.; New Haven: Yale University 
Press, I92lj77 pp. 1-10, 186-93, 251-94. For Sorokin's 
analysis of geographical theories, see Social and Cultural 
Dynamics (New York: American Book Co., 1937-4177 IV, 500ff• 
and 531ff„; and Contemporary Sociological Theories (New York:
Sorokin also
see
Harper & Bros.., 192877 Chaps. II and III. _ «
objects to the emphasis by depth psychology on the role o 
the sub- or unconscious in the development of genius.
Instead of the subconscious, Sorokin points to a Super- 
conscious" which also has no ego and is the root of creativity. 
Without it, Sorokin believes, only mediocre accomplishments
It functions through intuition and cooperates
Its accomplish-are possible.with the consciously rational or empirical, 
ments are validated by logical and sensory evidence, 
many respects, Sorokin's description of its creative manifes­
tations parallels Toynbee's description of the phenomenon of 
etherialization. ("On Superconsciousness," Review of Inter­
national Sociology. XI [January-March, 1953], 27-50.)
In
^Toynbee, A Study, II, op. cit., 419.
^Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit 
52^ Toynbee, A Study. IX, op. cit 
5^^Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, op.
^Carl G. Jung, Essays on a Science of Mythology, 
trans. R. F. C. Hull (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), 
100. Cf. William James, Principles of Psychology (New * 
York: Henry Holt & Co., 1931), I, 224-30.
216. Cf. p. 128.• 9
306.• 9
cit., p. 255.
P.
215
55Frederick J. Teggart, The Processes of.History 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1910), pp~ 85f.
Cf. Todd, p, 87.op. cit • f
^6Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, op, cit PP. 255f.• y
57Ira Progoff, Jungfs Psychology and Its Social 
Meaning (New York: The Julian Press, 1953) / P • 277.
Cf, Barnes and Becker, Lore to Science, op, cit II, 81|9.• y
58Alexander Goldenweiser, History, Psychology and 
Culture (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1933), PP. lOJ+f.
59Toynbee, A Study, III, op, cit, , 2I4.3, "The so- 
called savage has no monopoly of the emotionally governed 
life of the collective unconscious," (Civilization on Trial, 
op, cit,, pp# 254f.), L§vy-Bruhl believed that primitive 
mentality was essentially different from civilized mentality. 
Boas, on the other hand, advanced considerable evidence (in 
his The Mind of Primitive Man) to show that there is no 
essential difference, L6vy-Bruhl contrasted the two on the 
basis of the nature of the outcome of the two mental 
Boas believed that the primitive could be
(Cf. a remarkable
processes.
educated into the civilized mentality, 
study supporting this view in Margaret Mead, New Lives for 
Old, Cultural Transformation--Manus, 1928-1953 [New York: 
Morrow, 1956].) Toynbee distinguishes the two mentalities 
on the basis of the nature of psychological processes 
themselves,
60Ibid,, p. 377. Cf. p. 128 and IX, op. cit 291. 
For Toynbee” "btherialization" is the tendency to shift the 
"field-of-action" (Ibid., p. 192). This tendency to shift 
stimuli is suggested £n the social psychology of Charles 
Ellwood who speaks of the selective factor in human inter-
the mind tends to select 
(Introduction to Social
action with the environment, i.e
stimuli to which it will respond. _____ __
Psychology [New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1917 J.)
• y
6lIbid., p. 289. "It is through the.inward develop- 
ment of Personality that individual human beings are able to
p. 233.)(Ibidperform creative acts." • y
62Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1954-), P-
216
^Toynbee's hierarchy of orders may be outlined as 
follows (with capitalizations retained): (1) The Order of 
Inanimate Physical Nature, the world of external nature more 
generally subject to man and thereby relatively less pre­
scriptive than the Subconscious.* (2) The Order of Psychic 
Nature, the world of the subconscious and its Laws, varyingly 
prescriptive depending on the degree of etherialization. It 
liberates Life from the bondage of Inanimate Physical Nature 
at the cost of Death and the Laws of the Subconscious.
(3) The Order of Human Will, Ego-Consciousness, the order 
wherein Man is liberated to Limited Liberty in terms of 
Freedom of the Will at the cost of Moral Responsibility.
Uj.) The Order of God Himself, the Law of Love and Perfect 
Liberty, absence of coercion, where Law and Freedom are 
indistinguishable and Man may be liberated to the Perfect 
Liberty of God when he wills God's Will with a will of his 
own.
^Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit 
271-30ZT"
382. Of. p. 395• 9
and I, op, cit • 9
6%bld. , p. 402. Cf.. p. 391.
66Ibld., p. 404.
^Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit 361.• 9
68 Cf„ a similarToynbee, A^tud^, 233. ^
view in Smuts, op, cit., pp. 107, 3Ub, ana juo.
Etherialization by "internalization" of the challenge-and- 
response rhythm is suggested in the Darwinian hypothesis 
wherein "challenge** is the external factor^of natural 
selection, i.el ti , i ., "survival of the fittest," and "response" 
is the inner creative factor of "variation."
69Ibid., p. 234.
70Carl Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, trans. 
W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes (Harvest Book ed.; New York: 
Harcourt Brace, 1933), P. 21+3.
^Toynbee, A Study, VII, op, cit I2I1X. Toynbee• 9
quotes Cornford.
' Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit.. 306. The problems 
of life are resolved by their transformation rather than by
Cf. Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice.their elimination, 
op. cit P. k-2.• 9
217
73Toynbee, A Study. IV, op. clt 33.. Cf. V, op. cit.,12. • 9
74Toynbee, A Study. Ill, op. clt.. 211.
75Ibid., p. 134. Cf. pp. 139f.
76Ibid., pp. 154-74. Cf. P. 134.
77 Ibid P. 174.• >
78Henri Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, 
trans. R. Ashley Andra, Cloudesley Brereton, and Horsfall 
Carter (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935), P. 248, passim.
79Toynbee, A Study. Ill, op. clt 191.• 9
80Ibid., p. 183.
81Murphy, op. cit., pp. 24f. Toynbee quotes Murphy 
in I, 197f., 205f., 431f., and III, op. cit.t 243f. The idea 
°f rhythm was early suggested by Empedocles in his rhythm of 
Love as the'integrative and therefore qualitatively simpli­
fying force and Hate as its opposite disintegrating force.
It was also suggested in the Yin and Yang of the neo-Confucian 
philosophers of the 11th century A.D. The dialectical 
approach to historical analysis is basic. It is found in 
Spengler, Sorokin, Heard, Smuts, and many others. In Idealism, 
it is Hegel's dialectic.
class struggle. In Pragmatism it takes the form of environ- 
ment--challenge (maladjustment) and response (readjustment) 
or the process of adaptation. Helmut Kuhn, "Dialectic in 
History," Journal of the History of Ideas. X (January, 194-9), 
21: "An alternation of periods of predominantly integrative
action followed by predominantly disintegrative periods . . .
a systole and diastole of Time" is evident throughout history. 
The concept is indispensable to the analysis of history.
Cf. Sidney Hook's contrary view in Reason, Social Myths and 
Democracy (New York: Humanities Press, 1951), Chap. XI, 
""Dialectic in Society and History." Hook argues that the 
term "dialectic" should be dropped. The writer does not 
agree.. The rhythmic nature of "etherialization," for example, 
becomes evident when one examines examples of "progressive 
simplification" in the progress of technique.
In Marxism, it is the materialistic
218
82Kuhn, _______ p. 27: "The rational agent . . .
reflecting . . . on the world as the whole of which he is a 
part . . t discovers Organic Rhythm as [the] salient feature 
of this whole."
op. cit • 9
®^Toynbee, A Study. Ill, op. cit
^Ibid.. p. 184. The examples of etherialization 
drawn from transportation technology are the writer1s 
rather than Toynbee*s. Etherialization is evident in 
numerous social as well as mechanical inventions.
210.• *
8%bid.. p. 209.
86J. W. N. Sullivan, The Limitations of Science 
(Mentor Book ed.; New York: The New American Library of 
World Literature, 191+9), Chap. III.
87Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit 128-217.• 9
88 531.Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit • 9
89Toynbee, A Study, VI, op. cit., 35i+.
90Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 185. Cf. Spengler 
The Decline of the West, trans. C. F. Atkinson (New York: _
A. A. Knopf, 1926), I, 3l8ff.; and Heard, Ascent of Humanity, 
op. cit., pp. 226-28.
91Sorokin, Social Philosophies, _______
For a study of philosophies- of history based on aesthetics, 
see Chap. II and Dynamics, op. cit., I, Chaps. V, VI, and VII.
p. 38.op. cit • 9
^Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit
9^Ibid., p. 18.7. See particularly poems no. 34, 37, 
40, 45, 477~4B, 67, and 8l of the Tao T§ Chlng.
4l6.• 9
^Ibid. , p. 259. Cf. Bergson, Two Sources, op. cit.. 
246-1+8 et passim; Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (Anchor 
ed.; Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1953), Chap. VII. In the 
development of religion, “etherialization" is effected in the 
change from polytheism and the intolerable burden of compli­
cated taboo systems to an "etherialized" monotheism and 
“etherialized" moral responsibility of freedom.
PP.
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^Toynbee. A Study, IX. op, cit
op. cit.. 561. ----------
96Ibld.. p. '382. Cf. I 
III, op. cit., 217, 259ff
29£. Cf. VII,• 9
22-26, kk2l. op. cit 
and 37of.
• 9
• 9
97Solomon Asch, Social Psychology (New York: Prentice- 
Hall, 1952), p. 286. The idea of "internalization" is also 
found in Freud, but it is a defense mechanism rather than a 
mechanism of growth. The individual responds to external 
challenges as social demands that conflict with his natural 
instincts by "internalizing" them. The response becomes a 
Conscience. " "Internalization" becomes the tool of sub­
limation and repression in Freud rather than creativity. 
Creative activity follows from the sublimation of sexual 
instincts. Creativity is the secondary by-product of a 
sublimated secual energy rather than the natural output of
"Freud did not deal with the pro- 
(Ibid.)
an integrated personality, 
ductive forces in man." 1
98See Chap, VIII infra, re the psychological signifi­
cance of the w i thdr awal - and- r e^ turn rhythm,
^Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit 288.° 9
100Ibid., p. 1+66.
101 p. 290.Ibid • 9
102Ibid.., p. 263.
10%. A. L. Fisher, "A Universal Historian," (A review 
of A Study of History, vols, I-III). The Nineteenth Century 
and After. CXVI (December, 1934)9 889.
^^Toynbee, A Study, III, op, cit,, 4-84*
10^Ibld., p. 253. Cf. pp. 2£lf.
Ibid., p. 254- Platonic perfectionism stands in 
sharp contrast to Augustinian or Bergsonian creationism at 
this point. Toynbee repudiates the former as a kind of 
intellectual pathology associated with and evidence of social 
breakdown and disintegration. The perfection sought by 
Toynbee is the perfection of a creative process which is the 
life of God, a process whereby man achieves harmony with God 
and His purposes.
106
220
107Albert Schweitzer, The Philosophy of Civilization. 
Part II, Civilization and Ethics, trans.. C. T. Campion 
(1st American ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), p:
108Sri Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western 
Thought (2d ed.; London: Oxford University Press7l94oT, 
Toynbee does not believe, however, that the 
phenomenon of "withdrawal-and-return”--physical or psychic, 
individual or social--is an inexorable law. He cites an 
exception which "proves the rule" in "Muhamraed1 s career," 
which—he says — "appears to have been a movement in the 
opposite sense. . . . The first stage of his career he 
withdraws as a merchant and returns as a prophet in keeping 
with ?etherialization.1 In the second stage, however, he 
withdraws as prophet and returns as conqueror." (Ill, 
op. cit., 467.)
PP. lOlf.
109 372.Toynbee, A Study, III, opc cit • 9
110For studies by Toynbee of the time-scale of the
116, 293; and IX, 
527, 596, 600,
unconscious, see A Study, VIII, op. cit 
op. cit., 48, 328, 336-37, 361, T&T,
• 9
47 Of • ;
and 704.
i:L1Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit 372.• 9
112Ibid., p, 373. Whatever desirable effect these 
momentary periods of equilibrium have had socially has been 
limited largely to the outcome of "primitive social drill
. . [a] social expedient [that is]. . . called mimesis . 
a 1 short cut.J" (Ibid.)
^Toynbee, A Study, VI, op. cit., 324f. Toynbee 
goes on to say in his characteristically poetic prose that 
"the music that the rhythm of Yin and Yang beats out is the 
song of creation; and we shall not be misled into fancying 
ourselves mistaken because, as we give ear, we can catch 
the note of creation alternating with the note of destruction. 
So far from convicting the song of being a diabolic counter­
feit, this doubleness of note is a warrant of authenticity.
If we listen well we shall perceive that, when the two notes 
collide, they produce not a discord but a harmony, Creation 
would not be creative if it did not swallow up in itself all 
things in Heaven and Earth, including its own antithesis."
CHAPTER VII
TOYNBEE'S THEORY OF BREAKDOWN AND DISINTEGRATION
One of the perennial stimulants to speculation on 
the part of historians is the decline of the great world 
civilizations. To be sure, it is customary to fit the fall 
of Rome or of Assyria into the larger framework of Civili­
zation, into a linear advance of human culture. Yet the 
somber fact of periodic falls of great societies moves the 
historian to speculate concerning the nature and cause of 
these catastrophes in the lives of proud societies-- 
societies which for the most part viewed themselves as the 
pinnacle of human achievement and blessed with immortality.
Particularly sobering is the fact that perhaps no 
civilization is more obsessed by this illusion of immortality 
than is our own Western civilization. Economic and political 
domination of most of the earth is more than Western man can 
enjoy without succumbing to the temptation to view his 
accomplishments as the acme of human achievement. There is 
no better evidence of this overweening confidence in his 
superiority and permanence than his systematically formulated 
self-assurance that he is indeed "civilized11 man and that the
touchstones of his values are those for which men everywhere 
will henceforth strive. This supreme self-confidence is
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reflected in the unilinear view of Civilization which has 
become the implicit if not explicit doctrine of most Western 
students of human society.. The popular mythos of "the Unity 
of Civilization11 is a convenient means, however, by which an 
overconfident Western man avoids the embarrassing fact that 
his "Illusion of Finality" is but a comfortable substitute 
for a real lack of spiritual confidence..
of the best Western minds is the belief that a particular
The error of some
method is the key to eternal progress and that this method 
is blessed with a universality and immortality that will
All this Toynbeepersist even though its proponents falter, 
exposes to the uncompromising glare of his logic and his
By revealing Western assumptions for what they really 
are, Toynbee has alienated the affections of most of his
Yet no one else "has taken in the dimensions of
facts.
colleagues.
the current crisis in history better than Arnold J. Toynbee — 
or placed it in fuller historic perspective."^* x
In his expos6 of the paradox of pessimism and optimism 
in Western provincialism, Toynbee examines the efforts to 
attribute man's disasters to forces beyond his control. He
says:
Three predestinarian explanations of the breakdowns 
of civilization [have been given]: the theory that 
they are the incidental consequences of a running- 
down of the clockwork of the Physical Universe; the 
theory that a civilization, like a living organism, 
has its own inherent life-span and life curve which 
compels it to pass, within a definite number of 
centuries, from birth through growth and senescence 
to death; and the theory that the breakdown of any 
given civilization at any given date is due to the
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racial degeneration of a particular portion of the 
Human Race, from which this particular civilization 
happens to have drawn its l!members. "2
Toynbee rejects all these theories. He rejects as well
theories of cosmic cycles which characterized Classical and
Hindu thought and which found renewed life in Nietzsche !s
doctrine of eternal recurrence. He rejects also Spengler*s
organismic theory of civilizations. These doctrines are
themselves products of a psychic and social breakdown. Nor
are the breakdowns of civilizations T,acts of God," says
Toynbee:
They are neither the inexorable operations of a 
Saeva Necessitas nor the sadistic sport of a Kali 
snatching another head for her necklace of skulls.
Nor are they the vain repetitions of senseless laws 
of Nature . . . [or] loss of command over the en­
vironment, either physical or human. . . . [They] 
are not catastrophes . . . [or] homicidal assaults.
. . . Broken down civilizations have not met their 
death from an assassin* s hand . . . [but] from 
suicide. . . . "We are betrayed by what is false 
within". . . . The greatest danger to Man is Man."
Even in Life-in-Death [of "petrified" societies] 
there is still Hope-against-Hope. The Goddess with 
whom we have to do battle is not Saeva Necessitas . . . 
but only Probability.3
And within the limits of probability there is always possi­
bility. "We are not compelled to submit ... to the blind
If we examine the record of 
the civilizations that have come into existence, Toynbee
nkarbitrament of statistics.
says, we note that,
sixteen [civilizations] prove to have broken down 
through their own acts, before ever any alien human 
force succeeded in dealing them a potentially mortal 
In all of these cases the most that the alienblow.
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enemy has achieved has been to give the expiring 
suicide his coup de grace. . . 
the Arabic and the Hittite Civilizations are the 
only two cases out of the nineteen in which the 
original breakdown . . . wears the appearance of 
being the work of an alien hand and even in these 
two cases this finding is not conclusive. . . .
The cause of breakdowns of civilizations is not to 
be found in a loss of command over the human 
environment. . . . Actually an external attack 
usually proves to be stimulating.5
Symptoms of breakdown are evident in the West, Toynbee
The histories of
believes, but it cannot be said with certainty that break­
down has in fact occurred. No necessary law is indicated.
The great war [of A.D. 191l|.-l8 and its sequel, A.D. 
1939-451 . . . may or may not prove to have been 
the undoing of our own Western Civilization. . . .
The generation now alive will not live to know 
whether the wound dealt to our Western Society . . . 
has been mortal or not, though the truth--whatever 
it may be--will doubtless be manifest, several 
centuries hence, to our descendants.6
The cause of breakdown, Toynbee believes, is psycho­
logical, social, and spiritual—not material, external or 
determined. Philosophies of determinism arise during periods 
of disintegration as emotional escape hatches. Failure of 
creative activity gives rise to the need for ego-satisfaction 
substitutes. Instead of accepting the reality of breakdown 
and responding creatively to its challenge, a degenerate 
creative minority may turn to dismal doctrines of doom. 
Perhaps the classic and most sublime example of this response 
is that of Lucretius. In his De Re rum Natura — particularly 
Book II, lines 1144-45 and ll50-74--Lucretius recognizes the 
reality of growth and progress but falls into pessimism when 
he resigns himself to what he believes to be the ultimate
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senescence of all nature and admonishes his reader with 
sublime poetry to face the future without fear, to seek in 
the ephemeral the values and satisfactions of the good life. 
Predestinarian and deterministic doctrines are themselves a 
part of the phenomenon of breakdown.
Breakdown is the counterpart of etherialization. It 
is a failure of creative functioning in personal and social 
relationships. In turning to determinism, responsibility for 
the affliction is avoided--for the moment at least--and the 
burden of guilt shifted to forces beyond man*s control, 
determinism is an invitation to despair, for it destroys any 
possibility of reestablishing a basis of value in human 
existence.
In an eternally repetitive universe all human 
endurance becomes the torment of . . . Ixion, and 
all human action becomes the ineffective gesture 
of a Tantalus.7
In what sense can any act or relationship be creative, asks 
Toynbee, if it possesses no significance apart from itself, 
or if it is the necessary outcome of an antecedent condition? 
Only freedom and purpose can give meaning to history, and 
this freedom and purpose must link the destiny of man to the
But
destiny of the universe itself.
Because creativity is the breath of Life,
This failure is what Toynbee means by
failure of
creativity is death, 
breakdown.
theories of progress, 
to the fearful speculations of historians who have been
The idea of breakdown embarrasses conventional
Consequently it is attributed by some
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"overcome by the imagination of disaster." For Toynbee, 
however, breakdown is essentially the cessation of etherial- 
ization. It therefore involves all aspects of life.
If breakdown is the failure of creativity or 
etherialization, to what can this failure be attributed? 
Toynbee believes that "idolization of the ephemeral" is the 
key cause of the failure. Idolization of the ephemeral 
manifests itself in the direction of human faith toward some 
personality, social group, institution, or technique. By 
directing attention to some ephemeral achievement, it tends 
to peg etherialization at some particular level of achieve­
ment instead of encouraging a continuation of the creative 
process. Transitory goals are substituted for the creative
There is an absolutization of the relative. 
But "every form of idolatry is intrinsically disastrous for 
the idolater.
process of Life.
..8
At the personal level, breakdown is reflected in the
The creative personality iscorruption of personality, 
seduced by some particular success to imagine that this 
particular success possesses value in and of itself. The
A dark horse may winresulting overconfidence is deceptive.
out over a favorite.
An intrinsically superior technique which has been 
idolized by its adepts [for example] .. . . may be 
defeated by an intrinsically inferior technique 
which has no point in its favor except that it has 
not yet had time to be idolized.9
Perhaps the most insidious of idolizations is the
idolization of the "Ephemeral Self"—the perennial error of
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anthropomorphism. This idolization assumes many forms 
depending on the particular Zeitgeist of the culture in 
question. The Greeks, for example, worshipped a false MGod 
the Reason"—a false god that was subsequently favored by 
Modern Western Man. On the other hand, Vedantic philosophy 
worships "God the Subconscious"--a false god to which
, , 4- 4. 10Westerners--thanks to Freud—are now beginning to turn.
Idolization of a particular success is a powerful
inducement to breakdown. For example, "a rise in spiritual
standards," says Toynbee, may
incidentally produce a consequent rise in material 
well-being. . . . This incidental mundane effect of 
spiritual progress exposes Man to a temptation to 
which he readily succumbs. The material harvest of 
spiritual travail is apt to divert Man!s energies 
from spiritual into material channels.il
Indeed, Toynbee continues:
If "the greater the success, the greater the temptation" 
were in truth one of the laws to which the Human Psyche 
was subject then it would seem to follow that an equi­
librium which had to be unstable if it was to be a 
vehicle for the growth-process must be prone to become 
precarious with each successive victory.12
Hence "the price of growth condemns a growing civilization
The creative person-
ever more
to live dangerously," Toynbee concludes, 
ality must resist a growing temptation to idolize the 
ephemeral—to rest on his oars; for in succumbing to this
temptation, the burden of creativity is abandoned for less
1*3J Dr. Inge 1sburdensome but uncreative ephemeral pursuits.
"Nothing fails like success" aptly describes the 
predicament of "Man-in-Process-of-Civilization."
"Resting on onefs oars," says Toynbee, "is the passive
aphorism:
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way of succumbing to the nemesis of creativity [which is
An active way, he continues, is the substitution 
of violence, of a masochistic and suicidal militarism, for 
the action of creativity.
Breakdown is a potent social contagion.
breakdown].M
11+
It takes its
toll of the creative minority of all societies, 
afflicted, corrupted personalities suppress the emergence of
Serious psychic and social 
"When these considerations are taken
When
creativity in new minorities, 
stagnation may occur, 
together,"
it will be seen that the . . . sterilizing of 
ci-devant creators through an inward psychological 
aberration to which their very achievement makes 
them prone is the most potent cause of breakdown 
of any that our survey has revealed. 15
The sterilizing of which Toynbee speaks may follow a number
If the creative personality is not seduced by
success to abandon his creative effort, if he has escaped
of phenomena.
the deceptive illusion of having achieved perfection, he may 
yet acquire the mistaken notion that perfection is the goal 
This was the fatal mistake of Plato and Aristotle.of life.
Their desire was to peg society at the ideal level of the 
city state, to preserve, if possible, the ideal form of
"Not happiness and not progress, but stability, is
the Alpha and Omega of the Athenian philosopher's social 
i.l6
society.
"The Platonic and Aristotelian programme," Toynbee 
the Hellenic society to the social 
In these instances, there
creed.
continues, "is to 'peg 
level of a fLycurgeanf system." 
is "a mental reversion from the human towards the insect type
,,17of mental rhythm.
229
For Toynbee, perfection is creative process--not 
Only by plunging in the stream of Life does the 
human psyche fulfill its intended destiny, and the stream of
"Perfect
stasis.
Life pursues a turbulent and hazardous course, 
adaptation is death" wrote the American sociologist, Arthur
Todd:
Progress means struggle to adjust rather than 
adjustment . . . [and] manfs progress has been 
won at the e-xpense of nature1 s laws.1**
Fortunately perfect adaptation is never achieved.
But man must keep the rhythms of life alive if he is
The human personality must make the
fateful choice between the hazards of a creative life and
The choice is
to escape breakdown.
the deadlier hazards of stable inactivity.
difficult, but is nevertheless the essence of the drama of
To etherialize is to invite breakdown-- 
Yet not to etherialize is
the human situation.
a challenge few can surmount, 
ipso facto breakdown. To seek the security of acquiescence
to the "cake of custom," to renounce creative venture, is to
It is to return to the more primitive
Worse yet, it
renounce life itself.
level of subconscious domination of life, 
involves the risk of damming up psychic energy—a psychic 
disorder that may activate the autonomous contents of the 
subconscious.. The human psyche cannot long deny its creative
potential without endangering the health of Its personality 
Either it withers from lack of psychic nourishmentas well.
or the nourishing psychic elements assert a subhuman life of 
In any event, the psyche must find its way backtheir own.
to the stream of life.
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Idolization of the ephemeral commonly appears as the 
result of mechanization. Toynbee’s negative appraisal of 
mechanization goes hard against the main stream of contemporary 
thought. Yet Toynbee is convincing when he argues that the 
invention of soulless mechanisms increases the tendency to 
rest on one’s oars. This is because, he argues, mechanization 
frees people from the burdens of life and by so doing 
encourages them to extend mechanization to all spheres of 
life including the creative process itself. In other words, 
the creative personality may be encouraged by a partial and 
successfully etherializing mechanization to renounce the new 
opportunity for creativity by substituting for the burden of 
creativity a full mechanization of the remainder of life.
The evil of mechanization is the tendency to idolize it 
rather than mechanization itself, for mechanization is
progressive simplification of technique is a form of
But mechanization of human interactions oretherialization. 
responses is per se a repudiation of self-determination and
therefore an invitation to disaster.
The mechanization of Life, either in the inner 
workings of a soul or in the external relations 
between a number of human beings in a society . . . 
[involves a] risk of catastrophe [which] proves to 
be inherent in the use of the faculty of mimesis 
[social imitation], which is the vehicle of mechani­
zation in the medium of Human Nature. . . . The 
weakness of mimesis lies in its being a mechanical 
response to a suggestion. . . 
proceeds from mimesis is essentially precarious 
because it is not self-determined.19
If mimesis is directed toward creative personalities who are
able to prevent the cake of custom from hardening, growth may
. All action that
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On the other hand if mimesis becomes mechanical
obedience to habit or ephemeral worship of an institution or
the past, disaster is invited:
The condition which is required for the maintenance 
of the Promethean 61an of growth is a condition of 
unstable equilibrium in which "the cake of custom" 
is never allowed to set hard before it is broken up
again.20
Yet for all of its hazards in the mechanicalness of
persist.
mimesis, social imitation is the unavoidable means of social
Only a communion of saints, 
The irony of history is
communication of the Way of Life, 
says Toynbee, could eliminate it. 
that the very processes by which progress is achieved are
Man's doom isalso the potential sources of breakdown.
Toynbee comes close to a fatal determinism—almost assured.
but only for a moment, because breakdown is itself a challenge. 
The traumatic experiences it evokes may issue in responses
The Way of Life remains open to man. 
Instead of a spiritual determinism, Toynbee offers a crisis 
philosophy of life; and if we interpret crisis to mean oppor­
tunity as well as danger, we have in essence Toynbee fs view 
For Toynbee, man must confront the Charybdis and 
Scylla of the human situation, the sin hubris—being 'puffed 
resting on one's oars' in a cessation of
of the highest order.
of life.
up'--and a 
creativity.
The only wisdom we can hope to acquire 
Is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless.
With Bunyanlike steadfastness of purpose man must work out
The Way of Life is the eternal struggle of
21
- his salvation.
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creation, of self-transcendence.
For most of us, this is the aim 
Never to be realized;
Who are only undefeated 
Because we have gone on trying.
To falter is to fail but only if the challenge of failure
does not itself provoke a creative response.
ceasing of this striving. Utopian hopes are the vain
imaginings of those who would revert to the instinctive way
of the beehive--the
mental reversion from the human towards the insect 
type of mental rhythm; from the blundering but 
progressive [and creative] mobility of reason to 
the infallible but inflexible rigidity of instinct 
[and habit].23
Like the philosophies of determinism, utopian dreams are the
phenomena of broken down societies--attempts to inhibit
disintegration, in other words, idolizations of the ephemeral.
They lead to the dehumanization of man rather than to progress.
The two phenomena of caste and specialization, and 
the fatally perfect adaptation of the society to its 
particular environment which these two phenomena 
bring about between them, are just as characteristic 
of the Utopian and the Insect World as they [were] 
of four actual societies [the Spartan, Eskimo, Nomadic 
and Osmanli] . . . which suffered arrest.2q
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There is no
Compared with periods of growth during which there
Mweis evidence of a qualitative differentiation of culture 
shall now find,11 says Toynbee,
that conversely, the qualitative effect of the dis­
integration process is standardization. ... As 
social breakdown has occurred and the
thesoon as aprocess of social disintegration has set in, 
tendency towards variety and differentiation that 
is characteristic of the growth phase of a civili­
zation is replaced by a nisus towards uniformity 
and identity.25
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But no human enterprize can survive if it abandons the Way
By leaving the stream of life, civilizations perish. 
The stream, however, moves on. 
creative minorities move with it.
of Life.
Other societies, other
The responsibility for growth and breakdown is the 
burden of the creative minority, 
the breakdown of civilization lies upon the heads of the
By resting on their oars, the leaders or creative 
minority forsake their roles as creators of value, and ,!if 
the blind lead the blind, both . . . fall into the ditch.
Any loss of creative power by the creative minority
When this occurs, the
,!Moral responsibility for
leaders.!!
n26
alienates the quiescent majority.
Creative Minority is no longer able to inspire mimesis and
converts itself into a Dominant Minority which maintains
27leadership on the basis of favorable power relationships.
”In the interaction between leaders and led, mimesis and
pO
During growth, 
But inspiration
power are correlatives,” says Toynbee, 
power is exercised through inspiration, 
requires a high level of personality development and human
During breakdown this is lost, and coercion 
and mechanization take their inevitable toll in dehumanization.
relationships.
There emerges — in the words of T. S. Eliot--the phenomenon of
. . . decent godless people:
Their only monument -the asphalt road 
thousand lost golf balls.29
Power relationships in society reorient themselves
in terms of mechanized conformity backed by coercion.
And a
Self-
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masses are cut adrift. No longer guided by free and inspired 
responses, their social life becomes the rubber stamp imi­
tation of personalities who enjoy--for the moment--a favorable 
power relationship. But a society held together by the 
authority of brute force explicit or implicit converts itself 
from a state of harmonious integration into a state of chaotic 
disintegration which can be arrested only by the threat or 
application of increasing force and violence.
A civilization that has broken down and failed to
retrieve itself becomes a paltry shadow of its former self. 
Its armies may occupy the four corners of the world, but its
Indeed it is doubtful that it can lay
Attention must be
spirit is broken.
claim to recognition as a social entity, 
directed to the social entities which emerge from its ruins.
Prom the disintegration of secondary civilizations
The first is an alienated
This
emerge three social entities.
Internal Proletariat who create a Universal Church.
group is confronted by a second social entity, the Universal 
State which the Dominant Minority erects in pursuit of peace
A third entity also appears in the form ofand immortality, 
an External Proletariat which Toynbee indentifies with
belligerent and barbarian war bands.
Of the three groups, the Internal Proletariat is the
most significant, for out of the deep trauma of the challenge
of alienation arises the creative response of higher religion.
"The true hallmark of the proletarian," says Toynbee,
is neither poverty nor humble birth but a consciousness 
--and the resentment which this consciousness inspires —
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of being disinherited, . , . The subjective [i.e 
psychological] proletarianism is not incompatible 
with the possession of material assets.35
The internal proletariat are alienated by the dis­
tasteful and uninspiring social relationships which replace 
the sense of growth and purpose. This loss of confidence 
carries serious social implications of a general and wide­
spread nature because the power relationships which bind the 
society degenerate. Symbols of authority become perverted, 
and there is a loss of the sense of community, 
coercion replaces respect; fearful imitation, inspiration.
A sense of malaise within brings in its wake aggressive 
compensatory measures without:
One of the commonest forms in which the breakdown 
of a civilization declares itself is an outbreak 
of fratricidal warfare between the state members of 
the society; and if ever the children of the house­
hold pause for a moment from their self-imposed 
task of self-destruction in order to turn their arms 
against outsiders, it is likely enough that the 
improvement in the art of war which they have been 
making at the price of their own blood will purchase 
them wide dominion over their neighbours.36
• 9
Threat of
The illusion of growth which military conquest 
brings parallels the illusion of immortality which the
Both are revealingUniversal State appears to establish, 
symptoms of the progress of the social disease of disinte- 
Both promote an artificial sense of unity to 
compensate for the pseudo-relationships of a diseased society,
gration.
"In aand both lead to the phenomenon of the "savior,M 
growing civilization,11 says Toynbee,
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a creative personality comes into action by taking 
the lead in making a successful response to some 
challenge. ... In a disintegrating civilization 
Challenge and Response is still the mould of action 
in which the mystery of creation takes place, but .• . % 
[while] in a growing civilization the creator is called 
upon to play the part of a conqueror who replies to a 
challenge with victorious response, in a disintegrating 
society the same creator is called upon to play the 
part of a saviour who comes to the rescue of a society 
that has failed to respond because the challenge has 
worsted a minority that has ceased to be creative and 
has sunk to be merely dominant.37
Saviors seek the salvation of their society by various 
means and with varying degrees of success or failure, 
responses to the challenge of breakdown may be Archaistic or 
Futuristic.
Violent
They may
attempt to substitute a mere transfer in the Time- 
dimension for that transfer of the field of action 
from one spiritual plane to another [higher one] 
which is the characteristic movement of [genuine] 
growth [through etherialization].3°
In essence, a pseudo-etherialization is attempted.
The gentle responses of Detachment and Transfigur­
ation find greater favor with Toynbee because they “effect a
. Their respectivegenuine change in spiritual clime. . .
otherworldly,f“ instead of being mere transfersgoals are
in the time dimension of This World, 
arrested form of etherialization.
drawal without a return, a withdrawal “out of This World . . 
[through the] push of aversion.” 
other hand, is the response of withdrawal-and-re turn—an 
etherialized response to the challenge of disintegration, and 
attempt to “transcend the earthly life of Man [which has
Detachment is an
It constitutes a with-
Transfiguration, on the
broken down] without ceasing to embrace it."
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• . . to apprehend
The point of intersection of the timeless 
With time . . .39
It is the response of the Buddhist Bodhisattva who achieves
salvation but lingers in This World to save his fellows.
During disintegration, transfiguration renews the
It "bears witness to the growth ofbroken rhythms of life.
a society ... of some other kind than the one in disinte-
ti^O In the relatively short history of Man, trans­
figuration has signalled the emergence of higher religion. 
Higher religion, Toynbee believes, is the supreme human 
achievement which makes of the growth and disintegration of 
civilizations something more significant than "the ineffective 
gesture of Tantalus.”
A civilization that brings a church to birth and 
perishes in the creative act does not stultify itself 
by perishing, but, on the contrary, justifies its 
existence by carrying out its historical mission at 
the cost of its own life. [This is particularly true] 
when the life of a civilization has served as the 
overture not to the miscarriage of an abortive church, 
but to the birth of a living church. ... [in which] 
the death of the precursor civilization is not a 
disaster but a triumph [of purpose in history].4l
Only transfiguration is the successful response to breakdown,
for in transfiguration the encounter of challenge-and-response
takes place in the soul of Man.
gration.
In the diversity in the relations of Religion to the 
rises and falls of civilizations, in different gener­
ations ... we can discern that human freedom springs 
from an encounter in which Man is summoned to respond
presented by God [Himself to the soulto a cha 
of Man]
allenge
Though the growth of civilization is "topped" by
^ Duringbreakdown, the creativity of God does not cease.
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disintegration, it shifts its field of activity from the 
broken down civilization to new social entities. In particu­
lar the Universal Church which is the visible expression of 
a higher religion becomes the vehicle of growth. ,!Both 
Detachment and Transfiguration,” says Toynbee,
are examples of that ”transference” of the field of 
action from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm which 
manifests itself qualitatively in the spiritual 
phenomenon of "etherialization. ” If we are right in 
believing that these are symptoms of growth and right 
again in believing that every example of human growth 
will always be found to have social as well as an 
individual aspect, and if we are also bound to assume 
ex hypothesi that the society to whose growth the 
movements of Detachment and Transfiguration thus bear 
witness cannot be any society of the species ”civili- 
zation”--considering that a disintegrating society of 
that species is the City of Destruction from which 
either movement is an endeavour to escape — then we 
can only conclude that the movements of Detachment and 
Transfiguration bear witness to the growth of a society, 
or societies, of some other kind or kinds.kb
Because creativity is prostituted by mechanization
in many mundane expressions of Life, it may find expression
in exclusively spiritual activities. These may thrive when
material outlets for creativity have withered. All four
higher religions, for example, arose during a Time of Troubles,
An outburst of spiritual life at a moment of mundane 
catastrophe was the secret of the triumphant religion’s 
success in converting both the human sheep left 
shepherdless by the disappearance of a secular uni-i ^ 
versal state and the wolf-like invading barbarians. r^
Nicholas Berdyaev detects a similar correlation. 
Spiritual progress, he asserts, is realized when real life 
is difficult as, for example, during the Napoleonic Era in 
Germany.
progression of periods of spiritual plenitude wherein values
ij.6 Both Toynbee and Berdyaev detect a rhythmic
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are created followed by periods of a plenitude of the material 
utilization of these values followed in turn by an attempt to 
replenish the source of value withered by Idolization of the 
ephemeral* During disintegration, therefore, etherialization 
finds continued vent in religious and aesthetic creativity.
The creative activity in religion and the fine arts 
Is paralleled by an ephemeral effort of a Dominant Minority 
and its saviors to establish and maintain the Universal State. 
In its effort to heal the Schism of the Soul, the Dominant 
Minority creates the Universal State, a pseudo-achievement 
which,
proves to [be] the last phase of a society before its 
extinction, and the pursuit of the mirage of immor­
tality, into which a dominant minority is misled 
through mistaking its ephemeral universal state for 
the goal of human endeavour.47
The plight of the Universal State is ironical.
best that it can achieve short of the delay of final dissolution
is the reverse of etherialization in immobility and petrifaction.
Its achievements accrue to the benefit of aliens rather than to
the dying civilization for which they were intended.
frustrating
experience of losing their lives in order to find them 
again In the lives of their beneficiaries . . . pro­
vokes them [the dominant minority] to recalcitrance 
and indigna tion * 4®
Yet for all its agonized efforts, the Universal State is but a
49temporary respite from the rhythm of disintegration.
Toynbee believes, the social point of no return,^
If the society that has become known as civilization
The
This
It is,
21*1
fails to retrieve the creative rhythm of life, and the spirit 
of G-od manifests itself in the emergence of newer societies, 
the differentiation of the creative life of the culture within 
that civilization will give way to pronounced rhythms and 
regularities that show up as patterns on a scale of time. 
During growth, patterns in the life of a society are obscured 
by the pronounced differentiation of cultural traits. After 
breakdown, and particularly with the onset of disintegration, 
these patterns become evident. Their presence suggests, for 
example, that the society and the individuals who comprise it 
are functioning more nearly at subconscious levels. Toynbee 
believes that,
if the social laws current in the histories of civili­
zation are reflections of psychological laws governing 
some infra-personal layer of the Subconscious Psyche, 
this would also explain why these social laws should be 
as we have found them to be, so much more clearly pro­
nounced and more exactly regular in the disintegration 
phase of a broken-down civilization's history than in 
its foregoing growth phase.51
During growth, irregularity characterizes the patterns 
of social phenomena as variety characterizes the challenges 
and responses. In contrast, the disintegration phases of
twelve cases studied by Toynbee reveal regularities and uni-
cjpformities in all their aspects. There is, says Toynbee,
a striking contrast between the regularity and uni­
formity of the phenomena of social disintegration and 
the irregularity and diversity of the phenomena of 
social growth.
Why should this be the case? Toynbee suggests that,
a key to its solution may be found in the difference 
between the respective natures of the conscious person­
ality on the surface of the Psyche and the subconscious 
levels of the psychic life, underlying it.53
2l±2
For one thing, the challenge of individual and social 
counters upon the subconscious psyche has a deeper effect 
than that which is evident in the immediate response of 
consciousness.
en-
Moreover, the laws operative in the sub­
conscious and in the intermediate layers of the psyche are 
not necessarily confined to the life-span of a single indi­
vidual, but stamp their effects on the psychic character of 
the collective or racial unconscious:
The pace at which the subconscious element in the 
Psyche habitually moves is . . . not merely the 
limiting, but the governing factor in [for example] 
the determination of the time that an encounter 
between two contemporary civilizations will take, 
from first to last, to work itself out; and the 
usual Time-scale of the working of the Subconscious 
in this province of the realm of social life [has] 
been of a much higher order of magnitude than 1|50 
years [which is the approximate period of impact by 
Modern Western society on other contemporary 
civilizations]m5k
The regularity of social disintegration suggests a
rhythm of Rout-and-Rally:
The cyclic rhythm of Rout-and-Rally . . . has [in 
ten examples excluding a lost Minoan account and an 
uncompleted Western example] been apt--apart from 
cases in which the domestic history of a society 
has been thrown out of its own course by the impact 
of an alien body social—to take a run of three-and- 
a-half beats . . . [proceding] from the breakdown . . 0 
to its final unretrieved dissolution. The first rout 
. . „ [initiates] "a Time of Troubles” which is relieved 
by the first rally, followed by a second, and usually 
more violent paroxysm. . . . This relapse is followed 
. . . by a second rally which is more robust . . . [and 
establishes] a universal state. ... A further [third] 
relapse eventually supervenes . . . [but the] universal 
state manages to stage a recovery. This third rally, 
however, is the last that the disintegrating Civilization 
finds the strength to make. When, thereafter, the 
universal state is smitten by a second [the fourth for
21+3
the civilization] . . . stroke, this is the end, not 
only of this oecumenical body politic, but also ol 
the body social.
The standard Time-spans both of the Times of Troubles 
and of the universal states . . .. 
order of four centuries each.5i>
The emergence of the affiliated civilization--if 
there is one—is about three hundred years after dissolution 
of the apparented civilization, that is, three hundred years 
between the last relapse of the apparented civilization and 
the earliest visible evidence of a new civilization, 
total process of disintegration may last from 800 to 1100 
years depending essentially on the resistance of the universal
This may be illustrated as follows: 
BEGINNING OF THE AFFILIATED CIVILIZATION
appear to be of the
The
state to final collapse.
Time of Universal
Troubles 
HOP vrs.
State
^ 1+00 yrs 700 t
Dissolution of the 
apparented civili­
zation.
min. max.yrs.
Rally
\
Rout
*
BREAKDOWN OF THE APPARENTED CIVILIZATION
In examining the above, we note that there is no uniformity 
in the spans of the individual routs and rallies.^
General breakdown and the ensuing routs and rallies 
are terminated by dissolution of the civilization as a 
society. Though exhibiting a pattern, these phenomena do not 
indicate the working of an inexorable law of decay. Toynbee 
does not believe that sufficient evidence is available from 
the life histories of a handful of civilizations to establish
One can only describemore than a degree of probability.
2kk
what has happened and view this eventuality as a possibility. 
No necessary pattern of breakdown, disintegration and 
dissolution is established by the relatively meager set of 
facts at hand. In the case of the Egyptiac society, for 
example, an unusually long period developed between the
breakdown in the 16th century B.C. and the final dissolution
cj7 This deviationof that society in the £th century A.D. 
from the usual pattern Toynbee characterized as an example 
of T!petrif ied-lif e-in-death.I! Knowledge of civilized
societies.cannot match the anthropologists knowledge of
Over six-hundred primitive societiesprimitive societies.
58have been studied. Also, Egyptian history is by no means 
clear, and Toynbeefs treatment of it as well as his treatment
In the caseof Chinese history has evoked many objections, 
of the latter, Toynbee radically revised earlier conclusions 
and suggested that he is disposed to alter other conclusions 
wherever evidence suggests to him that a revision is in order.
In summary:
The nature of the breakdowns of civilizations can 
be summed up in three points: a failure of creative 
power in the minority, an answering withdrawal of 
mimesis on the part of the majority, and a consequent 
loss of social unity in the society as a whole.
If the stricken society fails to recover the Way of Life,
Assuming ex
it
ultimately passes from the stage of history. 
hypo the si that breakdown has occurred, the future of the West
If adepends in part on the emergence of a Universal State.
Universal State--as Toynbee defines it--were to be established 
in the contemporary world, our doom would be virtually assured.
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When once a Time of Troubles [which the West may be 
experiencing at present] has passed over into a 
universal state, there are manifest inherent 
obstacles to recuperation that are so serious that 
they may well be insurmountable.
But emergence of a Universal State is only a possibility, and
should it occur, the doom of the West would remain a proba-
No inexorable fate controls 
Creativity—etherialization--does not
bility rather than a necessity, 
the destiny of man. 
cease with breakdown as Professor Sorokin believed Toynbee
Nor is creativity confined to the spiritual in 
exclusion of the material as Professor Barnes believed 
Toynbee to say.
which value infuses all of life, 
necessarily the precursors of doom, 
the prelude to transcending successes, 
destiny of man is resolved in the ultimate triumph of value 
for which purpose the creative process transcends all 
ephemeral existence, even breakdown, disintegration, and 
dissolution.
to say.
Instead, etherialization is the means by 
Momentary failures are not 
They may be, instead, 
For Toynbee, the
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CHAPTER VIII
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHERIALIZATION
Toynbeefs idea of etherialization and his psychologi­
cal principle of withdrawal-and-return deserve a careful 
analysis in terms of the psychology which he has embraced,.
When Toynbee revealed his preference for Jungian assumptions 
about man in the last four volumes of his Study, he had 
already developed his idea of etherialization and the psychic 
mechanism of withdrawal-and-re turn. What is invariably over­
looked is that ToynbeeTs alliance with Jungian psychology 
greatly strengthened this theory. Indeed, it is doubtful 
that Toynbee himself fully grasped the significance of the 
implications of this alliance.1 The Jungian picture of 
personality not only provides an explanation of the phenomenon 
of etherialization but also yields clues to the emergence of 
creative minorities. Without this Jungian picture of 
personality,
Toynbee's minority [would] remain a complete mystery 
as to the what, how, whence, and why of its emergence 
and disappearance,
and Sorokin would be further justified in objecting that,
instead of explaining the creativity of a given group, 
[Toynbeefs] postulate [would] itself require even 
greater elucidation than the question of why some 
groups become civilizations while others do not.2
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Sorokin insists that because Toynbee!s rhythms of
challenge-and-response and withdrawal-and-return are
universal, continuous, and common to all living groups 
and individuals, [they] evidently cannot be a factor 
that operates only for creative groups and persons. . . 
Only if Toynbee had specified that what he had in mind 
was a special form of challenge-and-response, of with­
drawal-and-re turn, a form found in operation only 
among creative groups and persons . . . only in such a 
case would these factors .... . [be] helpful.3
But Toynbee did not make the mistake of suggesting a dimorphism
of human personalities based on factors external to psychic
Instead he suggests—but never fully develops—functioning.
a theory which relates these personality processes themselves
The rhythms he employs —to the appearance of creativity, 
which are strikingly similar to those of Jung--become the 
means for describing these almost inscrutable processes.
Sorokin1s difficulty illustrates the impossibility of making 
sense of Toynbee apart from his psychology.
If the rhythm of withdrawal-and-re turn is carefully 
examined In the light of Jung*s system it will be noted that
It Is a search of the depths 
The return--
withdrawal is Jung!s regression, 
of a suffering psyche for spiritual resources, 
or Jung*s progression—puts new energy 
as well as psychic field because the psyche lives and moves
into action in a social
In withdrawal and return,in interaction with other psyches, 
the individual psyche consciously differentiates from the
group in order to make it
possible for the personality to realize individual 
potentialities which might have remained in abeyance 
if the individual . . . had not been released for a 
moment
254
The rhythm of withdrawal-and-return does not necessarily
involve distinct events in clock-time:
Under the term "withdrawal,T a variety of different 
kinds of action is comprised. One obvious kind is 
[that in which] a man goes apart by himself for some 
considerable period and only when he has thus made a 
rather complete adjustment to the inner world attempts 
the return. . . , Another . . . man continues in his 
normal way of life but gives far more attention ... 
to the other side of consciousness [as self-awareness].
• . . Another type ... is not so much a movement of 
"withdrawal" followed by a movement of "return" as a 
continuous process.5
The important point is that the return is the return 
of a personality rather than the addition of a cipher to the 
mass, and that wholeness or integration is achieved in a 
personality that,
as individual and as collective [social] being alike,
in touchconsciously as well as unconsciousl 
with the universe [Ultimate Reality
In other words, the rhythm gives significance to life as well 
as establishes communion with it. It introduces a spiritual 
dimension that infuses objective significance into all aspects 
of life. Values that are relevant to the human situation 
must be able to transcend the vicissitudes and necessities 
of that situation. The eternal must be able to enter time 
in kairos — the "fullness of time. ,.7 In short, the withdrawal- 
and-return leading to etherialization has as its end what
a cultureProfessor Tillich terms a theonomous cultures 
wherein the infinite infuses the finite, the unconditioned 
the conditioned, the eternal the temporal, and the creative 
the created. Values emerge and persist because,
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the ultimate meaning of existence shines through all 
finite forms of thought and action; the culture is 
transparent, and it 
spiritual content.8
During withdrawal, the "inward-turning of the libido
s creations are vessels of a
[as psychic energy] is a painful time for the individual, a
time of crisis."*^ It may become a "bitterness not far from
death. . . [but] it is a tide which, rightly taken, can float
,,10the man to a new level; wrongly taken, destroy him.
however, the "necessary condition for an action of creation,
for it taps the "springs of human action . . . [and] human
„11
It is,
life is either action or failure.
In Jung's system of thought . . . progression [return] 
is founded on the necessity of adjustment to the 
external [social], . . . Regression [is] founded on 
the necessity of adjustment to the internal. . • •
in which naturalBoth are equally necessary forms 
psychic processes are experienced.S 12
When related to Toynbee's etherialization, Jung's 
progression implies an expansion of consciousness through a
More of the external is 
By internalizing more of
widening of the field of action, 
internalized by Ego-consciousness, 
the external through increased consciousness, the Ego becomes
Its field of actionless influenced by its own unconscious, 
involves more social concerns whose challenges are internal-
The whole processized through a qualitative simplification, 
of the return or progression may be summarized as a psychic 
synthesis and an acceptance of the total environment. In
The individualshort, the human situation is etherialized. 
achieves greater self-determination.
Practically speaking this suggests a number of
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observable results. The individual becomes more inner—rather
than outer--directed, more socio- rather than ego-centric, 
comes to terms with his problems more objectively at the level
Tensions tend to challenge rather than
He
of Ego-consciousness, 
to disrupt his personality.
Through the rhythm of withdrawal-and-return or 
regression-and-progression the psyche is able to maintain a 
dynamic unity of consciousness and unconsciousness on the one 
hand and consciousness--the Ego--and society on the other.
In other words, there is an integration of internal psychic
The personality achieves aand external social functioning, 
wholeness that Jung calls an individuation.
Because members of the creative minority are more 
self-directed than their less creative colleagues, a nvariety 
and differentiation . . . becomes characteristic of growth," 
a proliferation of values which accounts for the
striking contrast between the regularity and uni­
formity of the phenomena of social disintegration 
and the [apparent] irregularity and diversity of 
the phenomena of social growth.13
Through withdrawal-and-return, the creative individual
"performs the invaluable function of mobilizing the combined
More energy.illl-energy of consciousness and the unconscious, 
is brought into action through transforming symbols, and more
A strong senseenergy is directed into social life as well.
of style may develop as the "subjective counterpart of the
l£ This may be illustrated byobjective process" of growth, 
the two diagrams below:
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The miracle of psychic energy is the marvel of human 
In human personality physical energy is trans- 
Physical energy is no less
personality.
formed into psychic energy, 
impermanent than physical matter was once thought to be. 
Indeed, if the human protagonist is the creative agent of 
God1 s Will in This World, values that have spiritual signifi­
cance must accrue through a transformation by the Human Psyche 
of energy available to it from nature into psychic energy,
for it is psychic energy which is the active agent in the
If it is God who is the source andpsyche's field of action, 
sustainer of creative process, it is God who is the ultimate 
source of the energy which is transformed in the Human Psyche 
or field of action into the psychic energy of creativity. 
Insofar as this transformation occurs through the catalytic
action of human personality, man becomes the creative agent 
of God, and he becomes God's agent all the more as self-
God is therefore not only ultimatedetermination is achieved, 
source but ultimate challenger, for it is God who brings 
into the human situation the contents of that situation.
Psychologically speaking, etherialization may be 
described as evidence of the psyche's successful effort to 
extricate itself from the mechanical laws of Physical Nature 
and the laws of the Unconscious, to an existence in which the 
energy of these primordial determinants is transformed into
As "power of being" — to 
borrow Tillich's term—etherialization is evidence of,
the energy of self-determination.
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the possibility of self-determination in spite of • 
internal or external negations [that is, subconscious 
or natural determinants], . . . Human power is e yj 
possibility of man to overcome non-being infinitely.
The psychic energy thus brought into action in crea­
tivity is essentially inexhaustible.
believing that there is no !!intrinsic reason why this process
..18
Toynbee is justified in
So long as man isshould not repeat itself ad infinitum, 
a social creature, a source of psychic energy is available
through the
pressure [challenge] of society that converts physical
. . If the conditions of man'sto psychic energy. . 
life were not social, psychic energy would not be 
brought forth. The fact of living in groups is a. 
necessary prerequisite for the emergence of psychic 
energy, and it is just this type of energy that 
characterizes the human being,
Man is not the only creature who lives in groups, but he is 
the only creature who has developed self- or Ego-consciousness, 
who converts physical into psychic energy.
The role of man as a social creature in creative
During etherialization, aprocess cannot be overemphasized, 
progression of psychic energy brings into interaction indi-
It also brings social tensions intovidual fields of action, 
individual consciousness.
Both Toynbee and Jung recognize that it is social 
experience that is the main content of the individual field 
This emphasis upon the social origin of psychic 
contents links Toynbee to Jung rather than to Freud,
Freud, whose theory is particularly applicable to the analysis 
of psychic disorders, Jung offers a theory of the human psyche
Consciousness can etherialize these
tensions.
of action.
Unlike
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which is particularly applicable to creative behavior.
Jungian theory of the human psyche is fully congruent with 
Toynbee!s field of action theory, 
of individual Ego-consciousness vis & vis society in the 
external field of action and vis 6. vis the collective 
unconscious in the internal field of action becomes apparent.
The
When conjoined, the role
Progress depends on creativity of individuals with
It is at once personalrespect to the advance of values.
and social--not only with respect to the values themselves
It is "in inter-but with respect to personality realization, 
personal communication . . . [that] man becomes a self, a
persona." But individual and social values issue from human 
relations in depth:
The biological individual becomes a self in personal 
existence when and in so far as he steps into living 
relationships with other selves. . . 
of human life is what happens [in and] between man 
and man.20
Toynbee reminds us that,
no being can be what he is unless he is putting his 
essence into action in his field . . . [which] lies 
in a society [and] which [in turn] is [the] common, 
ground between his field and fields of a host of 
other people.21
Every example of human growth will always be found 
to have a social as well as an individual aspect.22
The profound effect of the relations which Ego-
consciousness enjoys or suffers with respect to society
without is more than matched by the relationships which it
enjoys or suffers with respect to its subconsciousness.
Toynbee's "fount of Poetry and Prophecy" is Tillich's "power
The essence
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in personal and social life that is creative and destructive 
at the same time.”^ The Ego must face this power within— 
not to slay it as Mithras slew the bull—but to transform it
into the ox of Zen Buddhism which the boy charms and coaxes 
down the path:
Every being [must] affirm its own being, 
its self-affirmation--even if its self-affirmation has 
the form of a self-surrender. . 
of a being is correlate to the power of being it embodies. 
It is greater in man than in animals and in some men 
greater than in others. A life process is the more 
powerful, the more non-being it can include in its self-* 
affirmation, without being destroyed by it. 
neurotic can include only a little non-being, the average 
man a limited amount, the creative man a large amount, 
God--symbolically speaking—an infinite amount. .The 
self-affirmation of being in spite of non-being is the 
expression of its power of being.^4-
But most men are so fearful of the contents of their sub-
consciousness that they cultivate a cautious conservative
In contrast to the courageous venturing of the creative
minority who are willing to plumb the depths of their being,
the uncreative majority will suppress the demonic at all
,!The post-Christian world,” writes Toynbee,
Its life is
. . The self-affirmation
The
mood.
costs.
has been vainly seeking to ban those dread psychic 
principalities and powers in the name of . . . 
Science . . . [but it is] as. impotent to exorcise 
them as [was] any pre-Christian magic.25
To avoid these unpleasant realities, a self-conscious 
rationalism may center attention on externals--on the objective 
study of phenomena which in no way suggest the darker side of
Revulsion fills the rationalist at thehuman personality, 
thought of the subconscious; it is something sinful; it is 
basically indecent, or it suggests pre-scientific modes of
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Because consciousness is a precious possession, it
Indeed, it may be deified as God 
This repudiation of the inner man may become 
so compulsive that personality may be denied contact with
Yet, paradoxically, the failure to come
thought.
is guarded at all costs, 
the Reason.^
its source of being, 
to terms with that which drives the psyche from within may 
only lead to its being blindly driven from without.
Human freedom is the capacity to transform these
It is not merely the capacity to conquerdrives from within.
the world from without.
Constructive activity of the unconscious [is] not 
restricted to neurotic patients. Normal men and 
women, provided they are prepared to take the trouble 
and run the risks, also experience this flow of life­
bringing symbols; and [undergo] a profound change in 
values and attitudes as a consequence [of what may be 
termed e therialization]. . .
[is] not a kind of psychological antibody, produced, by
It [is] an integral
. This . . .. energy . .
the psyche to combat neurosis, 
part of normal life.27
Failure of creativity is breakdown, a reality that
But breakdown is notthe human psyche can hardly escape.
doom, for it confronts the personality with the most
The increasing depth andchallenging of all challenges.
intensity of psychic tensions it brings may unleash new
This is why Toynbee stresses the idea ofsources of power.
"learning through suffering."
Breakdown may also be a failure to confront the 
"beast within"--to establish a modus vivendi with the
If this happens, subconscious-"demonic" as Tillich calls it. 
ness wins by default, for failure to come to terms with
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subconsciousness prevents individuation of personality. A 
participation mystique may engulf the personality imposing 
the sluggish, routine-like behavior of primitive mentality. 
nMan in the crowd,11 says Jung, Mis unconsciously lowered to
an inferior moral and intellectual level, to that level which
,.28is always there, below the threshold of consciousness.
Failure of the Ego to "dwell in unity” with its subconscious
may lead to a corollary external projection of the inner
conflict in terms of social disharmony.
Consciousness, whose mission is to liberate the Human 
Spirit from "laws of nature" ruling over the subcon­
scious abyss of the Psyche is apt to defeat itself by 
misusing, as a weapon in fratricidal conflict between 
one personality and another, 
raison d'etre.^9
the freedom that is its
This unhappy state of affairs is reflected in the behavior 
of a defunct creative minority.
Toynbee,
"A declining society," says
is apt to hasten the day of its dissolution by 
squandering its diminishing store of vital [i.e 
psychic] energy in material [uncreative] performances 
on an excessive scale, not so much out of a wanton 
megalomania as in a vain effort to give the lie to 
its own unacknowledged but agonizing consciousness of 
incompetence and failure and doom.30
At the personal level this may be reflected in grandiose
31displays of conspicuous consumption.
Whatever may be the severity of the breakdown, 
however, doom is not final.
Mater may open the floodgates of new energy.
But "the price of growth condemns [the 
creative minority of] a growing civilization to live
• 9
Withdrawal to the womb of Magna
The miracle of
life does not cease.
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dangerously."^2 
possession of 11 the psychological strength and stamina to
^ Withdrawal may be final. 
"The regressive movement . . . [may result in] a one-sided 
. . unavoidable obstruction of energy," a spiritual 
An "obstacle [may] dam up the river of life,"
The measure of their success will be the
under take wi thdr awal - and - re turn.11
but .
34malaise .
cautions Jung,
and whenever such a damming up of libido [psychic 
energy] occurs, the opposites formerly united in 
the steady flow of life [in personality individuation] 
fall apart and henceforth oppose one another.35
Yet if the psyche refuses toIn short, breakdown occurs, 
withdraw, to maintain the rhythms of life, it may lapse into 
a participation mystique—a group mind as it were--whose 
thoughts and ways become its own and for whom the individual
New values cannot emerge.possesses little significance.
Progress is not achieved, however, because of these
The relationship is not one of cause and effect.breakdowns.
Nor does growth occur in order to effect a breakdown, so 
that religion which is "the true end of man," may emerge 
triumphant .
transcend his failures that prevents him from entering a
"If the law of the Universe [were] really the
£a change plus c'est la mSme chose, ” argue s
Rather it is man!s capacity to suffer and to
culde sac.
sardonic law Plus
Toynbee, one would 
cry
Existence [a wheel] which may be a thing of beauty 
so long as it is merely guiding the stars in their 
course, but which is an intolerable tread-mill for 
our human feet.37
for the Buddhist release from [the] Wheel of
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On the other hand, etherialization does not require, nor does 
it imply a perfection of psychic functioning, 
the exploitation and the intensification of the normal 
rhythms of life and a transforming of otherwise meaningless 
situations into significant opportunities.
man's strength suffice to bring [all] his work without and
Breakdown is a temporary
It is rather
“Seldom does a
h38within to like perfection.
interruption of life which may prove to be disastrous, but
which the human psyche transcends by progressing on "the
stepping stones of its dead self."
be transformed into opportunity.
If the libido [psychic energy] succeeds in tearing 
itself loose and pushing itself up into the world 
above, a miracle appears. The journey to the under­
world has become a fountain of youth.3V
The tragic and the dramatic nature of life is reflected in
the inescapable choice between the hazards of creative living
and the perhaps more hazardous reversion to a participation
To pursue the way of life invites breakdown.
to revert to the primitive security of the "cake of custom,"
to avoid creative venture, is to risk a permanent regression
of psychic energy that may activate dangerous elements of the
unconscious or lead to a "petrified in life existence.
The cosmic drama is therefore--in this sense--resolved
Philistine eyes may not detect
Instead, the tragic burden of responsibility may be
shifted to a scene of action beyond human ken—to an impersonal
process wholly external to the human field of action or at
The travail of life may
Yetmystique.
in the human field of action.
it here.
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least beyond the influence of conscious will. Social, sub­
conscious, biological, or geographical factors may be set 
forth as determinative, 
is the stricken one that must confront and transcend these
But it is the human protagonist who
challenges.
and not merely in a metaphorical sense. 
spiritual sluggard fails to venture to the Tlboundary situ­
ations11 of life--to borrow Tillich's term--his more courageous 
fellow member of the creative minority moves forth to become 
an agent of progress. Creative living "is [therefore] not 
an incident, a brief interlude’. . . [but] a new and perilous 
mode of living."^1 
not distinguished by their race or circumstances but by the 
manner in which they transform the circumstances in which 
they find themselves. Psychic, social, or physical forces 
serve as stimulants rather than as coercive determinants.
If we examine further the psychological aspects of 
etherialization, we have additional reason to believe that 
personality realization is the ground of the creative process, 
for it is through what Jung calls the archetypal energy­
transforming symbols pregnant with meaning that the creative 
psyche is able to come to terms with the circumstances in 
which it finds itself. It is through these symbols that the 
human situation is transformed and values come into being.
The problem is existential. It involves the human situation 
as a whole. Values are not solely the product of intellectual 
endeavor, nor do they arise from social experience alone.
Creative personality is "superhuman in a literal
Whereas the
The members of the creative minority are
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It is through the archetypal transforming symbols that con­
sciousness comes to terms with non-conceptual experience, 
i.e., ultimate concerns.^
non-conceptual to the conceptual or the contents of the 
unconscious to the terms of the conscious.
Consciousness cannot reduce the
Yet it must come
to terms with them in order to establish the significance 
which values require, 
whereby this is achieved.
The transforming symbols are the means 
They are the means by which values 
are created in specific historical and cultural situations.
The [whole] creative process consists in an acti­
vation of the timeless symbols [archetypes] of 
humanity resting in the [collective] unconscious 
and in the development and refinement of them.43
The values that etherialization produces are at once 
material and spiritual, objective and subjective. They 
center dialectically in the existential concerns of human 
personality, and become conscious concerns in a manner 
parallel to psychic functioning generally. Their wholeness 
or significance varies as their participation in these polar 
opposites of value concern. When they are oriented in terms 
of the archetypal and quaternal symbol of wholeness, they 
assume the following relationship.^
SPIRITUAL
•SUBJECTIVEOBJECTIVE-
MATERIAL
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In the conscious delineation of value in life, the 
human psyche functions in a manner similar to personality 
functioning. Differences of value lie in the degree of 
differentiation and emphasis of traits. Thus the ascetic 
imagines pure spiritual value when in fact he is suppressing 
the material aspect of that particular value. An absolutely 
spiritual or objective value is inconceivable; indeed, it is 
a contradiction in terms. It could enjoy no possible relation 
to the human situation. Likewise a purely subjective value 
is a contradiction in terms. To enclose value in a windowless 
monad would be to annihilate it. Having no relationship, it 
would possess no significance in any context. Similarly, 
purely material values would--in terms of the human situation 
lack relevance. Food, for example, is a material value 
enjoyed as well as digested. Thus values--like personality 
to which they are linked--have their being in terms of whole­
ness, and their advance--upon which progress depends--is part
45and parcel of personality realization itself, 
individuated human personality is a possibility, progress
So long as indi-
So long as
through etherialization is a possibility.
vidua ted human personality is a reality, progress is a reality. 
Individuated personality is a process--a becoming--informed 
Kierkegaard understood this when he spoke, for
Toynbee expresses it in
by an ideal.
example, of "becoming a Christian."
the view that,
unstable spiritual equilibrium is the essence of Human 
personality„ . . . The . . . salvation ... to be 
found by Man is the peace, not of nerveless self-
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annihilation [of Nirvana], but of taut-string harmony 
[of consciousness and subconsciousness ] .4°
In summary, therefore, Toynbee* s etherialization and
the psychic processes which form the matrix of its values
alter the human situation in four ways.
a fundamental change in man's attitude to outer 
events; a fundamental change in relationship to 
others; a fundamental change in the springs of 
action; and a fundamental change in ultimate 
perspective.47
The first is the attitude that says:
It is a reverent acceptance of the creative process--a process 
which has its own way and its dark as well as its light side.. 
The second change is the development of social relationships 
in depth--one that surpasses the relative superficiality of 
role playing and links human psyches at their living centers. 
Social relationships have ,Tlittle virtue so long as [they]
There is
"Let life happen to you."
remain merely at the persona level. Everything depends upon
This is the relationship byn48the relationship in depth, 
which values find their way from creative to less creative 
The third change effected by etherializationindividuals.
Is the change in the springs of action, the qualitative alter­
ation of the entire process of personality dynamics, 
essentially the emergence of personality itself, 
to the fourth change, a change of ultimate perspective wherein 
the psyche comes in touch with the universe through the
It is
and it leads
deep-seated but (in the present age) little-regarded 
opposition between time and eternity. ... If . . . 
belief is that, both for the individual and eventually 
for the species, life offers no more than a fitful*and
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essentially empty awareness of existence, ending in 
oblivion, then, whether or not I am consciously aware 
of it, everything I am and do is subtly undermined 
and rendered meaningless. At the opposite extreme, 
if I have my eyes so firmly fixed on eternity that 
I think only of the heavenly kingdom beyond this 
life, I can help bring hell on earth. . . . Unless 
and until the living middle way is found between the 
opposites of time and eternity, life may be urbane, 
but for the individual, it will be essentially empty, 
for the collectivity chaotic.4-9
No genuine theory of progress will be possible because values
will lack objective support and human personality will be
The psychicepiphenomenal to impersonal cosmic process, 
processes of man must therefore enjoy ontological anchorage 
if human life is to have significance, or, indeed, if it is
Without these, there isto function at all as "human11 life.
no progress.
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with which the psyche seriously identifies itself. (Jacobi, 
op. cit. . p. 24-) Cf. Martin, op. cit., pp. 194-96. Any 
form of serious role-playing jeopardizes personality. In the 
participation mystique that may follow, the unassimulated 
shadow side of personality may be projected on some imagined 
enemy--the Jew, the capitalist, or the communist--whomever 
happens to suffer the misfortune of being the object of 
censure. On the other hand, the persona, i.e 
role, may be identified with some Siegfried, some superman 
whose ostensibly superior status or superior interests 
justifies or demands barbaric and inhuman deeds.. r" 
of community upon which mimesis of the creative minority 
depends is possible only when the participants in society 
have themselves acquired wholeness. One can be at peace 
with his neighbor only if he is at peace with himself, 
community fails, it becomes a gang of impersonal entities 
contiguous in space and time but a ,!City of Destruction”-- 
from which the psyche seeking to reenter the stream of life 
must withdraw.
• 9
the psyche*s• 9
The sense
When
^Martin, op. cit.t pp. \\\$f.
CHAPTER IX
TOYNBEE'S ETHERIALIZATION: CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSION
Toynbee introduces the idea of etherialization as a 
criterion of progress in order to establish a basis for the 
growth of his civilizations. Etherialization differs, 
however, from conventional naturalistic criteria of progress. 
Toynbee rejects the eighteenth century belief in progress as 
the perfectibility of man in terms of This Worldly or Western 
touchstones of value. Instead he revives Augustine's belief 
that man is a citizen of two worlds whose ultimate destiny 
lies in the Civitas Dei rather than in the Civitas Terrena. 
MIf we adopt this Augustinian Platonic We 11anschauung as our 
own,” he says,
and attempt, in the light of it, to envisage terrestrial 
history sub specie aeternitatist what significance shall 
we find in the idea of progress in This World?
Age of Civilizations, progress, in so far as human minds 
had entertained this idea at all, had often been identi­
fied with the progressive improvement of some terres­
trial institution: a tribe, a city-state, an empire, a 
church, a system of knowledge or "know-how,” 
art, a code of morals. . . .1
In the
a school of
In other words belief in progress customarily constituted an 
idolization of some ephemeral institution, technique, or the
Toynbee does not reject the idea ofhuman self, per se. 
progress as such, but he rejects the attempt to establish it
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on naturalistic grounds. "The touchstone of the value of an 
institution,M he argues,
is whether it helps or hinders Man to find his way back 
to his Maker, and an institution will become an 
obstacle to Man’s true end .... if it is taken as 
being an end in itself instead of being used as the 
mere means that is all that it truly is. . . : What 
is the significance and the purpose of the social 
heritage, far transcending the temporal and spatial 
limits of any single human life on Earth, which insti­
tutions embody, preserve, and transmit? 0 . . Improve­
ments in this social heritage, which register social 
"progress," are to be estimated and valued according 
to their effect in increasing the possibilities for 
individual human beings in This World to live good 
lives.2
Progress, therefore, is spiritual:
The progress of individual souls through This World 
towards God, and not the progress of Society in This 
World [as such] is the end in which the supreme 
value is found.3
Yet individual transfiguration is not the sole end,
prayer, "Thy Kingdom come," continues Toynbee, implies
another kind of progress which transcends individual concerns:
The Lord*s Prayer gives an answer, in the form of a 
spiritual act, to our perplexing question how, if 
spiritual progress in Time in This World means progress 
achieved by individual souls during their brief passages 
through This World to the Other World, there can.be at 
the same time such a thing in This World as spiritual 
progress taking place on a Time-span far longer than 
that of individual lives.4
Toynbee is convinced that whatever may be their 
ephemeral worth, mundane achievements must possess spiritual 
significance for individuals and the destiny of Man if they 
are to be properly thought of as "progressive." 
wins meaning and value for Man," he says, only "in so far as 
Man cooperates in History with God, [and] this meaning and
for the
"History
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value of History must be found in some mode of being which 
transcends that of Human Life on Earth.
The value that transcends "Human Life on Earth" is,
«5
however, a distinctly human value as well, for it concerns
"All spiritualthe human actor in the creative drama of life, 
reality and therefore all spiritual value, resides in 
" says Toynbee.^
history seen solely from the standpoint of each 
individual human participant in it is "a tale told 
by an idiot, signifying nothing". . . . This 
apparently senseless "sound and fury" acquires 
spiritual meaning when Man catches in History a 
glimpse of the operation of a One True God who is 
both transcendently infinite and intimately loving, 
and who has the power and the will to take up His 
human creatures in His own range of action and mode 
of existence, in so far as they respond to His 
challenging call to act in This World as partners 
in His divine [and creative] work.7
Yet he warns that the meaning ofpersons,
Human Nature ... [is] a field in which there might 
be [as there has been] spiritual progress in Time 
extending over an unlimited number of successive 
generations of Human Life ... [in which there is] 
a growing fund of illumination and of grace.o
Thus Toynbee's progress is the spiritual progress of mankind
of an individualas a whole as well as the spiritual progress
Moreover Toynbee does not exclude material 
values from the content of progress so long as they acquire
in particular.
The mechanism for theand retain spiritual significance, 
infusion of spiritual significance is etherialization, for it 
is through etherialization that values find their way into
the otherwise meaningless processes of life.
Etherialization is unique to the human situation, 
only in the human situation do values reside, and only in the
for
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human situation could the idea of progress make sense.
Although he revives Augustinian convictions concerning 
the nature and destiny of man, Toynbee's dualism is not the 
Augustinian dichotomy of an essentially corrupt This World 
and a perfect Next, but a distinction between events in 
process of etherialization and an otherwise meaningless flux. 
Human events acquire significance insofar as they become 
infused with value, that is, insofar as they acquire a 
spiritual significance through etherialization. Value--as 
Whitehead put it--is the intrinsic reality of an event, that 
which links the event to the structure of the universe, to 
reality. In Toynbee this linkage is achieved through 
etherialization, for etherialization links the life of man 
to the Life of God. Etherialization is not escape from 
11 This World" but a transformation of it in and through the 
miracle of human personality.
Thus for Toynbee, the dualism that confronts the 
human psyche is axiological and epistemological rather than 
The world "out there" is real; events--socialontological.
and historical--are real; but they possess significance, 
that is, acquire value, only as they are brought into a 
meaningful relationship with the human psyche, 
manner they acquire a subjective relevance which enjoys
If value lies in a relation-
In this
universal significance as well. 
ship--and Toynbee believes that it does--it is a relationship 
which links particular human concerns to objective reality..
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Toynbee rejects the eighteenth century idea of 
progress for two reasons: (1) Through faulty axiology, 
ideals of perfectability were set up in terms of ephemeral— 
because culturally conditioned--value systems and imagined 
to represent genuine ideals. (2) A faulty view of the human 
situation failed to account for realities which the exagger­
ation of human rationality obscured. Perfection became, 
paradoxically, its own antithesis--an attenuation of the very 
factors which are the source of human creativity and progress.
Although Toynbee recognized these shortcomings and 
offered instead the basis for a more adequate theory of 
progress, he never actually developed a general theory of 
progress. This failure to develop a full-dress general 
theory of progress may be attributed to certain uncertainties 
on his part as to the nature of spiritual progress as well as 
to his distrust of the idea of progress in particular.
Two conflicting theories of spiritual progress are 
found in Toynbee. He presents spiritual progress as the 
restoration of souls as well as the creative emergence of 
transfigured personalities. In some respects his cliff 
climbers appear to become !lless unlike Godfl in their efforts 
to become full partners with God in the creative process.
In other respects the cliff climbers appear to return to 
heights from which they once fell rather than to gain new 
ground. In one passage Toynbee says:
In the higher religions . . . Man [has] been reendowed 
with the spiritual treasure that he . . . possessed in
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the days of primeval inefficiency and . . .• jettisoned
. . [for] material progress.9in his „ . . scramble .
Elsewhere he speaks of the Subconscious
as one of those statically perfect works of creation 
that are the Creatorfs l!stopping places'1 whereas the 
Conscious Human Personality is an infinitely imperfect 
approximation towards of Being of an incommensurably 
higher order.10
The difficulty arises from Toynbee fs effort to 
buttress a nostalgic interest in orthodox interpretations of 
Original Sin and the Fall. He invokes the anthropology of 
Father Schmidt wherein the thesis is set forth that primitive 
humanity innocently worshipped a Supreme Being in a monotheism 
that was spoiled as men achieved technical progress and fell 
into the idolatrous worship of nature or themselves 
if restoration is the goal of life, a cyclical theory is 
implied, for unless Toynbee is prepared to demonstrate that 
there will be no repetition of the Fall when Restoration is 
consummated, there can be no assurance that it will not occur 
again. Indeed, the idea of restoration is an awkward and 
essentially incongruous idea in the general context of Toynbee* s 
philosophy of history.
Yet
Toynbee fails to recognize that Augustine is the basis 
for a genuine theory of progress as well as the basis for a 
fall and restoration theory. Augustinian creationism implies 
the notion that God is the continuous creator and sustainer
This belief is germane to Toynbee, 
and his idea of etherialization suggests that man cooperates
which involves
of value and existence.
with and participates in a creative process
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personality as well as of thethe transfiguration of his own
The cliff climber struggles to gain new ground, notworld.
Transfiguration is an emergent reality which climaxes
Original sin is over-
old.
creative process--not a restoration.
come not by escape from This World but by a transfiguration
Man does not become f,less unlike God” byof This World.
returning to noble savagery, for primitive man was neither
Moreover, because Tlthe Subconscious is 
nearer to God than the Conscious Self ... as the channel
noble nor innocent.
through which the Soul is in communion with God,” it does not 
follow that man "progresses” by "regressing" back to the
This would constitute aprimordial source of his being.
withdrawal without a return, and hope for it would be by
Toynbee's own definition--a Romantic archaism.
state of innocence and communion with Supreme Being which
Toynbee ascribes to the first Homo sapiens merely describes
metaphorically the unrealized potential of a Homo sapiens
who had not yet confronted the challenge of "breakdown or
"schism of the soul" and who, for the same reason, had not
yet created higher religion, nor in "learning through
. 12
suffering" scaled the cliffs of spiritual progress.
Toynbee's etherialization proposes a progressive trans­
ference of the arena of human action from lower to higher
The original
levels beginning with the realm of the Laws of Physical Nature 
and extending through the various levels of the realms of the 
Humafi Psyche to the spiritual goal of Life which is Transfigur­
ation and communion with God Himself. By introducing Father
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Schmidt's thesis, Toynbee jeopardizes his vision of etherial- 
ization as the creative emergence of transfigured personality.
He suggests a real Adam perfect in innocence and characterizing 
the state of a primitive man who fell from grace and must now 
return to the privileged state he once possessed. Nowhere 
does Toynbee clearly reject this view. Nor does he fail to 
entertain it as a possibility. Hence there arises a certain 
ambiguity in his meaning of spiritual progress and the sig­
nificance of etherialization.
He would incur less difficulty were he to embrace the 
hypothesis that original sin is the burden of every man 
because every man is — in a sense--Adam. He would be more 
persuasive were he to view the corruption of the human situ­
ation as the result of an emerging self-awareness mythologically 
portrayed as the eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge 
of good and evil. He could reconcile his belief in Original 
Sin with his theory of progress by etherialization were he to 
picture the former as the outcome of a sense of "separateness11 
or the anxiety which emerging self-consciousness brings and 
which issues in rebellion and pride. Indeed, Toynbee could 
profitably link original sin to his idea of the "schism of 
the soul.” Psychic tensions encourage a "self" as well as 
"God" rejection.
Toynbee thus weakens his position by introducing a 
questionable anthropological theory for the purpose of 
supporting a nostalgia for orthodoxy. His position would be 
strengthened by the unequivocal affirmation of his belief in
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genuine spiritual progress and his belief in the progress of 
a higher religion which parallels the progress of human 
personality. There is a "growing fund of illumination and 
grace" in the human partner of creative process, he argues.
This conviction should give him the courage to set his eyes 
resolutely on the future.^
It is a curious and ironical fact that Toynbee unin­
tentionally suggests a doctrine of inevitable progress.. This 
is implied in the idea that "spiritual achievement and 
material achievement are antithetical" in the sense that 
etherialization proceeds in the spiritual when the material 
fails, and even as the spiritual advances material progress 
follows in its wake. Improvement of the material, however, 
encourages a breakdown because of the tendency to idolize the 
ephemeral, i.e., Original Sin, and breakdown further stimulates 
a revival of the spiritual. The creative process thus appears 
to be continuous and unyielding, and it is material as well 
as spiritual. What saves Toynbee from determinism is his 
repudiation of Saeva Necessitas and his theory of law as an 
approximate description of approximate uniformities whose 
probability is a matter of degree. Despite this clear 
suggestion of an inevitable dialectic of progress, however, 
Toynbee is unable to establish a theory of general material 
as well as spiritual advance.^
When Toynbee embraced the psychology of C. G. Jung, 
he acquired a tool whereby some of his seminal ideas might 
have become more clearly formulated. One of these was the
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idea of etherialization.^ Had Toynbee returned to this 
idea and reconsidered it in the light of the psychology he
subsequently adopted, his position might have been greatly 
clarified and strengthened, 
would have buttressed Toynbee's own recognition of the 
importance of the inner life of man in the life of society. 
It would have strengthened his conviction that this inner 
life of man is the source of a creative energy which links 
the human psyche to God rather than to the well-spring of a 
new barbarism.
Jung's theory, for example,
16Yet Toynbee* s basic categories remained Bergsonian.
The "cake of custom" is broken ,!by some privileged individual 
. . • [or] certain men."17 Bergson's closed and open 
societies are Toynbee's primitive and civilized societies. 
The essence of life is the creative activity of dynamic per­
sonalities who represent "God Himself moving upon the waters 
of the deep," and "the great mystic is the individual being 
capable of transcending the limitations imposed on the species.
Absence of a clearly articulated psychology not only 
inhibited the development of a more general theory of 
progress but failed to forestall Toynbee's extension of the 
idea of withdrawal-and-return to personified social entities. 
Toynbee's transference of a mechanism of etherialization 
from the arena of the human f ield-of-action to the life of a 
group offended friends and foes alike—to say nothing of its 
introducing psychological difficulties. He comes perilously 
close to a doctrine of the group mind—a theory patently
.tl8
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incompatible with his theory of man in particular and his 
theory of society in general.
While it is true that the human psyche is grounded
in a social reality internally as well as externally, it is
individual psychic energy which is the agent of action.
Individuals and their fields-of-action are the channels
through which the creative process must occur. A group is
an interaction of these individual fields-of-action. Its
life depends on the lives of the individual fields of action
which comprise it. Withdrawal-and-return is an individual
rather than a group phenomenon. In order to make it a group
phenomenon, Toynbee must personify his group, and he must
over-emphasize the life of his personified group. For
example, he speaks of the isolation of the social entity,
England, which withdraws with the accession of Elizabeth and,
after passing through two stages, returns around I87O or
possibly 191I|.. "The whole of this suggestion of an isolation
lasting from 1558 to 1914, or at least to I87O," laments
Toynbee *s formidable critic, Pieter Geyl, "is completely
Toynbee*s attempt to trace the withdrawal-and-
return of groups provides his critics with ample opportunity
to illustrate his "scandalous treatment of history." Toynbee
himself recognizes his difficulty when he admits that,
there are, of course, creative individuals at the back 
of all creative minorities, [which withdraw-and-return] 
on the hypothesis that some individual human being is 
the ultimate author of every creative human act.20
But he does not permit this difficulty in identifying the
;
:
i.l9untenable.
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creative members of the group that withdraws to deter him
p-i
from outlining the rhythms of groups as a whole.
So long as Toynbee writes of individuals in groups,
his theory of the withdrawal-and-return of groups is less
objectionable. This is illustrated in his view that,
the first step in any group-movement of Withdrawal- 
and-Return is the extrication of the potentially 
creative minority from the general life of the society 
to which it belongs. This step may be accomplished in 
any one of several different alternative ways....
The second stage in the movement is the stage of rela­
tive isolation in which . . . creative work is performed; 
and this stage is apt to fall into two distinct phases 
respectively. The first, or originative, phase is a 
youthful age of poetry and romance and emotional up­
heaval and intellectual ferment; the second or con­
structive phase is a comparatively sedate and ,Tgrown-upn 
age of prose and matter-of-fact and common sense. . . .
The third stage ... is the return of the creative 
minority [as a group] into communion with the general 
life of the society from which it has temporarily 22 
withdrawn in order to perform its work of creation.
By the constructive phase Toynbee means a preparatory or 
transitional stage prior to and in preparation for return to 
society in general. It is the means whereby creative indi­
viduals prepare to evoke a mimesis when the return is effected. 
So long as Toynbee maintains the locus of activity in indi­
vidual fields-of-action as creative member agents of a 
creative minority, his theory is consistent. Otherwise it 
is fraught with difficulties because it is inconsistent with 
his theory of man and society.
Other difficulties appear as the result of his attempt 
to apply essentially psychological categories to group behavior. 
This is particularly true when the idea of breakdown is too 
closely identified with a group or civilization as such rather
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than with the functioning of personalities whose behavior has
Professor Sorokin,social as well as individual implications, 
for example, shows that there was a decided decrease of
internal and external disturbances in Greece from the fourth 
through the second centuries B.C., immediately following the 
breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization which Toynbee identi­
fied with the Atheno-Pelopennesian War of 1|3l-ij-Ol| B.C.
Sorokin submits evidence to show that scientific, philosophical
and religious thought reached its peak of creative activity
He assumes, to be sure,during and after the 5th century B.C.
that the contributions of Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus were
more significant than those of the pre-Socratic philosophers
23 From a comparison of evi-excepting, perhaps, Heraclitus, 
dence submitted by both Toynbee and Sorokin, one suspects that 
the facts of history may be sufficiently complex to suffer 
the imposition of more than one plausible pattern if indeed
they do not already carry with them an implicit pattern which
the historian must impose in order to delineate them as
Appeal, therefore, must be 
An exact date for
historically significant facts, 
made to criteria other than facts alone.
breakdown, for example, is in reality a contradiction in 
Breakdown is not so much an event having simpleterms.
location in space and time as a state of affairs in the life
of men.
Toynbee's penchant for categories also aggravates his 
difficulties.^ So long as he restricts himself to the 
behavior of specific human personalities and corollary group
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phenomena his ideal type constructs serve as useful heuristic
devices. When he deals with groups exclusively, however, one
suspects that he strains his method. He finds, for example,
that Universal Churches pass through three significant phases:
the conceptive, the gestative, and parturient.
to align data to illustrate these categories he is obliged
to resort to elaborate explanations that burden rather than
29enlighten the imagination.
To the objection that Toynbee tends to personify 
group behavior may be added the objection that he does this 
to the neglect of highly relevant social and psychological
pZL
This neglect of relevant social and psychological 
theory is one of the most persistent and legitimate grounds 
for negative criticism. It suggests a certain lack of balance. 
One wishes that 11 the re were more Attic restraint and less 
Asiatic luxuriance" in ToynbeeTs "stiff-robed . . . monumental 
style," and that he had confined himself to exhaustive treat­
ment of strictly relevant material rather than taking the
liberty to digress freely into interesting but irrelevant
27poetic extravagances.
In attempting
theory.
Finally, there is the objection that some crucial
"What is culture?" asks Feibleman:definitions are neglected.
We are never told by Toynbee; although he insists 
that "the cultural element in a civilization is its 
soul and life-blood and marrow and essence and 
epitome."28
To be sure, Toynbee carefully delineates the psychological 
significance of cultural planes in the life of individuals
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and groups, but nowhere is there definitive treatment of his 
theory of culture. The problem of definition is not peculiarly 
his, but it is aggravated by his general approach and his 
poetic license.^
These questionable aspects of Toynbee's treatment of 
history do not necessarily impugn his idea of etherialization 
as a valid criterion pf progress. Yet there are legitimate 
questions about the value of the idea of etherialization as 
a criterion of progress. It does not provide a quantitative 
index. As Toynbee describes it, it is a qualitative phenomenon. 
But it stands for or isolates that qualitative character of 
growth that may be called progress. If progress means — in 
some sense--the increase and preservation of value, the idea 
of etherialization suggests the means by which progress is 
realized and more important, perhaps, the basis for a theory 
of value itself. Hence it may be thought of as a qualitative 
rather than a quantitative criterion. Moreover, by giving 
depth to the meaning of progress, it suggests the means by 
which the idea of progress itself may be more firmly reestab­
lished as a sound and legitimate ideal for Western man.
Progress is not a matter of fact demonstrably true 
or false; it is a matter of value, and value is a special 
kind of fact that possesses its reality and status by virtue 
of its significance in the human situation and its ability 
to link human concerns to cosmic reality rather than by 
virtue of its measurable verifiability. Hence quantitative 
criteria of a general progress cannot be established. Only
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the progress of particular aspects of life can be measured.
That there has been particular progress in this or
that institution or technique may be a fact, but general 
progress can be affirmed only if other requirements are 
satisfied. The question ultimately reverts to the nature and 
the content of the human situation and the conditions by which
values come into being. Yet the problem is not one of 
separating values out of verifiable facts. The distinction 
is not one of kind but of nature and degree of emphasis. 
Verifiable facts are not devoid of value nor are values 
devoid of relation to fact. The problem of progress directs 
attention to that end of the spectrum of human concerns wherein 
questions of value predominate and quantitative yardsticks 
are inappropriate. Hence Toynbee is justified in treating 
etherialization as he does—as a qualitative phenomenon that 
identifies the qualitative character of growth.
Since general progress implies a persistent quali­
tative improvement in time, only that value theory which can 
conjoin a theory of values relevant to the human situation
with a theory of the independent status of these values in
30time can support a theory of progress, 
must discover within the matrix of human experience grounds 
for a belief that values enjoy a significance extending 
beyond the limits of a solitary biological life-span or 
cultural situation. Moreover it must delineate an element 
of human history which is independent of the fluctuating 
rhythms that characterize human pehnomena. Toynbee^ criterion
A theory of progress
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of etherialization meets this condition. With assistance 
from Jungian psychology, the idea of etherialization is able 
to account for the nature, meaning, emergence, and preser­
vation of value. In short, it provides a basis for a general 
theory of progress.^
Contemporary pessimism threatens the vitality of 
Western civilization. It issues from a failure of nerve, 
and this failure is the outcome of a breakdown and disinte­
gration of fundamental Western ideals. No ideal so basically 
represents the character of Western ethos as does the ideal 
of progress, the idea and the belief that an amelioration of 
man's lot in This World is both possible and worthwhile.. Fate 
of the ideal of progress parallels the fate of contemporary 
civilization itself. This is why the contemporary liberal 
clings to what he instinctively believes to be the necessary 
condition for its survival--devotion to the betterment of man 
by those twin instruments of reason and science which have
demonstrably proven themselves.
Often overlooked in Toynbee is his essential optimism. 
Toynbee's exhaustive efforts to find a way back to solid 
ground have been viewed as the quest of a religious mystic. 
What is not fully appreciated is that the alternative to the
11 every thingness" of Toynbee's mysticism is liable to be the
Toynbee's optimism centers in"nothingness" of the skeptic, 
his belief that human history is not meaningless and that 
creative advance is a universal human possibility anchored
He finds that creativity is anin the life of God Himself.
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individual and spiritual phenomenon having only incidental 
relationship to the particular level of material culture.
In this respect Toynbee goes hard against the main stream of 
Western liberalism.
Contemporary social science is preoccupied with 
quantitative studies of human relations and achievements in 
the hope that the scientific method so applied will yield the 
felicitous results in the area of human relations that it has
This has encouraged 
(1) Progress is the measurable
enjoyed in the mastery of physical nature, 
two general views of progress: 
discovery by science of the growth or quantitative advance
of this or that culture trait or the means to secure it.
(2) When the inadequacy of this view of progress becomes 
evident, progress and the axiology which supports it become 
a purely subjective phenomenon unrelated to fact, 
this absolute relativization of value, however, there remains 
implicit the assumption that because the growth of material 
culture is an established fact, contemporary man is somehow 
superior to his predecessors in his thought and morals as 
well as in his tools and capacity for material culture.
Beneath
Toynbee*s great contribution is that he reexamines 
those intuitions which gave rise to Western civilization.
He recognizes the basic role of religion in the life of man. 
This recognition restores a dimension to his thought which
He demonstratescontemporary social thought tends to neglect, 
that the fate of man is linked to the quality of life within.
His idea of etherialization suggests a basis for a
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From the lessonsreconstruction of the ideal of progress, 
of the past, he constructs a vision of the future.
Whatever may be his
errors, his vision is sublime and his thoughts a lofty 
inspiration for a generation that has lost its way.
His
view is forward rather than backward.
296
CHAPTER IX
Footnotes
1Toynbee, A Study, VII, op0 cit., 561. 
2Ibid;, p. 562.
^Ibld.. p. 561^.
^Ibid.. pp. 562ff.
5Ibld.. p. 756.
Ibid., p. 562.
7Ibid., pp. 5l2f. Cf. pp. 756-58.
6
8Ibid., p. 563.
^Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., pp. IjULf* ^-s
not very easy to discover what Toynbee really does believe In: 
in progress, but not in 'the superstition of Progress';1 
(0. H. K. Spate, "Reflections on Toynbee1 s A Study of History: 
A Geographer* s View," Historical Studies: Australia and New 
Zealand [Melbourne: University of Melbourne Press], V [May, 
1953J, 330.)
■^Toynbee, A Study, VII, op, cit 498.• ;
11Ibid., pp. 76lff. Toynbee refers to Father Pater w. 
Schmidt, The Origin and Growth of Religion, trans. H..J,
Rose (London: Methuen, 192lT. In his later work, An Historian's 
Approach to Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 195o), 
Toynbee expresses the view that mankind originally engaged In 
polytheistic nature worship followed by an idolatrous worship 
of Man as the parochial community, the ecumentical community, 
or the self-sufficient philosopher respectively. Yet a con­
tinued uncertainty characterizes Toynbee's observation that 
"what Man's original religion may have been is . . . 
under debate. . . . The evidence existing . . • [doesj not 
seem to warrant either the rejection or the adoption of Father 
W, Schmidt's theory." (Ibid., p. 20.) Toynbee sustains an
297
interest in Schmidtfs hypothesis by suggesting that Man may 
not have begun Nature worship until he had acquired some 
measure of control or imagined control of Nature.
12 pp. 200 and £08, n, 3.Ibid • 9
13Ibld.. p. 563.
14Ibid., p. 701.
"^Letter from Arnold J. Toynbee, December 15, 1955.
16Professor Edward D. Myers, however, is certain 
"that Toynbee would have arrived at about the same idea had 
Bergson never written [and] he would have expressed them 
differently had Jung never written.*1 (Letter from Edward D. 
Myers, December 22, 1955.)
17Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality agg. 
Religion, trans. R. Ashley Andra, Cloudesley Brereton, 
Horsfall Carter (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935), P*
l8Ibid., p. 209. Cf. Henri Bergson, Creative 
Evolution, trans. A. Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt & Co.,
1911), p. 68. For an excellent discussion of Bergsonian 
influence, see Ernst Zahn, Toynbee und das Problem der 
Geschichte (Zurich: Westdeutscher Verlag, Koln und Opladen, 
1954), P. 23. Bergson and Toynbee both envision a recal­
citrant world whose challenges life must confront and surmount
Both rewrite inin order that creativity may continue. , .
dramatic terms the individualistic creationism in Augustine.
In the perennial "struggle between Greek eternal ism and 
Augustinian creationism," both choose the latter. Concerning 
a treatment of Greek eternalism vis A vis Augustinian 
creationism see Hugh Miller, An Historical Introduc on—o 
Modern Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Co., 194« )* PP» 3 •
19Pieter Geyl, et al.t The Pattern of the Past (Boston: 
The Beacon Press, 1949), p. 35. Cf. pp. 31-36. Also cf. 
Toynbee* s own treatment of the subject in A Study, III. 
op. cit 250-63.• 9
^°Toynbee, A Study^ III, op. cit 365, n. 1.:• 9
21Ibid PP. 333-90.• 9
22Ibid PP. 366-68.• 9
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views philosophers in general and Plato in particular a 
spokesmen of decadence.
^"This tendency to categorize encouraged one of 
ToynbeeJs outspoken dissenters to remark that Toynbee was 
11 suffering from a hardening of the categories.11
^Hans Morgenthau, lfToynbee and the Historical 
Imagination,” Encounter, March, 1955. If one wishes to 
extend Toynbee's use of "categories" to its ultimate applin. 
cation in his **carving out" of civilizations, the objection 
might be made that his delineation of civilizations is some­
what inconsistent; that for the Hellenic, for example, he 
uses language as the touchstone, for the Iranic, government; 
and for the Hindu, religion. The major characteristics which 
Toynbee--and Spengler as well—ascribe to a given phase of 
their civilizations, Northrop, Sorokin, Berdyaev, and Kroeber 
ascribe to certain types of culture. See Pitirim Sorokin, 
Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (Boston: The Beacon 
Press, 1950), pp. 2lSf., and 292; and Alfred L. Kroeber, 
Configurations of Culture Growth (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1944)* 801ff. Kroeber refuses 
to delineate civilizations as such and limits his analyses to 
,!configurations** of the superorganic in "fundamental patterns 
in space and time. In some respects, Toynbee tends to develop 
a sociology of knowledge in which--as Sorokin puts it, mental 
production is . . . conditioned, molded, and patterned by 
each civilization ... in its own way. * (Social Philosophies, 
op. cit.. p. 306.) In short, he resorts to the use of 
Spengler*s and Danilevsky's "prime symbol." Hellenic civili­
zation becomes predominantly aesthetic, Indie, religious, 
and the Western, technological. Although Toynbee argues that 
"Civilization is not a thing in itself," (III, op. cit.,
P. 383), he follows this with a concession to Spengler that 
"a mechanical penchant is as characteristic of Western civili­
zation as an aestheic penchant is of the Hellenic Civilization 
or a religious penchant of the Indie and the Hindu."
(Ill, op. cit... 387.)
°This criticism may be found in the following: 
Zahn, op. cit.. p. 20; Barnes, "Review of Toynbee's A Study 
of History." American Sociological Review. XII (1947), 4&0; 
H. E. Barnes and Howard Becker, Social Thought from Lore to 
Science (Washington: Harran Press, 1952), I 
Sorokin, "Toynbee's Philosophy of History,"
History. XII (September, 191|.0), 374~87j and Spate, op. cit 
who objects that "such geographers as he does quote^-they
, 764; Pitirim 
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number five—belong mainly to the determinist school whose 
findings are definitely not accepted by a great ^o^ity 
modern geographers, yet the subject is not an eso >
nor are Humbolt, Reclus, Vidal de la Blache, „
Mackinder [whom Toynbee ignores] entirely obscur ,
(Ibid,, p. 303) and although like Toynbee, Burckhardt tried 
to write history as "historical psychology, no 
Toynbee mention him.
27Sir Ernest Barker, "Dr. Toynbee's §tudy_of Htstory: 
A Review ” International Affairs, XXXI » *
For other expressions of this negative critic! » , d
various reviews collected by Montague F. Ashley- 
Toynbee and History (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 195 ).
28James K. Feibleman, ^Revival_oO®§!^
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1-94°), P- 
Feibleman quotes Toynbee, A Study , VI, » . , * tudv
Edward Fiess also observes that a long F , „
could be made of the key terms in Toynbee s vocabulary^ 
("Toynbee as Poet " Journal of the History of Ideas, XVI 
[April, 1955], 278.)
2<^See Ashley-Montagu, op. cit 
tion of contradictory evaluations of Toynbee, 
theological critiques have been omitted, howeve , ,
example, those by Nichols and Harbison.
3°Tndeed if value is the intrinsic reality of an 
event, a limitation whose structure poaaeaaea wa^into
ontological anchorage, a limitation which n ^itevery Realized actual occasion-as Whitehead believed--it 
would appear that the main burden of a theof{ °f 
would be the establishment of an axiology which confirme 
this doctrine.
for the best collec- 
Some important 
for
• f
31There are many value-coordinates that may be con-
For a general theory of progress,sidered in relation to time, 
however, that value must be isolated which evidences a 
persistent advance. Toynbee finds it in the relation of 
religion and human personality. Naturalistic theory cannot 
establish and sustain a general theory of progress. "Whether 
there is or is not a value on the whole in respect of which 
history on the whole can be said to move up or down is . . . 
highly ques tionable7*" (Ralph Barton Perry, Realms of Value 
[Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951+], PP. l+02f.)
Perry does not find it in religion as does Toynbee and if he 
does not find it there, it is not to be found elsewhere.
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